Oil and Gas in America’s Arctic Ocean:
Past Problems Counsel Precaution
Michael LeVine, Peter Van Tuyn, Layla Hughes*
“Although it can be a forbidding moonscape, the Arctic is also varied, majestic, serene, memorably beautiful and occasionally gentle.
The far north is not only a prowling bear, a battering storm and vicious cold, but also a fat bumblebee buzzing among delicately yellow arctic poppies.”1
“I believe there will not be an oil spill.”2

I. INTRODUCTION
For most of history, the U.S. Arctic Ocean was protected from
large-scale industrial activities by sea ice, remoteness, and plentiful resources in other, more accessible regions. That reality is rapidly changing
as receding sea ice and the growing world demand for resources have led
to increased corporate interest in the Arctic Ocean. This industrial pressure occurs against the backdrop of a swiftly changing climate, an absence of holistic planning for the future of the region, missing scientific
information, and a lack of proven technologies.
The potential for industrial development in the America’s Arctic
Ocean has generated substantial controversy. At the center of this controversy are a series of decisions made by the federal government to allow offshore oil and gas activities in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas.
* Michael LeVine is Pacific Senior Counsel for Oceana, an international nonprofit organization
dedicated to maintaining and restoring ocean ecosystems. He is based in Juneau, AK. Peter Van
Tuyn is an environmental attorney with the law firm Bessenyey & Van Tuyn, L.L.C., located in
Anchorage, AK. Layla Hughes is an attorney and founder of Arctic Policy Consulting. The authors
owe a debt of gratitude to Karen Schmidt, Lisa Marrioti, Erik Grafe, Susan Murray, Chris Krenz,
Leah Donahey, Kristen Miller, Brian McLane, and Cindy Shogan for their contributions to, and
support for, this article.
1. Dr. William E. Taylor, Foreword to FRED BRUEMMER, THE ARCTIC WORLD 1 (1985).
2. John M. Broder, Shell Is Likely to Receive Permits for Oil Drilling Off Alaska, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/science/earth/interior-department-will-likelyallow-shell-to-drill-in-arctic.html?_r=0 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar).
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These approvals have greatly expanded the presence of multinational oil
companies in the U.S. Arctic Ocean. Prior to 2003, companies held almost no leases in the Chukchi or Beaufort seas, and no exploration drilling had been conducted since the early 1990s. Over the last decade, more
than three million acres of leases have been sold, and subsidiaries of
Royal Dutch Shell have been awarded permits to conduct exploration
drilling. The leasing and exploration-related approvals have generated
opposition and litigation, and activities undertaken pursuant to those approvals have created direct risk to the marine environment.
In this Article, we provide context for the controversy facing government agencies charged with making decisions about the future of
America’s Arctic Ocean. We then distill themes that, if addressed, could
help further a lasting solution for this region that respects its natural and
human values while crafting a reasonable path forward for decisions
about development. First, this Article offers background about the region, the threats facing it, and some of the challenges in managing the
natural resources there. Second, it provides an overview of the legal
framework through which the United States government makes decisions
about whether and under what conditions offshore oil and gas activities
should occur. Third, this Article highlights decisions about Arctic Ocean
resources that have been made pursuant to that legal framework and discusses the resulting court challenges.
Based on that review, we conclude that the controversy has resulted
in large part from: (1) the failure to ensure necessary preparedness; (2)
the lack of community involvement; and (3) the need for more specific
mandates to ensure that management decisions about resources in important and unique places, like the Arctic, are based on sufficient science,
precaution, and an equitable balancing of costs and benefits. This Article
identifies specific problems with the existing law that Congress could
address to improve decision making, and finally, it highlights steps that
federal agencies could take without congressional action to improve preparedness, community involvement, and the rules governing decisions
about Arctic Ocean resources.
II. AMERICA’S ARCTIC OCEAN
The U.S. Arctic Ocean, as defined by the Arctic Research and Policy Act, includes the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi seas, extending as far
south as the Aleutian Islands and north to the end of the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone, 200 nautical miles from the northern coast of Alaska.3
3. Arctic Research and Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4111 (2012).
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This vast and diverse region of the world’s ocean provides vital habitat
for countless mammals, birds, and fish, and it supports vibrant communities and opportunities for subsistence. It is also changing as a result of
climate warming and ocean acidification. The southern region—the Bering Sea—supports some of the world’s largest fisheries and is part of a
major industrial shipping route.4 By contrast, the northern region—the
Chukchi and Beaufort seas—have been largely insulated from large-scale
industrial activity until relatively recently.
This Article focuses on the federal waters of the U.S. Beaufort and
Chukchi Seas—which extend from three to 200 miles offshore—because
these areas are at the heart of the debate about whether and how to move
forward with oil and gas activities in the U.S. Arctic Ocean. In this Part,
we discuss the unique nature of northern Arctic seas and their importance
to wildlife and coastal communities; the state of scientific information
about the U.S. Arctic Ocean; and the dual challenges posed by changing
climate and growing industrial pressure.

4. See infra Part II.C.3.b–c (discussing shipping and commercial fishing).
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A. The Arctic Ocean Is Unique and Important
The coasts along the Beaufort and Chukchi seas are sparsely populated, with eight villages whose residents are predominately Iñupiat Eskimo.5 The Iñupiat people have lived in the region and depended on the
Arctic ecosystems to provide fish, whales, walrus, seals, seabirds, and
other resources for thousands of years.6 For the local people, subsistence
foods provide a substantial amount of everyday nutrition, comprising up
to 50% of total calories consumed in U.S. Arctic communities. These
foods also provide health benefits; the proportion of daily intake is inversely related to the risk of developing metabolic disorders.7 Arctic
communities have been experiencing a rise in chronic diseases such as
diabetes and cancer, making the availability of subsistence foods all the
more important.8 In addition to food, subsistence resources provide materials for clothing, boat-building, and other fundamental needs.9
Subsistence practices also form the basis of cultural, social, and
spiritual values in the region.10 “Subsistence activities are assigned the
highest cultural value by the Iñupiat and provide a sense of identity in
addition to the substantial economic and nutritional contributions.”11 The
sharing and trading of subsistence foods reinforces the strong relationships within and among families and communities.12 Because the most
important subsistence resources—whales, for example—are migratory,
subsistence activities can be concentrated in time and space.

5. Harry Brower Jr. & Taqulik Hepa, Subsistence Hunting Activities and the Inupiat Eskimo,
CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. (Fall 1998), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survivalquarterly/united-states/subsistence-hunting-activities-and-inupiat-es.
6. Id.
7. Aaron Wernham, Iñupiat Health and Proposed Alaskan Oil Development: Results of the
First Integrated Health Impact Assessment/Environmental Impact Statement for Proposed Oil Development on Alaska’s North Slope, 4 ECOHEALTH 500, 506–07 (2007).
8. Id. at 500, 504.
9. Brower & Hepa, supra note 5.
10. Id.
11. See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. ET AL., EFFECTS OF OIL AND GAS
ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN: SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
VOLUME I, AT 3-59, 2-60, 3-157 (2013) [hereinafter NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS], available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/permits/eis/arctic_sdeis_vol1.pdf.
12. Brower & Hepa, supra note 5.
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In addition to subsistence, Arctic waters are also of vital importance
to some of the world’s most iconic wildlife species, including icedependent polar bears, walruses, and ice seals. Bowhead, beluga, and
gray whales spend some or all of their time in these waters.13 Millions of
birds, representing more than 100 species, migrate from nearly every
corner of the world to nest and feed in the Arctic each summer.14 These
bird species include some that are protected under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), such as the Steller’s and spectacled eiders; candidate
species under the ESA, such as the yellow-billed loon and Kittlitz’s
murrelet; and other species of conservation concern, including Pacific
black brant.15 More than 100 fish species live in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, including Arctic grayling, Arctic char, all five species of Pacific salmon, capelin, herring, and various species of cod and sculpin.16
The “Arctic environment is highly variable both physically and biologically.”17 Thus, what could appear at quick glance to be a homogenous landscape of snow and ice is actually a vibrant web of important
places that change dramatically with the seasons. Phytoplankton and ice
algae form the basis of the food web, which is characterized by short
food chains, seasonal periods of high productivity, and migration.18
Habitats in the Beaufort Sea differ from those in the Chukchi, and within
each sea there is significant variance among areas. At the same time,
there are commonalities. Consistent ice leads and polynas—openings in
the ice—and the ice edge, which grows and contracts over great distances seasonally, are among the most important areas to many species.19
Migration corridors and certain high-productivity habitats along the seafloor are also among the most important areas. The concentrated seasonal
and spatial nature of biological resources in the Arctic and the simple
food chain may make the ocean ecosystem particularly sensitive to im13. NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 3–92.
14. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ARCTIC LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION COOPERATIVE (2010),
available at http://library.fws.gov/LCC/Arctic.pdf.
15. Id.
16. NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 3-59; N. PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL,
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR FISH RESOURCES OF THE ARCTIC MANAGEMENT AREA 56 (2009)
[hereinafter FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN], http://www.npfmc.org/wp-content/PDFdocuments/
fmp/Arctic/ArcticFMP.pdf.
17. Leslie Holland-Bartels & Jonathan J. Kolak, Oil-Spill Risk, Response, and Impact, in AN
EVALUATION OF THE SCIENCE NEEDS TO INFORM DECISIONS ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHUKCHI AND BEAUFORT SEAS, ALASKA 109, 151 (Leslie HollandBartels & Brenda Pierce eds., 2011) [hereinafter USGS REPORT], available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1370/pdf/circ1370.pdf
18. FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 16, at 43, 53–54.
19. NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 3-7.
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pacts from climate change and activities such as oil and gas exploration
and development.
In addition, the Arctic region plays a critical role in regulating the
global climate system,20 including weather patterns in the northern hemisphere.21 The colder Arctic is a sink for heat from the rest of the world,
and the movement of heat from the tropics to the poles affects weather
patterns. Storm tracks depend on the position, strength, and orientation of
the jet stream,22 and fluctuations in the polar regions affect the location
and speed of the jet stream, which affects weather patterns, especially at
mid-latitudes.23
B. Lack of Scientific Information About the Arctic Ocean
Though scientists know that the Arctic Ocean is important to the
people and wildlife of the region and as part of the climate system, there
is a widely acknowledged lack of basic scientific information about the
region. In 2005, the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) noted
that the Arctic is “the least studied and most poorly understood area on
Earth” and that, in particular, “[t]he Arctic Ocean is the least well known
ocean on the planet. We know more about the topography of the planets
Venus and Mars than we do about the bathymetry of the Arctic Ocean.”24
Since the USARC made that statement, scientific efforts have increased
in the Arctic, and more is known now than a decade ago. Still, there are
substantial information gaps, and, as explained below, the government
continues to rely on decisions that were made under conditions of considerable uncertainty. This lack of basic scientific information creates
significant hurdles to effective management of human activities.
Scientists recognize that the recent loss of sea ice during the summer months is fundamentally changing Arctic Ocean ecosystems, yet
relatively little is known about the abundance and distribution of com-

20. Gordon McBean et al., Arctic Climate: Past and Present, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT 21, 32–34 (Carolyn Symon et al. eds., 2005), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu/
pages/scientific.html.
21. Mark C. Serreze et al., Perspectives on the Arctic’s Shrinking Sea-Ice Cover, 315 SCIENCE
1533, 1536 (2007).
22. Cristina L. Archer & Ken Caldeira, Historical Trends in the Jet Streams, 35 GEOPHYSICAL
RES. LETTERS 1, 5 (2008).
23. See OCEANA ET AL., AS GOES THE ARCTIC, SO GOES THE PLANET 15–16 (2008), available
at
http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/o/fileadmin/oceana/uploads/pacific/ArcticPetition-FINALlowres.pdf.
24. U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT ON GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC
RESEARCH 2005, at 1, 6–7 (2005), available at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/goals/usarc_goals
_2005.pdf.
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mon species, much less how the food webs work in this region.25 As the
USARC noted, “Fundamental baseline scientific information is lacking
for living resources in much of the region, and basic biological aspects,
such as the ecology of the area, and the spatial habitat of flora and fauna
that might be at risk from spills are poorly known.”26 In fact, in the 2008
environmental impact statement (EIS) analyzing the potential impacts
from Oil and Gas Lease Sale 193 in the Chukchi Sea, the Department of
the Interior explicitly recognized that there is significant missing information about even the most basic parameters for every one of the largest
and most conspicuous animals in the ecosystem—all fish, marine mammals, and birds—which, in other regions, are typically the most studied
animals.27 The missing information for these species included abundance, distribution, and life history. As a result of this missing information, the government concluded, among other things, that it could not
determine the potential level of effects oil and gas development could
have on marine mammals.28 Accordingly, a court-ordered supplemental
EIS for the lease sale included a lengthy appendix chronicling the instances in which the agency acknowledged that it did not have data potentially relevant to the effects of oil and gas activity in the Chukchi

25. See SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC 8, 10, 14–15, 24, 58–61 (2004),
available at http://www.amap.no/arctic-climate-impact-assessment-acia; see also NAT’L MARINE
FISHERIES SERV. ALASKA REGION, FINAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS FOR THE ARCTIC
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN AND AMENDMENT 29 TO THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR
BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS KING AND TANNER CRABS 79–90, 99–105, 192 (2009) [hereinafter
ARCTIC FMP EA], available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NOAA-NMFS2009-0042-0403.
26. U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION RECOMMENDS
STEPS TO EXPANDED U.S. FUNDING FOR ARCTIC/SUBARCTIC OIL SPILL RESEARCH 2 (2010), available at http://issuu.com/wickcommunications/docs/2010.5.26_usarc_oilspill_white_paper_finalcrmt/
2.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 297–302 (discussing litigation challenging the decision
to hold Lease Sale 193 in the Chukchi Sea).
28. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., CHUKCHI SEA PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE
193 AND SEISMIC SURVEYING ACTIVITIES IN THE CHUKCHI SEA I, at II-42, II-45, IV-269, IV-274
(2007), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/
Alaska_Region/Environment/Environmental_Analysis/2007-026-Vol%20I.pdf (“[B]ecause of the
lack of data on marine mammal distributions and habitat use in offshore areas of the Chukchi Sea, it
is uncertain what the level of effects would be in offshore area.”).
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Sea.29 The agency has made similar acknowledgments for data gaps in
the Beaufort Sea.30
The lack of baseline science has also been highlighted by several
other prominent local and federal agencies as well as by international
bodies. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) has identified information gaps for nearly every species in the Arctic Ocean.31 In its
comments on the Draft Proposed 2010–15 Five-Year Leasing Program,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recommended using a precautionary approach, delaying oil and gas activities in
the Chukchi and Beaufort seas until more information is available to
support sustainable management.32 The final report of the National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (National Commission) echoed this sentiment, observing that the
“[s]cientific understanding of environmental conditions . . . in areas proposed for more drilling, such as the Arctic, is inadequate.”33 “The same is
29. See CHUKCHI SEA PLANNING AREA, OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 193 IN THE CHUKCHI SEA,
ALASKA: FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOL. I, APPENDIX A (2011)
[hereinafter
CHUKCHI
LEASE
SALE
193
FINAL
SEIS],
available
at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Enviro
nment/Environmental_Analysis/2011-041v1.pdf.
30. See, e.g., MINERALS MGMT. SERV., PROPOSED OCS LEASE SALE 202, BEAUFORT SEA
PLANNING AREA 109 (2006), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/BOEM_
Newsroom/Library/Publications/2006/2006_EA_202.pdf (noting lack of data on cumulative impacts
of development on polar bears); id. at 55–56 (noting that the impacts of an oil spill are uncertain).
31. See, e.g., Anthony R. DeGrange & Lyman Thorsteinson, Ecological and Subsistence Context, in USGS REPORT, supra note 17, at 41, 59 (For marine mammals generally, “seasonal, annual,
and geographic variability in diet are poorly quantified and foraging areas are poorly described . . . . Population enumeration is poor, even non-existent, for many [marine mammal] species,
and relatively good for a few. Without information on stock structure, however, which is poorly
known for many species but fundamental to management, data are difficult to interpret even for
species where abundance estimates exist.”); Deborah R. Hutchinson & Richard C. Ferrero, Marine
Mammals and Anthropogenic Noise, in USGS REPORT, supra note 17, at 165, 187 (“There is a basic
lack of information about ice seals. Key information about the abundance, distribution, and vital
aspects of ice seals is incomplete.”); DeGrange & Thorsteinson, supra, at 69 (regarding fish,
“[i]nformation about status and trends, habitat requirements, relative distribution and abundance, and
knowledge of life history stages . . . is incomplete and unavailable for large expanses of Arctic
nearshore and shelf waters . . . .”).
32. See Letter from Jane Lubchenco, Ph.D., Under Sec’y of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, to S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Dir., Minerals Mgmt. Serv. 5 (Sept. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.peer.org/assets/docs/noaa/09_12_10_NOAA_Comments_on_MMS_5_Year_Plan.pdf.
33. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING vii (2011) [hereinafter DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOOILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf. In the wake of the explosion of the
Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico, President Obama created the National Commission on
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. The Commission was “an independent,
nonpartisan entity, directed to provide a thorough analysis and impartial judgment. The President
charged the Commission to determine the causes of the disaster, and to improve the country’s ability
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true of the human and natural impacts of oil spills,” as well as the impacts of routine oil and gas operations.34 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, an international project of the Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science Committee, highlighted basic surveys and monitoring as well as ecosystem-based research as some of the highest priority
research actions needed for Arctic marine waters.35 Further, both the
North Slope Borough and Northwest Arctic Borough (the local governments in the U.S. Arctic, approximately equivalent to counties) have
called for better baseline science to guide decisions, and Senator Mark
Begich (D-AK) has introduced legislation calling for additional Arctic
research and coordination.36
Where basic information about the marine ecosystem exists, much
of it is old, spotty, and sparse. For example, the 2008 Environmental Assessment for the Arctic Fishery Management Plan states that “data [is]
scarce for estimating the abundance and biomass of fishes in the Alaskan
Arctic.”37 The review of potential data sources indicated that surveys for
fish have occurred about every fifteen to twenty years but typically over
different regions. Even if those surveys over the past sixty years were
combined, which would be inappropriate due to different sampling
methodologies and other reasons, there are still major areas of the U.S.
Arctic Ocean shelf region that have yet to be surveyed.
Despite harsh and changing conditions, progress is being made.
Various private and public entities have recently started scientific research programs in the Arctic Ocean to fill some of the data gaps. For
example, the Chukchi Sea Environmental Studies Program (CSESP),
funded by ConocoPhilips, Shell, and Statoil, is a multi-year, multito respond to spills, and to recommend reforms to make offshore energy production safer.” Id. at vi.
The Commission held hearings, produced working papers, and ultimately concluded its work with
the publication of the Deepwater Horizon Report.
34. Id. at vii; see also Letter from Jane Lubchenco, supra note 32, at 9 (noting that “[t]here are
also gaps in our understanding of how some species utilize habitat in the Arctic and how behavioral
responses to seismic airguns may or may not exclude marine mammal from these habitats, particularly in the face of potentially increasing levels of exploration and development.”).
35. See Harald Loeng et al., Marine Systems, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra
note 20, at 453, 522. The International Arctic Science Committee is “a non-governmental
organisation [sic] that aims to encourage, facilitate and promote cooperation in all aspects of Arctic
research in all countries engaged in Arctic research and in all areas of the Arctic region.” INT’L
ARCTIC SCI. COMM., http://www.iasc.info/ (last visited May 29, 2014).
36. See, e.g., Letter from Reggie Joule, Mayor, Nw. Arctic Borough, to Michael S. Rolland,
Chief, Leasing Section, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt. (Nov. 18, 2013); Arctic Ocean Research
and Science Policy Review Act of 2009, S. 1562, 111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s1562rs/pdf/BILLS-111s1562rs.pdf; Arctic Research,
Monitoring, and Observing Act of 2013, S. 1344, 113th Cong. (2013).
37. ARCTIC FMP EA, supra note 25, at 99.
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discipline marine science research program collecting information on
physical oceanography, ocean acidification, atmospheric conditions, sediments, benthic communities, plankton ecology, fish, seabirds, marine
mammals, and underwater acoustics.38 The purpose of the study is to
provide baseline information that can be used by the government in its
analysis and management of industrial activities.39 In addition, Shell and
the North Slope Borough are working together under a five-year collaborative science agreement in order to expand the baseline knowledge of
the Arctic ecosystem, including human health, social, and cultural conditions.40
Other entities are working to synthesize existing information. For
example, the North Pacific Research Board (NPRB), the National Science Foundation (NSF) Office of Polar Programs, and the North Pacific
Marine Research Institute (NPMRI) are synthesizing arctic science in a
project called the “Pacific Marine Arctic Regional Synthesis of the
Northern Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas” (PacMARS), and BOEM
and NOAA scientists are leading a somewhat different synthesis project
known as the “Synthesis of Arctic Research” (SOAR).41 Several nongovernmental organizations have worked collaboratively to collect available scientific information, use it to identify important areas in the U.S.
Arctic Ocean, and provide that information to government decision makers.42

38. CHUKCHI SEA ENVTL. STUDIES PROGRAM, http://www.chukchiscience.com/ (last visited
May 29, 2014).
39. Id.
40. Press Release, Shell, North Slope Borough, Shell to Collaborate on Science (Oct. 28,
2010), available at http://www.shell.us/aboutshell/projects-locations/alaska/events-news/10282010science.html.
41. See, e.g., PAC. MARINE ARCTIC REG’L SYNTHESIS, http://pacmars.cbl.umces.edu/ (last
visited May 29, 2014); SYNTHESIS OF ARCTIC RESEARCH (SOAR), http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/soar/
(last visited May 29, 2014).
42. See generally Letter from Nat’l Audubon Soc’y et al., to Tommy Beaudreau, Dir., Bureau
of Ocean Energy Mgmt. (Dec. 3, 2013) available at http://ak.audubon.org/sites/default/files/
documents/chukchi_call_comments_and_appendices_3dec2013.pdf (“While we recommend against
proceeding with the lease sale at this time, our comments focus on providing BOEM with information and analysis necessary to follow through with a reasonable approach to targeted leasing
separate and apart from the valid reasons not to hold the lease sale.”); Melanie A. Smith, Arctic
Marine Synthesis: Atlas of the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, AUDUBON ALASKA,
http://ak.audubon.org/arctic-marine-synthesis-atlas-chukchi-and-beaufort-seas (last visited May 29,
2014).
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C. The Triple Threat: Climate Change, Acidification, and
Industrialization
The Arctic region is changing. Climate change is resulting in substantial warming, and marine absorption of carbon dioxide is causing
oceans to become more acidic. At the same time, industrial activity is
increasing in the Arctic Ocean. Together, these changes may have substantial effects on the people and ecosystems in the region. As the interagency working group created by President Obama to address Arctic issues explained,
The U.S. Arctic is experiencing rapid, sustained change, and those
changes are expected to continue into the coming decades due to
climate change, resource extraction, and increasing human activities. Terrestrial, freshwater, and marine ecosystems as well as
broader environmental, cultural, and economic trends in the Arctic
will be affected.43

This section summarizes the changes that are occurring in the U.S. Arctic
and the risks that are created by those changes.
1. Climate Change
The Arctic is warming roughly twice as fast as the rest of the
world.44 The more rapid temperature increase, known as “Arctic amplification,” is due in part to a number of processes known as feedbacks.45
Most importantly, warming is causing snow and sea ice to melt. Snow
and sea ice reflect solar energy, and as it melts, new areas of ocean and
land open; these darker areas absorb substantially more energy than the
ice-covered areas. Once it is absorbed, this energy is converted to heat,
which warms the Arctic.46
43. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC ENERGY DEV. &
PERMITTING IN ALASKA, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC 8 (2013)
[hereinafter INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. REPORT], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/upload/
ArcticReport-03April2013PMsm.pdf.
44. See Henry Huntington et al., Introduction, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT,
supra note 20, at 1, 3–23. In addition, the shape of the troposphere—the atmospheric layer over the
Earth’s surface—causes the Arctic to warm faster than other parts of the planet. Because the troposphere is thinner in the Arctic, less energy is necessary to warm it there than would be required to
warm the much thicker atmospheric layer in the tropics. See Vladimir M. Kattsov et al., Future
Climate Change: Modeling and Scenarios for the Arctic, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT,
supra note 20, at 99, 106. Finally, lower evaporation rates leave more energy available to warm the
atmosphere in the Arctic. Since a smaller fraction of energy goes to evaporation at the poles, more
energy goes directly to heating the atmosphere. See id. at 126.
45. Huntington et al., supra note 44, at 12.
46. See generally All About Sea Ice, Thermodynamics: Albedo, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA
CTR., http://nsidc.org/cryosphere/seaice/processes/albedo.html (last visited May 29, 2014).
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In 2012, the seasonal minimum sea ice extent in the Arctic reached
a record low.47 The years 2007 through 2012 represent the six smallest
sea ice extents on record.48 The rate of sea ice disappearance exceeds
even the most dramatic predictions from only a few years ago; if it continues at its current pace, the Arctic Ocean will be ice free in the summer
by 2017.49 Climate change in the Arctic is also contributing to increased
storms, sea level rise, melting permafrost, and coastal erosion.50
The changes in the Arctic have implications for the rest of the
world. For example, the Arctic plays an important role in driving currents across all oceans, and as the Arctic warms, currents could change.51
Rapid Arctic warming also may be tied to high-impact, extreme weather
events in the United States and Europe.52 In addition, melting glacial ice
caused by warming contributes to global sea-level rise, and the feedbacks
tied to melting sea ice contribute to increased warming throughout the
world.53
The changes in the Arctic also have significant effects locally. The
loss of sea ice affects Arctic species by altering the food web and reducing habitat for ice-dependent species such as polar bears, walruses, and
ice seals that depend on sea ice for feeding, breeding, and giving birth.54
Ringed seals, for example, depend on sea ice for resting, pupping, mating, molting, and feeding. Increased temperatures and loss of protective
47. Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR.
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-recordseasonal-minimum/. The record minimum is compared to years since 1979, which is when satellite
data became available. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Wieslaw Maslowski, Jaclyn Clement Kinney, Matthew Higgins & Andrew Roberts, The Future of Arctic Sea Ice, 40 ANN. REV. OF EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 625 (2012); James E.
Overland & Muyin Wang, When Will the Summer Arctic Be Nearly Sea Ice Free?, 40 GEOPHYSICAL
RES. LETTERS 2097 (2013); Quirin Schiermeier, Ice Loss Shifts Arctic Cycles, NATURE (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.nature.com/news/ice-loss-shifts-arctic-cycles-1.11387.
50. See generally Huntington et al., supra note 44.
51. See generally id.; see also McBean et al., supra note 20, at 22–33.
52. Andrew Freedman, Arctic Warming Is Altering Weather Patterns, Study Shows, CLIMATE
CENT. (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/arctic-warming-is-altering-weatherpatterns-study-shows; see also Jennifer A. Francis & Stephen J. Vavrus, Evidence Linking Arctic
Amplification to Extreme Weather in Mid-Latitudes, 39 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1 (2012).
53. Holli Riebeek, Arctic Melt Raises Sea Levels and Reinforces Global Warming, EARTH
OBSERVATORY (June 14, 2011), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/blogs/earthmatters/2011/06/14/
arctic-melt-raises-sea-levels-and-reinforces-global-warming/ (citing ARCTIC MONITORING &
ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, ARCTIC CLIMATE ISSUES 2011: CHANGES IN ARCTIC SNOW, WATER, ICE
AND PERMAFROST (2012), available at http://amap.no/swipa/).
54. See generally Kristin L. Laidre et al., Quantifying the Sensitivity of Arctic Marine Mammals to Climate-Induced Habitat Change, 18 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS S97, S98–S99 (2008);
Loeng et al., supra note 35, at 456, 496–97; NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 3-132 to 3133.
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snow covering will make ringed seals more vulnerable to predation.55
Loss of sea ice also may affect seals’ prey species, such as Arctic cod.56
In addition to reducing habitat for marine mammals, the rapid decline of
sea ice to a seasonally ice-free Arctic is likely to fundamentally alter marine productivity in the region, which would have dramatic effects on the
ecosystem.57
Along with ocean systems and marine life, warming in the Arctic
also affects subsistence. For example, climate change makes subsistence
whale hunting more difficult and dangerous by increasing waves that
affect fall whaling and by decreasing the stability of ice platforms needed
for spring hunting.58 Changes in the timing and location of ice-dependent
prey, such as ice seals and walruses, are making hunting more difficult,
and declines in those and other important subsistence species are expected.59 These changes threaten not only the health of individual residents but also the continuity of their cultural identify.60
2. Acidification
Carbon dioxide emissions are also resulting in ocean acidification.
Approximately one-third of the carbon dioxide that is added to the atmosphere is absorbed by the oceans.61 The absorption of carbon dioxide
alters the chemistry of the seawater, making it more acidic, which can
have substantial negative impacts on the marine environment. The Arctic
is at particular risk from the effects of acidification due to its cold, lowsalinity waters, in which carbon dioxide is more soluble.62 In addition,
changes caused by the warming environment accelerate ocean acidifica55. Brendan P. Kelly, Climate Change and Ice Breeding Pinnipeds, in “FINGERPRINTS” OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 43, 43 (G.-R.Walther et al. eds., 2001).
56. Cynthia T. Tynan & Douglas P. DeMaster, Observations and Predictions of Arctic Climate
Change: Potential Effects on Marine Mammals, 50 ARCTIC 308, 308 (1997); Bodil A. Bluhm &
Rolf Gradinger, Regional Variability in Food Availability for Arctic Marine Mammals, 18
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS S77, S89 (2008).
57. See Bluhm & Gradinger, supra note 56, at S77, S83–S87.
58. NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 3-195 to 3-196.
59. See, e.g., Igor Krupnik & G. Carleton Ray, Pacific Walruses, Indigenous Hunters, and
Climate Change: Bridging Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge, 54 DEEP-SEA RESEARCH PART II
2946, 2954 (2007).
60. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007).
61. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME ET AL., BLUE CARBON: A RAPID RESPONSE
ASSESSMENT
27
(Christian
Nellemann
et
al.
eds.,
2009),
available
at
http://www.grida.no/publications/rr/blue-carbon/. http://www.grida.no/publications/rr/blue-carbon/.
62. ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, ARCTIC OCEAN ACIDIFICATION
ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2013), available at http://www.amap.no/
documents/doc/amap-arctic-ocean-acidification-assessment-summary-for-policy-makers/808.
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tion in the Arctic. Warming promotes acidification in the Arctic in three
main ways: (1) declining sea ice promotes gas exchange with the atmosphere, which leads to more carbon dioxide being absorbed in Arctic waters; (2) increased light penetration promotes plant growth in the ocean,
and these plants initially use absorbed carbon dioxide to grow but then
release it when they decay; and (3) increased glacial ice melt and river
discharges lower the salinity of Arctic marine waters and thereby reduce
their capacity to buffer the ocean against acidification.63
Research confirms that ocean acidification is occurring in the Arctic. Direct measurements demonstrate a clear trend of declining alkalinity
(i.e., acidification) in the Bering and Chukchi seas.64 In addition, there is
proof that parts of the Arctic Ocean have become undersaturated with
respect to aragonite, a relatively unstable form of calcium carbonate used
by many Arctic species to form protective shells.65 This undersaturation
hinders formation of shells and skeletons in important components of the
marine food webs, such as pteropods and some benthic organisms.66
Such impacts to these species could reverberate through the marine ecosystem and ultimately affect food for larger Arctic animals, like walruses, seals, and sea birds.
Acidity also affects growth rates and reproduction in a variety of
marine organisms.67 Increasing acidity may also decrease the ability of
63. Marco Steinacher et al., Imminent Ocean Acidification in the Arctic Projected with the
NCAR Global Coupled Carbon Cycle-Climate Model, 6 BIOGEOSCIENCES 515, 525–28 (2009); see
also Nicholas R. Bates et al., Ocean Acidification and Biologically Induced Seasonality of Carbonate Mineral Saturation States in the Western Arctic Ocean, 114 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. C11, C17–
C18 (2009); Nicholas R. Bates & Jeremy T. Mathis, The Arctic Ocean Marine Carbon Cycle:
Evaluation of Air-Sea CO2 Exchanges, Ocean Acidification Impacts and Potential Feedbacks, 6
BIOGEOSCIENCES 2433, 2451 (2009).
64. See generally A. G. Andreev et al., Calculation Methods and the Distribution of Anthropogenic Variations of pH Values in the Pacific Subarctic, 49 OCEANOLOGY 418 (2009) [hereinafter
Calculation Methods]; A. G. Andreev et al., The Distribution of the Carbonate Parameters in the
Waters of Anadyr Bay of the Bering Sea and in the Western Part of the Chukchi Sea, 50
OCEANOLOGY 39, 49 (2010).
65. See Bates et al., supra note 63, at 17–18; Victoria J. Fabry et al., Ocean Acidification at
High Latitudes: The Bellwether, 22 Oceanography 160, 161–62 (2009); Michiyo Yamamoto-Kawai
et al., Aragonite Undersaturation in the Arctic Ocean: Effects of Ocean Acidification and Sea Ice
Melt, 326 SCIENCE 1098, 1098 (2009); Steinacher et al., supra note 63, at 530; Melissa Chierici &
Agneta Fransson, Calcium Carbonate Saturation in the Surface Water of the Arctic Ocean:
Undersaturation in Freshwater Influenced Shelves, 6 BIOGEOSCIENCES DISCUSSIONS 4963, 4965–
66, 4974 (2009).
66. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION: STARTING
WITH THE SCIENCE 7 (2013), available at http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-basedon-reports/booklets/OA1.pdf.; Steeve Comeau et al., Key Arctic Pelagic Mollusc (Limacina
Helicina) Threatened by Ocean Acidification, 6 BIOGEOSCIENCES DISCUSSIONS 2523, 2529–30
(2009); Yamamoto-Kawai et al., supra note 65, at 1098.
67. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 66, at 10.
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seawater to absorb sound,68 increase the size of otoliths in fish,69 and reduce the availability of iron, an essential nutrient for phytoplankton
growth.70 These changes can affect communication, feeding, and balance
in fish.
3. Industrial Activities
As the Arctic environment changes due to climate change and
ocean acidification, the region is becoming increasingly available for
industrial activities. These activities would bring substantial risks to a
part of the world that has remained relatively free from large-scale industrialization. Risks arise from both accidents and routine activities inherent in oil and gas exploration and development, shipping, and commercial fishing.
a. Oil and Gas
Though there is no oil and gas development from offshore rigs in
the Arctic Ocean, substantial activities related to the oil and gas industry
are taking place. Exploration drilling has been proposed and approved,
and significant seismic and other testing has occurred. These activities
require drilling rigs, fleets of large and small vessels, aircraft, and other
industrial infrastructure, and they can result in substantial risk to the marine environment and those dependent on it.
The most obvious risk from these activities is a large oil spill, like
the one that resulted from the Deepwater Horizon rig exploding and
sinking in the Gulf of Mexico. That “human, economic, and environmental disaster” caused the death of eleven crewmembers and resulted in
“more than four million barrels of oil . . . gushing uncontrolled into the
Gulf. . . .”71 The debate about the ecological and economic impacts from
the spill and BP’s liability for it still continues more than four years after
the accident, “but it is already clear that the impacts on the region’s natural systems and people were enormous, and that economic losses total
tens of billions of dollars.”72

68. Kieth C. Hester et al., Unanticipated Consequences of Ocean Acidification: A Noisier
Ocean at Lower pH, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L19601, L19601 (2008).
69. See David M. Checkley, Jr. et al., Elevated CO2 Enhances Otolith Growth in Young Fish,
324 SCIENCE 1683, 1683 (2009).
70. See Andreev et al., Calculation Methods, supra note 64, at 425; Dalin Shi et al., Effect of
Ocean Acidification on Iron Availability to Marine Phytoplankton, 327 SCIENCE 676, 676–78
(2010).
71. DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at vi.
72. Id.
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A similar spill in the Arctic Ocean would have dramatic impacts on
the people and wildlife in the region.73 While acknowledging the “limited
information” available upon which to make an assessment, the United
States estimates that “[f]or a catastrophic oil spill, it is assumed that two
entire years of Arctic marine mammal subsistence harvests and one and
one-half years of Bowhead whale harvests would be lost.”74 Given what
is known about the impacts of the Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez
spills on fish and wildlife, this estimate appears to be optimistic estimate.
Even this disruption, however, would ripple through the communities
that depend on bowhead whales as the center of their subsistence way of
life.75
The impacts of a catastrophic spill would be exacerbated by the
lack of effective response capabilities and the sensitivity of the environment. Moreover, the lack of baseline information would make it difficult
to prioritize response and measure impacts.76 Of course, a catastrophic
spill is not certain to occur, but the Deepwater Horizon tragedy made it
all too clear that such an event is not impossible.77 In addition, numerous
73. See, e.g., BEAUFORT SEA PLANNING AREA, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
VOL. IV 13–15, 30–34, 37–40, 47–49, 73–78, 91–98, 103–108, 118–122, 131–133, 137–139 (2003),
available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Regional-Leasing/AlaskaRegion/Alaska-Lease-Sales/Sale-186/Index.aspx; CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193 FINAL EIS, supra note
29, at 132–294.
74. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY FOR THE FIVEYEAR OCS OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM FOR 2012–2017 67, 69 (2012), available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/Five_Year_Pr
ogram/2012-2017_Five_Year_Program/PFP%20EconMethodology.pdf.
75. See, e.g., BEAUFORT SEA PLANNING AREA, supra note 73; CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193
FINAL SEIS, supra note 29.
76. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Assessing Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of
Mexico, SCI. DAILY (July 10, 2013), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/07/13071012
2004.htm. Moreover, oil spill response activities themselves can have impacts on subsistence and
wildlife resources. See, e.g., CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193 FINAL SEIS, supra note 29, at 32 (describing
“significant” effects on subsistence hunters); see also id. at 25 (“Impacts from the oil spill itself
could be exacerbated during spill response and cleanup activities such as vessel discharge, in-situ
burning, dispersants, drilling a relief well, and shoreline cleanup.”); id. 26 (discussing how “in-situ
burning would also cause adverse impacts”); id. 28 (noting “[s]pill response and cleanup activities
can also displace each species from important habitat areas” and that “cleanup efforts can lead to
additional exposure as well as disturbance and displacement of polar bears”); id. 34 (recognizing
“onshore spill response and cleanup activities . . . can alter site dynamics and increase resource degradation, resulting in potential adverse effects on historic properties”).
77. In fact, “[f]rom 1964 through 2010, there have been 33 spills ≥ 1,000 bbl from OCS platforms and pipelines.” CHERYL MCMAHON ANDERSON ET AL., BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
UPDATE OF OCCURRENCE RATES FOR OFFSHORE OIL SPILLS 9 (2012), available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/Five_Year_Pr
ogram/2012-2017_Five_Year_Program/Update%20of%20Occurrence%20Rates%20for%20
Offshore%20Oil%20Spills.pdf); see also id. at 10–11 (describing the incidents). In its 2008 Draft
Environmental Impact Statement for the Chukchi and Beaufort Planning Areas produced, the gov-
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other spills and near misses in the Gulf of Mexico further reinforce this
point.78
In addition to creating the risk of a catastrophic spill, exploration
and production activities also chronically release smaller amounts of oil,
toxic muds, and other fluids into the ocean. Drilling muds, in particular,
can have toxic effects in the water column.79 Moreover, discharges of oil
are virtually guaranteed to result from routine activities. As one Shell
executive made clear, “There’s no sugar-coating this, I imagine there
would be spills, and no spill is OK.”80 In fact from 1964 to 2009, there
were more than 2,700 reported spills from offshore oil and gas activities.81
Exploration activities also contribute to air pollution and global
warming by releasing greenhouse gases, black carbon, and other pollutants. The activities that Shell proposed for 2012 in the Chukchi Sea
were expected to release nearly 420 tons of NOx, a pollutant that can
ernment estimated a 40% chance of a large spill in the Chukchi Sea and a 26% chance of a large spill
in the Beaufort Sea. See MINERALS. MGMT. SERV., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
BEAUFORT SEA AND CHUKCHI SEA PLANNING AREAS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES, 209, 212, 217,
221, at 4-454, 4-461 (2008), available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-EnergyProgram/Leasing/Regional-Leasing/Alaska-Region/Alaska-Lease-Sales/Sales209-221/Vol4a.aspx.
78. In the first three years after the Deepwater Horizon disaster, there were more than 1,700
major environmental and safety violations on offshore energy platforms in the Gulf. See COMM. ON
NATURAL RESOURCES DEMOCRATS, DANGEROUS DRILLERS: OFFSHORE SAFETY LAPSES CONTINUE
THREE YEARS AFTER BP SPILL 11 (2013), http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/sites/
democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/files/documents/2013-05-10_BP_Spill_DangerousDrillers.
pdf. In November 2012, the Black Elk rig exploded, killing three workers. Black Elk Energy Company itself has been cited for numerous safety and environmental violations, drawing strong rebukes
from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau of
Safety & Envtl. Enforcement, BSEE Director’s Statement on Black Elk Report (Nov. 4, 2013),
available at http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE-Newsroom/Statements/statement11042013/ (“[T]hese
deaths were caused by a number of decisions, actions[,] and failures by Black Elk and contractors
retained by Black Elk while conducting construction operations. These failures reflect a disregard for
the safety of workers on the platform and are the antithesis of the type of safety culture that should
guide decision-making in all offshore oil and gas operations.”). On July 24, 2013, the Hercules Offshore jackup rig located off the Louisiana coast partially collapsed after catching fire due to a natural
gas well rupture. Kristen Hays, Gulf Rig Partially Collapses in Fire off Louisiana: U.S. Government,
REUTERS (July 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/24/us-usa-gulfofmexico-wellidUSBRE96N0SU20130724. The incident indicates the continuing lack of safety in offshore energy
activities and the dangers of offshore drilling even in shallow water conditions.
79. Offshore Energy Production: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (written statement of Dr. Jeffrey Short, Pac. Sci. Dir., Oceana), available at http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=0d1cabb7-f29f-1b599b61-e8055aef00e2 (written testimony to the Committee).
80. Philip Bump, Shell VP: Yeah, We’re Gonna Spill Some Oil in the Arctic, GRIST (Nov. 30,
2012, 12:25 PM), http://grist.org/news/shell-vp-yeah-were-gonna-spill-oil-in-the-arctic/ (quoting
Shell’s Alaska vice president Pete Slaiby discussing the likelihood that smaller spills would occur).
81. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 77, at 10 tbl.10.
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have substantial health effects.82 In addition, the proposed activities were
expected to result in the emission of more than 60,000 tons of carbon
dioxide and a substantial amount of black carbon.83 The problems associated with the emissions of black carbon are particularly acute in the Arctic. When they land on white snow and sea ice, particles of black carbon
accelerate melting, which in turn accelerates warming in the region.
Seismic testing, exploration and production drilling, and associated
activities dramatically increase noise levels in the ocean, and this noise
can have significant effects on marine mammals and other wildlife. “Marine mammals use hearing and sound transmission to perform vital life
functions. Sound (hearing and vocalization/echolocation) serves four
primary functions for marine mammals: (1) providing information about
their environment; (2) communication; (3) prey detection; and (4) predator detection.”84 Additional noise can disrupt these functions by displacing animals from breeding and feeding habitats, causing temporary or
permanent hearing loss, causing stress and other physiological responses,
making it more difficult for animals to hear other relevant sounds and, in
extreme situations, causing stranding or death.85
Finally, conducting offshore oil and gas activities is a massive industrial undertaking. For example, to support its efforts to drill exploration wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas in 2012, Shell brought two
drill rigs, a drilling vessel, ice breakers, tugs, barges, other support vessels, aircraft, helicopters, and other industrial machinery.86 In addition to
the direct impacts to the ecosystem discussed above, this large-scale industrialization brings an influx of people and industry from outside the
communities along the coast. These changes have economic, social, and
cultural impacts to Arctic communities.87

82. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., SHELL 2012 EXPLORATION PLAN—CHUKCHI SEA:
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 66–69 (2011), http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/2011_1214_
FINAL_2012ChukchiSeaEA.PDF.
83. Id.
84. NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 4-92.
85. Id.
86. See SHELL GULF OF MEXICO INC., REVISED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE
EXPLORATION PLAN CHUKCHI SEA, ALASKA, at section 13 (2011), available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Plans/Regional_Plans/
Alaska_Exploration_Plans/2012_Shell_Chukchi_EP/CS-EP-Public.pdf.
87. See, e.g., JOHN B. KENRIKSEN, OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS IN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LANDS
AND TERRITORIES IN THE ARCTIC: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE, AT 28–29, 39–40 (2006), available at http://www.galdu.org/govat/doc/oilengelsk2.pdf.
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b. Shipping
The Aleutian Islands are already a major shipping thoroughfare,
and shipping related to oil and gas activities, freight transport, and tourism are predicted to rapidly expand into the Arctic Ocean.88 In 2009, the
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment reported that “[t]here were approximately 6,000 individual vessels, many making multiple voyages, in the
Arctic region during the AMSA survey year; half of these were operating
on the Great Circle Route in the North Pacific that passes through Alaska’s Aleutian Islands.”89 As sea ice continues to retreat and the demand
for goods increases around the world, the number of vessels transiting
the Arctic Ocean is predicted to increase.90
Substantial risks to the marine environment will result from this increase in shipping. As with oil and gas activities, the most apparent risk
is a significant accident in the sensitive and remote Arctic environment.
Remoteness, lack of infrastructure and basic information, and difficult
conditions increase the likelihood of such an accident and make response
very difficult:
There is a general lack of marine infrastructure in the Arctic . . . compared with other marine regions of the world with high
concentrations of ship traffic. Gaps in hydrographic data exist for
significant portions of primary shipping routes important to support
safe navigation. In addition, for safe operations in the Arctic there is
a need for the same suite of meteorological and oceanographic data,
products and services as in other oceans, plus comprehensive information on sea ice and icebergs. Except in limited areas of the
Arctic, there is a lack of emergency response capacity for saving
lives and for pollution mitigation. There are serious limitations to

88. This section focuses on increases in commercial shipping. Other forms of vessel transit are
likely to increase as well. As discussed above, vessel traffic is associated with oil and gas activities.
In addition, vessel-based tourism is likely to increase. “Tourists now represent the single largest
human presence in the Arctic and the overwhelming majority of these visitors travel aboard ships.”
ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 Report, at 99 (2009), available at
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf
[hereinafter
AMSA REPORT]. Though relatively little of this traffic occurred in the U.S. Arctic Ocean, a cruise
did make an unexpected stop in Barrow in August 2011. See Jerry Beilinson, What If a Cruise Ship
Wrecked
in
Alaska?,
POPULAR
MECHANICS
(Jan.
25,
2012,
12:30
PM),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/engineering/extreme-machines/what-if-a-cruise-shipwrecked-in-alaska-6645471. “The future of Arctic marine tourism represents serious challenges to
public authorities and businesses seeking to address the issues of safe passage and resource management.” AMSA REPORT, supra, at 99.
89. AMSA REPORT, supra note 88, at 4. Of the 6,000 vessels reported, approximately 1,600
were fishing vessels. Id.
90. See id. at 4–5.
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radio and satellite communications and few systems to monitor and
control the movement of ships in ice covered waters.91

The report went on to conclude that “[t]he current lack of marine infrastructure in all but a limited number of areas, coupled with the vastness
and harshness of the environment, makes conduct of emergency response
significantly more difficult in the Arctic.”92
The Exxon Valdez and Selendang Ayu accidents and response efforts provide examples of these problems in less difficult Alaskan waters.
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground and spilled more than eleven million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound, creating a disaster that
brought the risks of oil development and transportation to American
shores and people.93 In December 2004, the Selendang Ayu was on its
way to China from Seattle, Washington, with a crew of twenty-six and
60,200 metric tons of soybeans. As the ship transited Unimak Pass in the
Aleutian Islands, it ran into heavy weather and eventually ran aground,
breaking into pieces, and spilling its soybean cargo and more than
300,000 gallons of fuel.94 While the Coast Guard was able to rescue
much of the crew, tragically six crew members and Coast Guard rescuers
perished when a rogue wave hit the vessel and downed the rescue helicopter.95
Similarly Shell’s drill rig, the Kulluk, separated from its tow vessel
and grounded in harsh but not unusual conditions in the Gulf of Alaska
in December 2012.96 While the situation was quite dangerous, thankfully
there was no loss of life related to the loss of control and eventual
grounding of the Kulluk.97
None of the Exxon Valdez, Selendang Ayu, or Kulluk incidents happened in the Chukchi or Beaufort seas. Rather, each took in waters that,
while subject to extreme weather conditions and seas, do not have ice,
and generally are closer to onshore support assets. In the more remote

91. Id. at 5.
92. Id.
93. See Exxon Valdez Spill Profile, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/
emergency-response/exxon-valdez-spill-profile (last updated May 23, 2014).
94. See Mike Schuler, M/V Selendang Ayu Oil Spill and Sinking, GCAPTAIN MAR. &
OFFSHORE NEWS (Apr. 29, 2009), http://gcaptain.com/mv-selendang-ayu-oil-spill-sinking/.
95. Marine Accident Brief, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD (Dec. 8, 2004),
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/fulltext/MAB0601.htm.
96. See infra Part V.C.3.f (discussing Shell’s problems in 2012).
97. Suzanna Caldwell, Kulluk Grounding: Shell Oil Testimony Opens Coast Guard Hearing in
Anchorage, ALASKA DISPATCH (May 20, 2013), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130520/
kulluk-grounding-shell-oil-testimony-opens-coast-guard-hearing-anchorage.
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and icy Arctic waters, the risk of an incident with catastrophic consequences is even greater.
In addition—and parallel to oil and gas activities—ship traffic in
the Arctic Ocean will result in increased noise, air, and water pollution.
Increased shipping also raises the likelihood of introducing invasive species from ballast water discharge or other sources. Additionally, the main
shipping routes in the Arctic overlap with migration corridors used by
many marine mammals and birds, including the endangered bowhead
whale. As a result, expanded commercial shipping will increase the likelihood of animal disturbances and ship strikes.
c. Commercial Fishing
Large-scale commercial fishing has been an important force in the
southern Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska for several decades. Some of the
world’s largest fisheries operate there, and more than four billion pounds
of fish is harvested from the region each year. These fisheries have contributed to changes in the marine ecosystem; stocks of pollock, cod, and
other species, for example, are currently managed to maintain 40% of
their historic biomass.98 These species, therefore, are managed so that
there are 60% fewer fish, by weight, than were there historically.99 In
some cases, these fisheries can compete with marine mammals, such as
endangered Steller sea lions, for prey.100 In addition to biomass removals,
some forms of fishing, such as bottom trawling, threaten important seafloor habitat and have a disproportionate effect on the marine environment.
There is currently no large-scale commercial fishing in the Chukchi
or Beaufort seas. It has been thought, however, that “[c]limate warming
is likely to bring extensive fishing activity to the Arctic, particularly in
the Barents Sea and Beaufort–Chukchi region where commercial operations have been minimal in the past.”101 More recent information sug-

98. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT—SECTION 7
CONSULTATION BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR AUTHORIZATION OF FISHERIES UNDER THE FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR GROUNDFISH OF THE BERING SEA AND ALEUTIAN ISLANDS MANAGEMENT
AREA 103 (2010).
99. See id.
100. See id. at 345, 348.
101. U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, THE ARCTIC OCEAN AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A
SCENARIO FOR THE US NAVY (2002), available at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/other/arctic_
and_climate_change.pdf.
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gests that it may be a long time before there is sufficient biomass of target species to support commercial fisheries.102
If commercial fishing were to occur, it would require careful management to avoid disproportionate or unexpected impacts. Though the
Arctic Ocean supports a complex system of marine life, it has lower species diversity and lower levels of production than temperate marine ecosystems. The loss or depletion of a single forage species, such as Arctic
cod, could seriously disrupt the Arctic marine food web.103
Recognizing these unique challenges, the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) and North Pacific Fishery Management Council have
taken a proactive management approach to the Arctic. The Arctic Fishery
Management Plan (Arctic FMP) was adopted unanimously by the Council and implemented with broad support by NMFS.104 It closes the Chukchi and Beaufort seas to commercial fishing until there is adequate information to manage fisheries in an ecologically sustainable manner.
Similarly, the Council recommended and NMFS created the Northern
Bering Sea Research Plan, which closes a portion of the Bering Sea to
bottom trawling to allow for an evaluation of the potential impacts of that
gear on benthic species and habitat, before bottom trawling expands into
this region.105 In both cases, the goal has been to ensure that fishing activities do not harm the health of the ecosystem. That shared goal has
established common ground between industry, local communities, and
conservation entities.106
III. CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT
There are multiple challenges to effective management of human
activities in the U.S. Arctic Ocean. The lack of baseline scientific information prevents good predictions and measurement of the impacts of
potential activities, undercuts efforts that could eliminate or at least min102. See, e.g., Hannah Heimbuch, As Globe Warms, Is an Arctic Fisheries Boom on the Way?,
ALASKA DISPATCH (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130407/globe-warmsarctic-fisheries-boom-way.
103. See, e.g., ARCTIC FMP EA, supra note 25, at 205 tbl.8-3 (“A fishery, if one turned to be
economically viable, that harvested Arctic cod or that took large amounts as incidental catch could
have an adverse and may have a significantly adverse impact on species that prey on it.”).
104. FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 16; see also Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone off Alaska, 50 C.F.R. § 679 et. seq. (2013).
105. See Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone off Alaska, supra note 104; Groundfish
Fisheries of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area, 73 Fed. Reg. 43362 (July 25,
2008); Mary Pemberton, Commerce Secretary Approves Arctic Fisheries Plan, USA TODAY, (Aug.
23, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/2009-08-21-alaska-fish_N.htm.
106. See Pemberton, supra note 105 (quoting federal government, industry, and conservation
organization representatives).
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imize or mitigate likely impacts, hinders response efforts, and creates
substantial uncertainty. The fact that the U.S. Arctic is remote from existing development and does not have even basic infrastructure makes management and oversight very difficult. The weather can also be extreme at
all times of the year, and emergency response is hindered, for example,
by a lack of adequate and proven oil spill prevention and response technology. The lack of a comprehensive legal regime to guide decisions
about such development also forces decision makers to operate without
overarching direction.
A. Research Needs
The lack of baseline information outlined above107 creates a significant impediment to effective planning and preparedness. The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy stated as a principle tenet, “Ocean managers
and policy makers need comprehensive scientific information about the
ocean and its environment to make wise decisions.”108 And as the USGS
explained, there are “major constraints to a defensible science framework
for critical Arctic decision making.”109 Similarly, an inter-agency government report addressing the need for integrated management in the
Arctic noted that “scientific information and data relevant to U.S. Arctic
decisions can be difficult to access[,] and it is not clear that the scientific
agenda for the U.S. Arctic adequately serves the informational needs of
decision-makers.”110 The final recommendations of the Interagency
Ocean Policy Task Force (OPTF) call for science-based decision making
and a better understanding of our ocean ecosystems, including a special
emphasis on the Arctic.111

107. See supra Part II.B (discussing missing scientific information)
108. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 374
(2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full_color_rpt/
welcome.html.
109. USGS REPORT, supra note 17, at 151.
110. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 5.
111. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL RECOMMENDATION OF THE
INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE 6, 39–40 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/OPTF_FinalRecs.pdf (noting that one of the priority
needs for addressing environmental stewardship of the rapidly changing Arctic Ocean is
“[i]mprovement of the scientific understanding of the Arctic system and how it is changing in response to climate-induced and other changes”). The Obama Administration formalized the final
OPTF recommendations through an Executive Order in 2010 and has released an implementation
plan. See Exec. Order No. 13547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43023 (July 19, 2010); NAT’L OCEAN COUNCIL,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov//sites/default/files/national_ocean_policy_implementation_plan
.pdf.
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Various other authorities have specifically recognized the need for
additional science before more oil and gas activities occur in the Arctic.
In March 2010, then-Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar cancelled
scheduled Arctic Ocean leases in the Beaufort, Chukchi, and Bering seas,
explaining “that the country must take a cautious approach in the Arctic . . . and gather additional scientific information about resources, risks,
and environmental sensitivities before making decisions about potential
future lease sales in frontier areas.”112 The National Commission, after
convening to study the Deepwater Horizon spill and make recommendations about offshore drilling, identified the need for “an immediate, comprehensive federal research effort to provide a foundation of scientific
information on the Arctic . . . in order to inform the decision-making
process.”113 In the fisheries management context, U.S. regulators have
determined that the U.S. Arctic should remain closed to commercial fisheries “until sufficient information is available to support the sustainable
management of a commercial fishery.”114
To the extent that information about environmental resources exists, it is often not sufficiently mapped or incorporated into planning and
management. Indeed, response to the Deepwater Horizon spill was hindered by response plans that were not appropriately targeted to important
areas and the resulting questions about how to prioritize equipment.115
B. Remoteness and Lack of Infrastructure
Effective management and response requires proven equipment,
trained personnel, and infrastructure. There is very limited capacity near
the Arctic Ocean, and the sheer distance, difficult conditions, and limited
transportation options would make it very difficult to bring equipment
and personnel to the region.
The North Slope Borough, the county-level political subdivision
adjacent to the U.S. Arctic Ocean, spans 88,000 square miles—an area
larger than the state of Utah. Approximately 9,500 people live in the
Borough; Barrow, the largest town, has just over 4,000 residents, and
other coastal villages have as few as 200 people.116 No roads connect the
112. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET: A COMPREHENSIVE, SCIENCE-BASED OFFSHORE
ENERGY PLAN 1 (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=
security/getfile&PageID=33566.
113. DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 303.
114. FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 16, at ES-1.
115. See U.S. COAST GUARD, BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: INCIDENT SPECIFIC
PREPAREDNESS REVIEW (ISPR) 16–17, 20–22 (2011) [hereinafter ISPR], available at
http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/bpdwh.pdf.
116. North Slope Borough, Alaska, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
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towns on the North Slope to one another or to the rest of the state, and
most communities rely on small airports or airstrips and small boat docks
for traveling between villages and to the rest of the state. There is no
deepwater port along the U.S. Arctic Coast capable of supporting offshore development.117 All existing docks are in shallow water, which
severely limits boat access and the types of equipment that can be accessed from the coast.
Very little response equipment is stored on the North Slope, and
there are few vessels there that could assist in a response effort. Senator
Mark Begich (D-AK) has pointed out that icebreakers are “sorely lacking” as well as U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) “cutters, aircraft hangars, crew
quarters, communication capabilities, deepwater ports and other infrastructure . . . .”118 Characterizing the lack of infrastructure after testifying
to a Senate Committee, USCG Commandant Robert Papp explained that
“[t]here is nothing up there to operate from at present and we’re really
starting from ground zero.”119
In contrast, a substantial number of people and vessels were available in, or easily transported to, the Gulf of Mexico to respond to the
Deepwater Horizon accident. Eventually, a total of 48,200 people—more
than four times the population of the entire North Slope Borough—
participated in the response efforts.120 Similarly, 345 response vessels
and over 3,000 vessels of opportunity (i.e., vessels not designed for oil
spill response but enlisted in the effort) took part in the Gulf response.121
Getting resources of that magnitude to the Arctic Ocean would be
nearly impossible. There are no hotels or other housing capable of accommodating thousands of responders.122 Nor is there an easy way to
states/02/02185.html (last revised Mar. 27, 2014).
117. In 2013, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Alaska State Department of Transportation and Public Facilities released a report on the first year (2012) of their co-sponsored three-year
study to examine the possible development of a deep water port north of the Aleutian Islands. See
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ALASKA DEEP DRAFT ARCTIC PORTS STUDY (2013), available at
http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/AKports/1ADDAPSReportweb.pdf.
118. Experts Say U.S. Needs to Improve Arctic Infrastructure, ARCTIC SOUNDER (July 27,
2012),
http://www.thearcticsounder.com/article/1130experts_say_us_needs_to_improve_arctic
(quoting Senator Mark Begich).
119. Deborah Zabarenko, Arctic Oil Spill Would Challenge Coast Guard, REUTERS (June 20,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/20/us-arctic-oil-idUSTRE75J6O620110620 (quoting
U.S. Coast Guard Adm. Robert Papp Jr.).
120. ISPR, supra note 115, at 156; DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 133 (noting that “[a]t the peak of the response, more than 45,000 people participated”).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., GENERAL PURPOSES COMM., A JOINT VENTURE, FINAL REPORT, OPERATION
ARCTIC SHIELD BARROW/PRUDHOE BAY, ALASKA 6 (2012) [hereinafter ARCTIC SHIELD FINAL
REPORT].
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move equipment or personnel from one location to another. The nearest
Coast Guard station is in Kodiak, AK, roughly 1,000 miles from the likely locations of oil and gas exploration, and the nearest large deepwater
port is more than 1,000 nautical miles from Barrow, in Dutch Harbor.123
Even in Dutch Harbor, the ability of the port to service drilling vessels
and house people is limited.124
C. Weather
As might be expected in a polar region, weather and other environmental conditions can be severe in the Arctic. The Arctic Ocean is covered with sea ice from approximately October through May, and the air
temperature drops below freezing on nearly every day of the year.125
Throughout the summer and fall, the Arctic experiences extended periods
of fog.126 Long hours of darkness also limit visibility in the late fall and
winter, and strong winds are prevalent during the fall, when the daily
maximum winds average forty miles per hour.127
These conditions can complicate every stage of offshore oil and gas
activities—from transporting equipment to and from a drill site, to drilling, maintenance, and emergency response. For example, rough water
and weather can affect transportation of drill rigs and their stability during drilling operations. Ice and fog also impede drilling operations, and
Arctic weather conditions can affect support vessels and aircraft. Routine
issues, such as re-fueling, offloading wastewater, and transferring per-

123. 123. See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle, Coast Guard Blames Shell Risk-Taking in Kulluk Rig
Accident, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 4, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/
2014/04/140404-coast-guard-blames-shell-in-kulluk-rig-accident/; see also Welcome to Kodiak, AK,
MARINE EXCHANGE OF ALASKA, http://www.mxak.org/ports/southcentral/kodiak/kodiak.htm (last
visited June 1, 2014) (describing Kodiak port). Smaller ports are available in the Pribilof Islands.
See, e.g., Welcome to St. Paul, AK, MARINE EXCHANGE OF ALASKA, http://www.mxak.org/ports/
northern_west/st_paul/st_paul.html (last visited June 1, 2014).
124. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Lawmaker: Did Shell Move Rig for Financial Reasons?, FUEL FIX
(Jan. 11, 2013), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2013/01/11/lawmaker-did-shell-move-rig-for-financialreasons/ (noting lack of hotel rooms and space for the workers and that the shipyard was not wellsuited for the maintenance work).
125.
Barrow,
CLIMATE
ZONE,
http://www.climate-zone.com/climate/unitedstates/alaska/barrow/ (last visited June 2, 2014) (tables showing average monthly temperature in
Barrow).
126. PEW ENV’T GRP. ET AL., OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN THE U.S. ARCTIC
OCEAN: UNEXAMINED RISKS, UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES 94 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts
.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/peg/publications/report/Oil20Spill20Preventionpdf.pdf [hereinafter PEW ENV’T GRP. ET AL.] (noting that 49% of days in the summer and 57% of days in the fall are
foggy).
127. Id. at 11 (noting that the maximum daily average wind speed for Barrow in October is
forty-four mph, forty mph in November, and thirty-five mph in December).
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sonnel, are risky in Arctic weather conditions.128 In addition, bad weather
can be difficult to predict, which can make routine operations problematic, increase the risk of an accident, and make emergency response difficult or impossible.
D. Emergency Response
The Deepwater Horizon blowout and the inability to stop or clean
up the resulting spill has increased attention on and controversy about
spill response in the Arctic. There are three primary oil spill response
methods currently available: mechanical containment and recovery; in
situ burning; and dispersants. The successful use of any of these methods in the U.S. Arctic Ocean is limited both by their own efficacy and by
Arctic conditions.129 These limits are so significant that Representative
Henry Waxman (D-CA) described spill response planning as follows:
“On paper these plans . . . might seem reassuring. . . . But when you look
at the details, it becomes evident these plans are just paper exercise[s].”130 Lloyd’s of London concluded that “cleaning up any oil spill
in the Arctic, particularly in ice-covered areas, would present multiple
obstacles which together constitute a unique and hard-to-manage risk.”131
1. Limits on Recovery and Removal Techniques
Traditionally, marine spill response has focused on mechanical containment and recovery techniques, such as boom and skimmers. The efficacy of mechanical response is limited, especially for large spills. After
the Exxon Valdez spill, for example, an estimated 8% of the spilled oil
was recovered using mechanical recovery,132 and only 3% of the spilled
128. For examples of these problems, see infra Part V.C.3.f (detailing problems Shell had in
2012).
129. See generally WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, NOT SO FAST: SOME PROGRESS IN SPILL
RESPONSE, BUT US STILL ILL-PREPARED FOR ARCTIC OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT (2009) [hereinafter
US STILL ILL-PREPARED FOR ARCTIC OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT], available at
http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/401/files/original/Not_So_Fast_Some_Progress_in_Spill
_Response__but_US_Still_Unprepared_for_Arctic_Offshore_Development.pdf?1345754373;
see
also PEW ENV’T GRP. ET AL., supra note 126, at 73–75.
130. Drilling Down On America's Energy Future: Safety, Security, and Clean Energy: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
111th Cong. 4–6 (2010) (statement of Sen. Henry Waxman), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg77911/html/CHRG-111hhrg77911.htm.
131. LLOYD’S OF LONDON & CHATHAM HOUSE, ARCTIC OPENING: OPPORTUNITY AND RISK IN
THE
HIGH ARCTIC 39
(2012)
[hereinafter
LLOYD’S REPORT],
available
at
http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/Files/News%20and%20Insight/360%20Risk%20Insight/Arctic_Ris
k_Report_webview.pdf.
132. Energy Development on the Continental Shelf and the Future of Our Oceans: Hearing
Before the Joint Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Res. and Subcomm. on Insular Affairs, Oceans

1298

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:1271

oil was recovered using these techniques after the Deepwater Horizon
spill.133 The relative ineffectiveness of these mechanical recovery methods results from the difficulty in finding oil in sufficiently dense concentrations, deploying and maintaining booms, and overcoming limits on
storage and the ability to separate spilled oil from water.134
The inability to effectively respond to the Deepwater Horizon
blowout using traditional techniques resulted in the development of new
methods, including a capping stack and containment dome.135 These
methods of recovery show some promise, but they have never been tested in Arctic conditions, and there is substantial concern about their
use.136
In-situ burning means that spilled oil is ignited and burned in the
ocean. The efficacy of in-situ burning is limited by the need to collect
and contain a large amount of the oil to burn and by the emulsification of
oil caused by waves, which makes the oil more difficult to ignite.137 Inand Wildlife of the H. Comm. Natural Resources, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (written testimony of Dr.
Jeffrey Short, Pac. Sci. Dir., Oceana), available at http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/o/
fileadmin/oceana/uploads/Climate_Change/Toxic_Legacy/Written_Statement_of_Dr__Jeffrey_
Short_3_24_Joint_Subcommittee_Hearing.pdf.
133. JANE LUBCHENCO, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. & U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL BUDGET: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OIL? 1 (2010), available
at http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/PDFs/OilBudget_description_%2083final.pdf (noting
3% recovery through skimming).
134. See generally T.L. ROBERTSON & E.G. DECOLA, JOINT AGENCY EVALUATION OF THE
SPRING AND FALL 2000 NORTH SLOPE BROKEN ICE EXERCISES (2000); INT’L TANKER OWNERS
POLLUTION FED’N LTD., USE OF SKIMMERS IN OIL POLLUTION RESPONSE (2014), available at
http://www.itopf.com/fileadmin/data/Documents/TIPS%20TAPS/TIP5UseofSkimmersinOilPollutio
nResponse.pdf (last visited June 2, 2014).
135. See SHELL, CHUKCHI SEA REGIONAL EXPLORATION PROGRAM OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN
N-13, app. N (2011), available at http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/OSRP/
Chukchi%20OSRP%20-%20February%202012.pdf (describing capping stack and dome).
136. See, e.g., John Ryan, Sea Trial Leaves Shell’s Arctic Oil-Spill Gear “Crushed Like a Beer
Can”, KUOW (Nov. 30, 2012), http://kuow.org/post/sea-trial-leaves-shells-arctic-oil-spill-gearcrushed-beer-can. Shell’s containment dome has been certified for use by the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) but testing took place only in Puget Sound, Washington. See
Tim Bradner, Arctic Drill Rule Advance; Shell Spill Dome OK’d, ALASKA J. OF COMMERCE (Aug.
15, 2013), http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/August-Issue-3-2013/Arcticdrill-rules-advance-Shell-spill-dome-OKd/. Even there, the first tests were a dismal failure. See infra
notes 149–54 and accompanying text. A court in Alaska has determined that these response techniques are not actually part of the required spill response plan. See infra Part V.C.3.c (discussing the
challenge to BSEE’s approvals of Shell’s Beaufort and Chukchi Sea Oil Spill Response Plans).
Moreover, prior to its submissions, Shell itself stated that these techniques are unlikely to be effective in the Arctic. See Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 21–24, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680
F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-72891).
137. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNDERSTANDING OIL SPILLS AND OIL SPILL RESPONSE:
ALTERNATIVE COUNTERMEASURES FOR OIL SPILLS 14 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/
oem/content/learning/pdfbook.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2014) (click on link for Chapter 3).
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situ burning also creates both air pollution and a residue that sinks to the
ocean floor, causing a risk of suffocation and contamination to benthic
organisms.138
Dispersants are chemical agents that enhance dispersion of oil by
generating larger numbers of microdroplets of oil that become suspended
in the water column “where they are much more susceptible to microbial
degradation.”139 To work effectively, dispersants must be applied in calm
conditions with moderate to mild mixing energy,140 and the oil must not
be weathered (i.e., condensed) due to time in the ocean. There is limited
proof that dispersants were effective after the Deepwater Horizon spill,
and tests on commonly used dispersants show that they may be even less
effective in the Arctic than in the warmer, more saline waters of the Gulf
of Mexico.141
There are also questions about the acute and sublethal toxicity of
dispersants.142 A recent study shows that dispersants, when combined
with oil, can be over fifty times more toxic than oil alone for some organisms.143 During the Gulf of Mexico blowout, dispersants were responsible for the death of coral, mutated seafood, and high mortality
rates for dolphins, whales, and turtles.144 Dispersants contain known carcinogens and appear to have caused a variety of human health ailments
during and after the Gulf of Mexico blowout.145
Even in the best of conditions, these response methods can recover
only a small amount of the total oil spilled.146 Arctic conditions are likely
to limit this efficacy even further. For example, low visibility or turbulent conditions can ground airplanes needed to spot or ignite oil and ap138. Offshore Energy Production, supra note 79, at 2–4.
139. Deluge of Oil Highlights Research and Technology Needs for Oil Recovery and Effective
Cleanup of Oil Spills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Env’t of the H. Comm. on Sci. &
Tech., 111th Cong. 3 (2010) (written testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Short, Pac. Sci. Dir., Oceana), available at http://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/
060910Short.pdf.
140. Id.
141. Dr. Jeffrey Short, Presentation at Alaska Forum on the Environment (2013),
http://www.akforum.com/PDFs/agenda2013.pdf; see also Letter from Oceana, Ocean Conservancy,
to Ivan Nuñz, InterAmerican Dev. Bank (Feb. 14, 2014) (on file with author (“[T]here is a general
lack of publicly available data that actually demonstrates the efficacy of dispersants in the field.”).
142. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL SPILL DISPERSANTS: EFFICACY AND EFFECTS 6 (2005).
143. Roberto Rico-Martínez, Terry W. Snell & Tonya L. Shearer, Synergistic Toxicity of
Macondo Crude Oil and Dispersant Corexit 9500A® to the Brachionus Plicatilis Species Complex
(Rotifera), 173 Envtl. Pollution 5, 5–10 (2013).
144. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, DEADLY GULF DISPERSANTS IN THE GULF 53–56
(2013), available at http://www.whistleblower.org/program-areas/public-health/corexit/.
145. Id. at 31–32.
146. See supra notes 132–34; see also generally US STILL ILL-PREPARED FOR ARCTIC
OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 129; PEW ENV’T GRP. ET AL., supra note 126.
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ply dispersants.147 Wind and waves can limit deployment of boom and
the use of skimmers. Similarly, ice can tear boom and clog skimmers.148
The same problems with boom can occur during in-situ burning because
boom is often required to corral the oil into pools that are thick enough to
ignite.
Response exercises in Alaskan waters have demonstrated the weaknesses of response techniques. Prior to 2012, the most recent tests of response equipment in the Arctic Ocean were held in 1999 and 2000 in the
Beaufort Sea. In those tests, skimmers, boom, and vessels were deployed
to test mechanical recovery systems. These tests were characterized as a
“failure,” despite the calm weather.149 They revealed that even though
mechanical recovery is typically assumed to work in up to 30% ice coverage, the system only actually worked in up to 10% ice coverage.150
The next known tests were held in August 2012 off Barrow, AK,
when the Coast Guard deployed boom and tested a skimmer designed to
recover oil in pockets of water trapped by ice.151 Although the trial focused on deployment, not actual spill recovery, the lessons learned from
this exercise demonstrate how difficult it would be to respond to a real
spill in the Arctic. As the Coast Guard noted in its report on the exercise,
the lack of docking facilities or ports was a challenge.152 Over the course
of nearly a week, the spill response equipment had to be trucked to Prudhoe Bay, loaded onto a shallow draft barge, then transported to the
Coast Guard boat offshore Barrow.153 The Coast Guard also encountered
challenges in finding berthing facilities for training personnel–a problem
that would be compounded by the much greater number of responders
that would have to be housed if a spill occurred in Arctic waters and a

147. RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41153, CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC:
BACKGROUND
AND
ISSUES
FOR
CONGRESS
30–32
(2014),
available
at
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc282294/m1/1/high_res_d/R41153_2014Feb27.pdf.
148. SAARA HÄNNINEN & JUKKA SASSI, VTT TECHNICAL RESEARCH CENTRE FINLAND,
ACUTE OIL SPILLS IN ARCTIC WATERS—OIL COMBATING ICE 26–27 (2010), available at
http://www.iccopr.uscg.gov/iccopr/i/files/Acute_Oil_Spills_in_Arctic_Waters_11JAN2010.pdf.
149. See Oceana, What If an Oil Spill Happened in the Arctic?, YOUTUBE (July 7, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dL3RGwpBaI (showing footage of testing oil spill response
capacity conducted by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conversation in 2000).
150. See ROBERTSON & DECOLA, supra note 134, at 47.
151. Press Release, U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Completes Arctic Spilled Oil Recovery
Systems Deployment (Aug. 3, 2012), available at http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/1508115/
Imagery-Available-Coast-Guard-completes-Arctic-spilled-oil-recovery-systems-deployment.
152. ARCTIC SHIELD FINAL REPORT, supra note 122, at 1; see also U.S. COAST GUARD, PREPSORS 2012 (CGC SYCAMORE) AFTER ACTION REPORT (2012) (on file with author).
153. ARCTIC SHIELD FINAL REPORT, supra note 122, at 3–4.
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meaningful response effort were underway. Finally, ice and fog inhibited
the exercise.154
Realities like these led the National Commission to find that “successful oil spill response methods from the Gulf of Mexico, or anywhere
else, cannot simply be transferred to the Arctic.”155 The National Academy of Sciences similarly determined that “no current cleanup methods
remove more than a small fraction of oil spilled in marine waters, especially in the presence of broken ice.”156
Generally, oil spill response plans have not reflected the fact that
basic response methods are limited. For example, before the Deepwater
Horizon spill, BP assumed that the boats and skimmers it used could mechanically remove 492,000 barrels of oil per day.157 In reality, skimmers
collected approximately 3% of the spilled oil.158 BP based its assumptions about skimmers on their Effective Daily Recovery Capacity
(EDRC). EDRC is based on the “Name Plate Recovery Rate” of the
skimmer, which is based on the amount of liquid that a skimmer’s pump
can draw, discounted by 20% to account for the lack of efficiency caused
by factors such as the percentage of water mixed with oil that is recovered.159 However, this simple formula does not account for other limitations, such as “moderate sea states, poor encounter rates, oil compositions that were incompatible with offshore skimming systems, and an
inability of skimmers to stay within the confines of the largest and thickest patches of fresh crude oil close to the site of the well.”160 Thus,
“[c]urrent planning standards for offshore skimming systems relying on
EDRC as the measure of skimmer effectiveness during a response proved
to be highly inaccurate and unreliable as measures of potential performance.”161
Similarly, the spill response plans approved for Shell’s proposed
activities in 2012 rely on the assumption that 90% of a worst-case discharge will be contained at the source and another 5% recovered by
skimmers or other mechanical recovery.162 Neither the plans nor the ap-

154. Id. at 6.
155. DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 303–04.
156. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CUMULATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF OIL AND GAS
ACTIVITIES ON ALASKA’S NORTH SLOPE 7 (2003), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?
isbn=0309087376.
157. ISPR, supra note 115, at 28.
158. Id. at 8, 29.
159. Id. at 8.
160. Id. at 110.
161. Id. at 30.
162. SHELL, supra note 135, at N-49.
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provals recognize the limits on these technologies, the lack of testing, or
the past failures.
2. Response Gap
The efficacy of oil spill recovery in water is limited under any conditions, but at times, recovery actions are completely impossible due to
environmental conditions. The time during which response is impossible
is called the “response gap.”163
As the USGS explained,
“[u]nderstanding what combination of countermeasures will likely be
available under the temporal and spatial variability of the Arctic is essential to assess environmental risks from any potential spilled oil.”164
A response gap assessment examines historical weather data and
operational limits during various time periods for a particular location to
assess when response is likely to be impossible. The Canadian government conducted a response gap assessment for a few locations in Canadian Arctic waters.165 The study found that, in the Beaufort Sea, visibility
precluded any response 20% of the time in July. In November, darkness
precluded response approximately 75% of the time, and visibility precluded response 80% of the time.166 The study did not, however, assess
the limitations caused by ice cover, which can also be significant. Ice
coverage between 30% and 70% is particularly challenging for any response method.167 A study integrating ice coverage with the Canadian
response gap study found that, in July, thresholds would not be exceeded
for at least one response measure about 50% the time, meaning that some
response could be mounted roughly half the days in July.168 By October,
response was possible only 20% of the time, and no response at all was
possible from November until May.169
Thus, each response method is limited in Arctic conditions, and
there are times when no response will be possible. As the experts who
163. See S.L. ROSS ENVTL. RES. LTD., SPILL RESPONSE GAP STUDY FOR THE CANADIAN
BEAUFORT SEA AND THE CANADIAN DAVIS STRAIT (2011) [hereinafter CANADIAN BEAUFORT
RESPONSE GAP], available at https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90463/
621169/700096/702787/A2A6V0_%2D_SL_Ross_Environmetal_Research_Limited_%2D_Spill_Re
sponse_Gap_Study_for_the_Canadian_Beaufort_Sea_and_the_Canadian_Davis_Strait.pdf?nodeid=
702903&vernum=-2.
164. USGS REPORT, supra note 17, at 130.
165. CANADIAN BEAUFORT RESPONSE GAP, supra note 163.
166. Id. at 19.
167. US STILL ILL-PREPARED FOR ARCTIC OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 130, at 11.
168. Letter from Will Amos, Counsel, WWF-Canada, to Anne-Marie Erickson, Sec’y, Can.
Nat’l Energy Board 3 (Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://awsassets.wwf.ca/downloads/wwf_
canada___letter_of_comment___sl_ross_spill_response_gap_study_for_the_canadian_be.pdf.
169. Id. at 1.
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conducted the Canadian response gap study observed, “there is a growing recognition” that the primary response method—mechanical response—“has significant limitations when used for large spills in . . .
Arctic locations.”170 The other existing methods—in-situ burning and
dispersal—are limited by many of the same environmental conditions
and have the additional disadvantage that they change at lease some of
the pollution from one form to another.171
E. Lack of Comprehensive Regulatory Regime
The lack of overarching legal or policy direction compounds the
challenges to rational decision-making outlined above. Management of
Arctic resources has been described as “balkanized”:
More than 20 federal agencies and bureaus have domestic Arcticrelated missions that include promoting safety, permitting commercial activities, conducting scientific research, assuring clean air and
water, and conserving fauna, flora, and ecosystems. The responsibilities of each of those agencies are spelled out in U.S. law, but
how they coordinate with each other can be unclear. State, municipal, and tribal governments also have authorities and responsibilities, further complicating the regulatory landscape.172

Decisions about Arctic Ocean resources fall under the purview of
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Bureau of Safety
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
(FWS), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), among others.
“These agencies are all separate entities, most of them located in different Cabinet departments. . . .”173
Different agencies are charged with making final management decisions about industrial activities—oil and gas, shipping, climate, fisheries—and these decisions by different agencies are not always consistent
with each other or reflective of a coherent long-term plan or risk-benefit
calculus. There is no single statute that governs Arctic resource management or planning; nor is there a single statute providing direction for
ocean management. Instead, federal agencies must implement their spe170. S.L. ROSS ENVTL. RESEARCH LTD. ET AL., BEAUFORT SEA OIL SPILLS STATE OF
KNOWLEDGE REVIEW AND IDENTIFICATION OF KEY ISSUES 29–30 (2010), available at
http://www.esrfunds.org/pdf/177.pdf.
171. US STILL ILL-PREPARED FOR ARCTIC OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 129, at 11–
12.
172. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 38.
173. Id. at 39.
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cific directions, which are not always in harmony. “For example, some
missions focus primarily on facilitating the extraction of minerals and
energy resources, while others are charged primarily with understanding,
moderating, and mitigating the potential impacts of human activities upon environmental or cultural values.”174 As mentioned above, NMFS has
precluded commercial fisheries in the U.S. Arctic at this time due to lack
of scientific information.175 The Department of the Interior, however,
with the same information, has moved ahead to allow offshore oil and
gas activities.176
These problems are complicated by the lack of binding international direction. There is no treaty or agreement governing international waters in the Arctic. Rather, the Arctic Council exists as a policy-making
body. Its goals are largely aspirational, and thus far, the work of the Arctic Council has not resulted in significant policy change in the United
States.
The multiple agencies and directions can lead to inefficiency, conflict, and poor management. To address some of those concerns, President Obama created the Interagency Working Group on Coordination of
Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska.177 The Working Group “facilitate[s] coordinated and efficient domestic energy development and permitting in Alaska while ensuring that all applicable
standards are fully met.”178 The Working Group is comprised of representatives from the federal agencies that play roles in Arctic management
and is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Interior.
The Working Group coordinates, but it does not have the authority to
change regulations or force specific actions at the member agencies.
F. Increasingly Politicization of Oil and Gas Issues
Management decisions are further complicated by the elevation of
offshore oil and gas issues in the national political debate. Exploration
and development of offshore oil and gas resources rose to national prominence in the early 1980s as a result of the Arab oil embargo and Reagan
Administration push for development.179 The issue faded from the national political scene in the late 1980s, and public opinion swung against
174. Id. at 38. The government prepares an Arctic Strategy, but the document provides general
policy direction, not specific governance. See U.S. COAST GUARD, ARCTIC STRATEGY (2013), available at http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CG_Arctic_Strategy.pdf.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 104–06.
176. See infra Part V.C.
177. Exec. Order No. 13,580, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,989 (July 11, 2011).
178. Id. § 1.
179. See infra Part V.A (describing early history from 1970–2000).
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increased offshore exploration and development in the wake of the Exxon
Valdez spill in 1989. In fact, in the aftermath of that spill, President
George H.W. Bush issued a presidential directive preventing leasing offshore most of the continental United States and in Bristol Bay, AK.180
Congress similarly expanded an annual funding limitation that precluded
funds from being used to lease in those places.181
1. Increasing Attention
That period of relative calm began to change in the early 2000s as
the George W. Bush Administration began to make more offshore areas
available to companies.182 In addition, the issue was a centerpiece of Republican rhetoric in the campaign leading up to the 2008 election. Most
famous of these rallying cries, of course, was Republican vicepresidential nominee Sarah Palin’s infamous chant, “Drill, baby, drill”
and Newt Gingrich’s call to “drill here, drill now.”183 The national attention and political gamesmanship had some substantive ramifications.
President Bush removed the presidential moratorium implemented by his
father, and Congress let lapse the annual funding moratoria.184 Together,
these two actions removed barriers to leasing in much of the U.S. Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS). Late in his final term, President George W.
Bush released a draft 2010–2015 Five-Year Leasing Program proposing
to expand even further offshore leasing of U.S. waters.185 This draft plan,

180. CURRY L. HAGERTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41132, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
MORATORIA ON OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 2 n.8 (2011), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41132.pdf.
181. See id. at 5.
182. See infra text accompanying notes 289–96 (detailing expansion of leasing under George
W. Bush). At the beginning of the George W. Bush Administration, Vice President Cheney convened an “energy task force” in which he met with oil industry leaders to develop an “energy policy.” Dana Milbank & Justin Blum, Document Says Oil Chiefs Met with Cheney Task Force, WASH.
POST (Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/15/
AR2005111501842.html.
183. Jeffrey Ball, Palin’s Policy: Drill, Baby, Drill, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2008),
http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2008/09/04/palins-policy-drill-baby-drill/;
NEWT
GINGRICH, DRILL HERE, DRILL NOW, PAY LESS: A HANDBOOK FOR SLASHING GAS PRICES AND
SOLVING OUR ENERGY CRISIS (2008).
184. Steven Lee Myers & Carl Hulse, Bush Lifts Drilling Moratorium, Prodding Congress,
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/washington/14drillcnd.html?_r=0;
HAGERTY, supra note 180, at 1.
185. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DRAFT PROPOSED OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS) OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM 2010–15 (2009), available at
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/DPP_FINALpdf.aspx.
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which was off-schedule (the existing plan did not expire until 2012), included thirty-one lease sales.186 This draft was never finalized.187
Offshore drilling issues were once again thrust into the national
spotlight by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident. Unlike the aftermath
of the Exxon Valdez disaster, however, public concern about offshore
drilling has not yet resulted in fundamental, substantive change in the
governing statutes or government policy.188 High-level officials have repeatedly stated that offshore drilling—in the Arctic Ocean and other
places—is an important component of the Obama Administration’s “allof-the-above” energy strategy.189
2. The Department of the Interior Seeks to Quiet Its Experts
The sensitive political environment appears to have had a direct effect on substantive work within the Department of the Interior (DOI). For
example, during the review of Shell’s 2007–09 exploration plans, a num186. Id. at 3; see also 74 Fed. Reg. 3631, 3633 (Jan. 21, 2009); Wesley Loy, NOAA, Natives
Oppose Much of 2010–15 Leasing Plan; Drillers, Lawmakers Endorse, PETROLEUM NEWS (Oct. 25,
2009), http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/612252252.shtml.
187. In fact, the Obama Administration consolidated its review of the draft 2010–2015 program with its reconsideration of the 2007–2012 program. As one of his first acts after being confirmed as Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar announced that the comment deadline on the draft
2010–2015 Five-Year Leasing Program would be extended and that a series of public meetings
would be held. See 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, BUREAU OF
OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Five-YearProgram/2012-2017/DDP.aspx (last visited June 2, 2014). These meetings were held, and before the
agency reached a decision, the court invalidated the 2007–12 Leasing Program and remanded it to
DOI. See infra text accompanying notes 297–302 (discussing challenge to 2007–2012 Five-Year
Leasing Program).
188. Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill.
After this spill, Congress acted to “prevent[] future oil spills . . . and enhanc[e] oil spill response.”
SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2002). Among other
changes, the Act requires double hulls on oil tankers, specifically mandates that parties responsible
for an oil spill will pay for removal and remediation, and obligates operators of offshore drilling rigs
to comply with Clean Water Act requirements for spill response planning. See Oil Pollution Act of
1990. No substantive legislation addressing identified causes of the Deepwater Horizon spill has
been passed. In addition, the government has continued to approve exploration proposals, hold lease
sales, and publicly state its support for offshore drilling. See, e.g., infra Part V.C.3.b (describing
approvals of Shell’s exploration proposals for the Chukchi and Beaufort seas); Gulf of Mexico OCS
Region, Table 1: All Lease Offerings, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
http://www.boem.gov/OCS-Lease-Sale-Statistics-All-Lease-Offerings/ (last updated Jan. 9, 2014)
(showing lease sales held in the Gulf of Mexico since 2010); Wendy Koch, Obama Calls for Offshore
Oil
Drilling
and
Clean
Energy,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
24,
2012),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/greenhouse/post/2012/01/obama-calls-for-offshore-oilnatural-gas-and-clean-energy/1#.U06ijVIdGoo.
189. Dan Pfeiffer, Fact Check: All-of-the-Above Approach to American Energy, WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/29/fact-check-all-above-approachamerican-energy.
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ber of DOI’s scientists expressed concerns about the potential impacts of
Shell’s drilling plans. The opinions of these scientists were not disclosed
in the final Environmental Assessment, but petitioners otherwise had
copies of these expert assessments and were successful in ensuring that
they were before the court during the challenge to the approval based on
that assessment.190
Subsequently, a manager at MMS filed a complaint with the DOI
Office of Inspector General (IG), asserting that one of the agency’s scientists wrongfully released the documents to outside parties.191 He asserted that the expert’s documents were a critical part of the agency’s
internal deliberative process and therefore not subject to public access
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In a parallel claim, the
manager alleged that two of the agency scientists “intentionally omitted
or used false data in their published manuscript” about observations of
dead polar bears found floating in the Beaufort Sea.192 The manager also
alleged that the scientists manipulated data in order to influence FWS to
list the polar bear under the ESA.193
The IG thereafter initiated a multi-year investigation of the allegations. Without public explanation, the agency—by then renamed
BOEM—suspended one of the scientists in connection with the IG investigation, but the scientist was restored six weeks later, again without public explanation. The IG report was released in September 2012.194 At that
time, BOEM informed the scientist that it was reprimanding him based
on a series of improper disclosures of internal government documents to
a non-governmental organization in 2007 and 2008.195 As BOEM explicitly noted, one of the disclosures listed in the letter of reprimand had
been “cited by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in making
decisions to vacate BOEM’s approval of the Shell exploration plan.”196
190. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Leaked Emails May Sink Arctic Offshore
Lease Sales, PUB. EMPS. FOR ENVTL. RESPONSIBILITY (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.peer.org/news/
news-releases/2008/02/04/leaked-e-mails-may-sink-arctic-offshore-lease-sales/.
191. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
OF CHARLES MONNETT 1 (2012), available at http://www.peer.org/assets/docs/doi/10_1_12_
Monnett_IG_Report.pdf.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Press Release, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, Drowned Polar Bear Paper Vindicated—Again (Feb. 14, 2013), available at http://www.peer.org/news/news-releases/2013/
02/14/drowned-polar-bear-paper-vindicated-%E2%80%93-again/.
195. Reprimand Letter from Walter D. Cruickshank, Deputy Dir., Bureau of Ocean Energy
Mgmt., to Charles W. Monnett, Wildlife Biologist 3 (Sept. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.peer.org/assets/docs/noaa/10_1_12_Monnett_reprimand.pdf.
196. Id.
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At some point thereafter, the IG re-opened the case, pursuing a new
scientific misconduct investigation. In response, the BOEM Scientific
Integrity Officer found no violations of the DOI Policy on Scientific and
Scholarly Integrity and declared the case closed.197
IV. OIL AND GAS MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY STRUCTURE
As discussed above, a variety of federal agencies are charged with
making management decisions about Arctic Ocean resources under several federal statutes. Decisions about offshore oil and gas activities are a
microcosm of this issue. DOI, through BOEM and BSEE,198 is charged
with planning and authorizing offshore oil and gas leasing, exploration,
and development. BOEM and BSEE are subject to permitting and other
authority that resides in a number of federal agencies. This next section
provides a general overview of the central regulatory directives for decisions about offshore oil and gas activities in federal waters.199

197. Press Release, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, supra note 194. As part of the final
resolution, the letter of reprimand was withdrawn, Dr. Monnett received a $100,000 settlement from
the agency, and he was given a conservation award by Interior. Nell Greenfieldboyce, Polar Bear
Researcher Gets $100,000 in Settlement with Feds, NPR, (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/12/04/248674546/polar-bear-researcher-gets-100-000-in-settlement-withfeds.
198. BOEM and BSEE are two components of what used to be the Minerals Management
Service. As another result of the Deepwater Horizon blowout, the Obama Administration reorganized the Department of the Interior’s oil and gas management agency. See, e.g., HENRY B.
HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41485, REORGANIZATION OF THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT
SERVICE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41485.pdf. It started by dividing the Minerals Management Service (MMS) into the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement
(BOEMRE)—which handled regulatory functions—and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue,
which handled the accounting functions of the former MMS. See id. at 3, 10–11. Later, BOEMRE
was further divided into BOEM, which handles planning and approvals, and BSEE, which is charged
with enforcement and oversight. Id. at 10–11. Unlike the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),
which manages federal lands under DOI’s purview, BOEM and BSEE are not directed by an organic
statute. There is no statutory companion for ocean management agencies, which, as a result, are left
solely with the direction provided in OCSLA. See infra Part IV.A.
199. Pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act and Equal Footing Doctrine, the state of Alaska has
jurisdiction over subsea resources from zero to three nautical miles offshore. See Submerged Lands
Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(2), 1311(a) (2012) (granting the states title to submerged lands
beneath a three-mile belt of territorial sea, measured from the state’s “coast line”); Alaska Statehood
Act § 6(m) (providing that the Submerged Lands Act applies to Alaska). As a result, the state makes
decisions about offshore oil and gas resources under those waters. The federal government manages
the remainder of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf, from three to two hundred nautical miles offshore.
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A. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) governs federal
offshore oil and gas activities.200 OCSLA calls for the “expeditious and
orderly development” of offshore oil and gas resources, “subject to environmental safeguards.”201 Congress left it to DOI to find the appropriate
balance between those competing objectives, with some guidance provided by the statutory factors addressed below.
Under the Act, decisions about offshore oil and gas activities occur
in four main stages.202 First, the Secretary of the Interior develops a nationwide leasing program, which sets forth a five-year schedule of proposed lease sales.203 The plan is crafted by BOEM and must indicate, “as
precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity
[that] . . . will best meet national energy needs.”204 A Five-Year Leasing
Program must “obtain a proper balance between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the
potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”205 It must be “conducted in a manner which considers economic, social, and environmental
values of the renewable and nonrenewable resources contained in the
[OCS], and the potential impact of oil and gas exploration on other resource values of the [OCS] and the marine, coastal, and human environments.”206 The statute sets out a number of specific factors, including the
relative environmental sensitivity and productivity of different ocean
areas, that the agency must consider in crafting this balance.207
Second, should it choose to proceed with a specific lease sale included in a Five-Year Leasing Program, BOEM conducts a more specific
analysis and decision-making process related to that specific lease sale
and the area in which it is scheduled.208 The sale areas often cover tens of
millions of acres, and the agency sells leases through a competitive bid-

200. See 43 U.S.C. §1331, et. seq. (2012)
201. Id. § 1332(3).
202. For a more detailed review of the statute and some of the difficulties in its implementation, see Andrew Hartsig, Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer Continental Shelf Oil
and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.
269, 273 (2011).
203. Id.
204. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
205. Id. § 1344(a)(3); see also id. § 1344(a)(1).
206. Id. § 1344(a)(1).
207. Id. § 1344 (a)(2)(g).
208. Id. § 1336(a).
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ding process.209 Successful bidders obtain a conditional right “to explore,
develop, and produce the oil and gas contained within the lease area.”210
Third, BOEM evaluates exploration plans submitted by lessees.211
Once an exploration plan is submitted and deemed complete, BOEM has
thirty days to approve, request modification of, or deny the plan.212 If a
company obtains all the necessary approvals from BOEM and the other
permits described below, it may drill exploratory wells on lease tracts
purchased during the second phase. BSEE is part of this approval process, and the ultimate approvals to drill wells require safety and spill response-planning approvals that are granted by BSEE.213 In addition to
exploration drilling, companies may apply to conduct seismic and other
activities, which are subject to approvals separate from the exploration
plan process.214
Fourth, BOEM evaluates proposals for development and production.215 OCSLA establishes requirements governing the scope and content of development and production plans, and operators must carry out
their activities in conformance with approved development and production plans.216 BSEE is part of this approval process as well.217
B. Other Statutory Direction
OCSLA establishes the framework for management, but decisions
made by BOEM and BSEE are subject to a series of other statutory obligations, some of which are implemented by other federal agencies.
OCSLA makes clear that the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) apply at all stages.218 As a result, BOEM
prepares Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) to accompany decisions about Five-Year Leasing Programs, lease sales, and development
plans.219 At the third stage—exploration—DOI has interpreted the thirtyday limit on approvals in such a way that it effectively precludes prepara-

209. Id.; see also infra Part V.B.2 (explaining that the government offered tens of millions of
acres in lease sales in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas).
210. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(4) (2005).
211. Id. § 1340(c)(1).
212. Id.
213. See id. § 1340(a)(1); see also id. § 1348(b)(1)–(3).
214. See NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at ES-1 to ES-4.
215. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (2014).
216. Id.
217. Id. §§ 1351(c)(1)–(6), 1351(b).
218. Id. § 1351(e)(1)–(2); see also id. § 1331(p).
219. See id. § 1351(f).
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tion of an EIS.220 Instead, BOEM prepares less detailed Environmental
Assessments to evaluate decisions about approval of exploration plans.
When companies get to the third and fourth OCSLA stages—
exploration and development—they must prepare spill response plans to
address potential discharges. Although OCSLA contains a statement of
policy that offshore operations be conducted “in a safe manner by welltrained personnel using technology, precautions, and techniques” to prevent spills and other accidents, it contains no substantive requirement for
spill prevention or preparation.221 The substantive obligations come from
Clean Water Act, which requires operators of offshore facilities to have
“a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst
case discharge.”222 Such plans “identify, and ensure . . . the availability
of, private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maximum extent practicable a worst case discharge (including a discharge
resulting from fire or explosion), and to mitigate or prevent a substantial
threat of such a discharge.”223 By executive order and subsequent memorandum of agreement, the responsibility for implementing this provision
with respect to offshore oil and gas drilling has been delegated to DOI,
and DOI has in turn delegated this authority to BSEE.224 Accordingly,
BSEE approves or denies oil spill response plans that have been provided
by companies for proposed exploration and development projects.225
BOEM and BSEE must also comply with the ESA in granting approvals.226 The agencies have generally met this obligation by undertak220. See Brief of Respondents at 52 n.11, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar (9th Cir. 2013)
(No. 09-73942); This interpretation is not mandated by the text of the regulation and, indeed, it
would be possible for the agency to interpret the provision to permit a full EIS. See Comments Regarding Shell 2010 EP Submitted by Alaska Wilderness League et al. for Jeffrey Walker, Regional
Supervisor, Minerals Management Service, at 17–18 (Aug. 31, 2009) (on file with author). President
Obama has blamed this limit for “leav[ing] no time for the appropriate environmental review.”
Obama Blames 30-Day Legal Limit for Role in Oil Spill, POLITIFACT (May 27, 2010),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/jun/01/barack-obama/obama-blames-30day-limit-law-role-oil-spill/.
221. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(6) (2014).
222. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i).
223. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii). Beyond that, the law does not establish specific spill plan requirements or measures that must be met as a condition of executive approval.
224. Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54757 (Oct. 18, 1991); see also MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT—U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, AND THE U.S. COAST GUARD—U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY (2012), available at http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/Newsroom/
Publications_Library/2012%20Coast%20Guard%20MOU.pdf.
225. There is a current controversy about whether considerations of spill response plans themselves require compliance with NEPA and other statutes. See infra Parts V.B.3 and V.C.3.c (discussing challenges to spill response plans).
226. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
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ing formal consultations at the lease sale, exploration, and development
phases of the OCSLA process.227 At the exploration stage, the consultation has resulted in programmatic Biological Opinions, which evaluate
the potential impacts of a series of potential activities rather than individual exploration proposals.228
A variety of other statutes apply to decisions at the third and fourth
stages of OCSLA. In order to drill exploration or development wells,
companies must obtain permits or approvals for air, water, noise, and
other pollution that the proposed activities may cause. NMFS and FWS,
for example, decide whether to grant approvals for harassment of marine
mammals pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act and ESA.229 Companies must also comply with Clean
Water Act discharge requirements administered by EPA.230 In the Arctic,
EPA has promulgated general permits pursuant to the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) for exploration activities.231 As
long as proposed discharges are within the scope of those contemplated
by these general NPDES permits, companies can simply apply for coverage.
Prior to 2010, companies seeking to operate in the Arctic also had
to comply with Clean Air Act protections administered by EPA.232 Drill
rigs and associated vessels were treated like emitting facilities subject to
the Clean Air Act’s restrictions on emissions and directive to protect
pristine airsheds. A legislative rider attached to the 2011 Omnibus Appropriations Act removed these requirements, and the authority to regulate air emissions from offshore activities in the Arctic Ocean was trans227. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2009).
228. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) SECTION 7(A)(2)
BIOLOGICAL OPINION (2013), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_
BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Environment/Environmental_Analysis/NMFS_Arctic%20R
egional%20Biological%20Opinion_4-2-13.pdf; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION
AND CONFERENCE OPINION FOR OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE BEAUFORT AND CHUKCHI SEA
PLANNING AREAS ON POLAR BEARS (URSUS MARITIMUS), POLAR BEAR CRITICAL HABITAT,
SPECTACLED EIDERS (SOMATERIA FISCHERI), SPECTACLED EIDER CRITICAL HABITAT, STELLER’S
EIDERS (POLYSTICTA STELLERI), KITTLITZ’S MURRELETS (BRACHYRAMPHUS BREVIROSTRIS), AND
YELLOW-BILLED LOONS (GAVIA ADAMSII) (2012), available at http://www.boem.gov/AboutBOEM/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Environment/Environmental-Analysis/Biological-OpinionsEPA.aspx.
229. See 16 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2012); see also id. § 1532(15).
230. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012).
231. See e.g., Arctic Oil and Gas Exploration General Permits, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/water.nsf/npdes+permits/arctic-gp (last updated June 13, 2013) (discussing Permit No. AKG-28-4300).
232. The law includes an exception for offshore activities in the Gulf of Mexico; these requirements applied elsewhere. See 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a), (b) (2012).
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ferred to DOI.233 Consequently, future offshore activities in the Arctic
will not have to comply with the Clean Air Act.
Until 2011, Alaska’s Coastal Management Program applied to oil
and gas activities in federal waters. That program included standards designed to limit the impact of oil and gas activities on the state’s coastal
zone, formalize local involvement in agency decision making, and provide a measure of local control over those activities even though they
occur seaward of the state’s borders.234 Over the years, however, Alaska
diminished those standards, and it ultimately allowed the program to expire in 2011.235 In doing so, Alaska gave up its authority to ensure that
federally authorized activities are consistent with state coastal policy and
lost funds that previously had been used to help local communities manage activities in their coastal zones.236
V. OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN
Oil was first produced in Alaska in the early 1900s from a small
onshore field adjacent to the Gulf of Alaska called Katalla.237 That production ended in 1933, and starting in the late 1950s, oil was produced
from fields on the shores of Cook Inlet.238 Oil was discovered at Prudhoe
Bay in the 1960s, and the first oil made it to market from the North Slope
field in the 1970s.239 The intervening years have seen consistent production of oil produced onshore in the state and offshore in Cook Inlet.240
233. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 432, available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ74/html/PLAW-112publ74.htm.
234. Tim Bradner, State’s Coastal Zone Management Authority to Expire This Month, ALASKA
J. OF COMMERCE (June 3, 2011), http://classic.alaskajournal.com/stories/060311/loc_sczm.shtml.
235. Id.
236. Richard Mauer, Loss of Coast Zone Program Hurts State’s Beluga Whale Case,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 30, 2011), http://www.adn.com/2011/10/30/2146856/coast-zoneloss-hurts-states-beluga.html.
237. Tricia Brown, Katalla: Alaska’s First Oil Well, LITSITE ALASKA,
http://www.litsite.org/index.cfm?section=Digital-Archives&page=Industry&cat=Oil-andGas&viewpost=2&ContentId=2747 (last visited June 4, 2014).
238.
Federal
Oil
and
Gas
in
Alaska, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
http://www.blm.gov/ak/st/en/prog/energy/oil_gas.html (last updated May 21, 2014).
239. Production began in earnest. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL,
MONEY & POWER 553, 648 (2009) (“By 1978 over a million barrels per day were flowing through”
the Trans Alaska Pipeline. It would double “[w]ithin a few years . . . [to] a quarter of America’s total
crude oil production.”).
240. Production from Prudhoe Bay peaked in 1987 at 1.5 million barrels per day. See BRITISH
PETROLEUM, PRUDHOE BAY FACT SHEET (2006), available at https://dec.alaska.gov/spar/perp/
response/sum_fy06/060302301/factsheets/060302301_factsheet_PB.pdf. It has been declining steadily since, though there are sufficient resources to keep the Trans-Alaska Pipeline operating for at
least five more decades. See Alan Bailey, A TAPS Bottom Line, PETROLEUM NEWS (Jan. 15, 2012),
http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/225019711.shtml.
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The same is not true for the Chukchi and Beaufort sea resources. In
fact, the history of Arctic offshore development is one of great expectations and failed realities. The next section below details those efforts, and
the controversy they generated. It is broken into three periods: 1980 to
2000, 2000 to 2011, and 2012 to the present. These time periods correspond generally to the development efforts.
A. 1970–2000
The first big push to develop Arctic Ocean oil and gas resources
began in the late 1970s and lasted through the early 1990s. In light of the
1973 Arab oil embargo and corresponding increase in oil prices, President Nixon directed that ten million acres of the OCS be leased in
1975.241 “This announcement was significant not only because it proposed leasing an amount of territory in one year almost equal to that
which had been leased since the OCS program began in the early 1950’s
but also because it envisioned moving into previously undeveloped or
frontier areas off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and off Alaska.”242 Congress responded by amending OCSLA to create the current regulatory
structure.243
Within this new framework, companies purchased large swaths of
leases in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas and explored for oil. With one
exception, those efforts failed, and companies relinquished almost all of
the leases they purchased. Here, we describe those leasing and exploration efforts and the controversy they engendered.

241. See G. Kevin Jones, Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development During the
Reagan Administration—Part I, 12 W. NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 6 & 11 n.44 (1990).
242. California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (internal citations omitted)
[hereinafter Watt I].
243. Nixon’s announcement led to the 1978 amendments to OCSLA.
It crystallized growing concern over the impact of OCS activities and the adequacy of the 1953 Act. Although the need to develop national energy independence was clear, state and local governments feared damaging impacts to
their coastlines from oil spills and the onshore development that accompanies
offshore drilling. Commercial and recreational fishing interests expressed
concern over the possible effects on their livelihoods and leisure activities,
while environmental and citizens groups raised questions about the effect of
OCS activities on the ecology. These interests accordingly sought a role in the
offshore leasing policy decisions, which had previously been committed to the
virtually unlimited discretion of the Secretary.
Id. at 1295–96 (internal citations omitted).
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1. Five-Year Leasing Programs
Against a backdrop of new congressional direction and increasing
pressure to expand exploration and development offshore, President
Jimmy Carter and Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus began developing the first Five-Year Leasing Program in 1978.244 A draft proposed
program was prepared, and in 1979, President Carter used “his second
Energy Message to the nation” to “direct[] the Secretary to increase the
amount of proposed acreage over that contained in the first Draft Proposed Program.”245 Ultimately, Secretary Andrus selected a Proposed
Final Program, which “scheduled 36 proposed lease sales for the period
from June 1980 through May 1985, covering virtually the entire Outer
Continental Shelf . . . .”246 The program scheduled “11 proposed sales in
the Gulf of Mexico, 6 in the Atlantic, 4 off California, 10 off Alaska, and
5 reoffering sales [in the Gulf of Mexico].”247
The final program was greeted by four separate court challenges.
Petitions for review were filed in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit by the states of Alaska and California,
the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the North Slope Borough.248
In this case, known as Watt I, the petitioners alleged violations of
OCSLA, NEPA, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in addition to a special trust responsibility owed to Inupiat Eskimos.249 The
court found that the Secretary violated OCSLA by failing ti: identify the
location of two proposed lease sales with greater specificity; consider
certain factors required in the balancing that underlies creation of the
plan and base the timing and location of leases on consideration of those
factors; consider the benefits and environmental risks shared among OCS
regions; consider the relative environmental sensitivity and marine
productivity among the OCS regions; balance environmental and coastal
zone factors and not just economic factors of oil potential; quantify envi-

244. Id. at 1299.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1300. The “Florida Straits, the Southern Aleutian Shelf in Alaska, and the area
seaward of the Washington and Oregon coasts” were excluded; “[a]ll these excluded areas possessed
a very low industry rating for hydrocarbon potential.” Id.
247. Id. The sales in Alaska included the following: Gulf of Alaska in 1980; Cook Inlet in
1981; Norton Basin in 1982; Beaufort Sea, Kodiak, and North Aleutian Basin in 1983; Navarin
Basin in 1984; and Chukchi Sea and Hope Basin in 1985. Id. at 1300 n.53.
248. Id. at 1294 n.1. The court described the North Slope Borough as “a local governmental
body in Alaska.” Id.
249. Id. at 1294.
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ronmental costs; and adequately explain the determination of net economic value.250
The court rejected petitioners’ other arguments, finding that the
Secretary met his trust obligations to Inupiat Eskimos through compliance with other relevant environmental statutes, including the ESA and
Marine Mammals Protection Act,251 and that section 19 of OCSLA (requiring coordination and consultation with local communities) is inapplicable to preparation of a leasing program.252 The court found it unnecessary to reach plaintiff’s NEPA claims.253
This case was pending when President Reagan took office. The new
President was faced with “rising inflation, record interest rates, further
turbulence in the oil market following the 1979 Iranian revolution, and a
severe recession.”254 His response, at least in part, was to state support
for moving aggressively to develop the country’s natural resources and to
remove the regulatory hurdles and protections that might limit development. Offshore drilling was one significant focus of this effort, and shortly after being confirmed, Reagan’s Secretary of the Interior, James Watt,
promised to offer one billion acres of the OCS for lease to oil companies.255
While the challenge to the 1980 Five-Year Program was proceeding, Secretary Watt prepared to make good on his promise and “was in
the process of revising and reapproving the program pursuant to section
18(e)” when the court issued its order remanding the 1980 plan.256 In
January 1982, “the court issued an order in which it adopted the Secretary’s position that he could meet the court’s remand in the course of the

250. Id. at 1325.
251. Id. at 1324.
252. Id. at 1325.
253. Id.
254. DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 63.
255. Id. “If the press is here,” Secretary Watt declared during a National Ocean Industries
Association meeting in April 1982, “I hope they will write this down. We will offer one billion acres
for leasing in the next five years. We will not back away from our plans to have 42 lease sales.” Id.
As part of this commitment, Secretary Watt created the Minerals Management Service (MMS) in
January 1982. He was
aiming from the outset to promote domestic energy supplies by dramatically expanding
drilling on the outer continental shelf. He combined, in one entity, authority for regulatory oversight with responsibility for collecting for the U.S. Treasury the billions of dollars
of revenues obtained from lease sales and royalty payments from producing wells. From
birth, MMS had a built-in incentive to promote offshore drilling in sharp tension with its
mandate to ensure safe drilling and environmental protection.
Id. at 56.
256. California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 590 (D.C. Cir 1983) [hereinafter Watt II].
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revision and approved the Secretary’s proposed timetable for completing
the revision.”257
In July 1982, Secretary Watt issued a new Five-Year Leasing Program that scheduled forty-one sales between August 1982 and June
1987. Together, these sales would offer nearly one billion acres in eighteen planning areas. The new sales would be “area-wide,” meaning that
entire swaths of the ocean—ranging from 8 to 133 million acres—would
be offered in the sales rather than only the areas in which oil companies
had demonstrated interest.258 This revised plan also generated substantial
opposition in court. The petitioners from Watt I challenged the revised
plan on the grounds that the Secretary failed to specify the size and location of lease areas with the precision required under OCSLA; failed to
consider and base his decision on relevant environmental factors required
by OCSLA § 18(a)(2); used an incorrect methodology to evaluate the
costs and benefits of leasing; violated OCSLA by failing to insure receipt
of fair market value under leases; violated OCSLA and NEPA by failing
to consider certain environmental impacts of the program; and failed to
indicate when consistency determinations under the Coastal Zone Management Act would be made.259 The court rejected these arguments and
upheld the 1982–1987 Five-Year Leasing Program.260
Soon thereafter, DOI began preparing the 1987–1992 Five-Year
Program. A Draft Proposed Program was released in 1985, and the program was finalized in July 1987.261 The plan continued the Reagan Administration’s commitment to area-wide leasing, and seventeen sales
were held between 1987 and 1992, including five in the Alaskan OCS.262
Environmental groups and Atlantic and Pacific coastal states challenged
the leasing program on a variety of NEPA and OCSLA grounds. In particular, petitioners were concerned that migratory species might be subject to synergistic or cumulative effects from oil and gas activities while
migrating through various regions, particularly in the Pacific Ocean and
Alaska.263 The court found that the cumulative effects of the lease sale
offerings were not properly evaluated in the Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS):
257. Id.
258. DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 65.
259. Watt II, 712 F.2d at 590.
260. Id. at 611.
261. Natural Res. Defense Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
262. See PATRICIA R. BRYARS, OFFICE OF LEASING & PLANS, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY
MGMT., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE SALE STATISTICS, ALL LEASE OFFERINGS 2–6 tbl.1
(Jan. 9, 2014), available at http://www.boem.gov/OCS-Lease-Sale-Statistics/.
263. Natural Res. Defense Council, 865 F.2d at 298.
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Although the FEIS contains sections headed ‘Cumulative Impacts,’
in truth, nothing in the FEIS provides the requisite analysis. The
FEIS for the most part considers only the impact within each area
of non-OCS actions plus OCS development and not the impact of
simultaneous OCS development in different areas. The few times
the FEIS does discuss the impact of simultaneous OCS development
in different areas, it makes only conclusory remarks, statements that
do not equip a decisionmaker to make an informed decision about
alternative courses of action or a court to review the Secretary’s reasoning.264

The court concluded that “[e]ven under the applicable deferential
standard of review, we believe that allowing the Secretary’s ‘analysis’ to
pass muster here would eviscerate NEPA” and remanded the matter back
to the agency.265
In the end, President Nixon’s directive resulted in lease sales in the
Gulf of Alaska, Cook Inlet, and Beaufort Sea between 1976 and 1980.266
Leasing pursuant to subsequent Five-Year Leasing Programs occurred
but was limited by litigation and congressional intervention.267
2. Leasing
The first federal lease sale in the U.S. Arctic Ocean was held in the
Beaufort Sea in 1979.268 During the 1980s and early 1990s, six more
lease sales in the Beaufort Sea and two in the Chukchi Sea were held.269
264. Id. (emphasis in original). The court went on to say, “The FEIS does devote a few more
sentences here to the inter-regional effects on migrating species but these snippets do not constitute
real analysis; they merely state (and restate) the obvious . . . .” Id. at 299.
265. Id. The court concluded that “[i]n each place in which the FEIS even mentions interregional impacts of OCS development, it merely announces that migratory species may be exposed
to risks of oil spills and other ‘impacts’ throughout their routes. These perfunctory references do not
constitute analysis useful to a decisionmaker in deciding whether, or how, to alter the program to
lessen cumulative environmental impacts.” Id.
266. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., ALASKA OCS REGION, LEASE SALES (2013),
available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_
Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Leasing/Historical_Alaska_Region_Lease_Sales.pdf.
267. See HAGERTY, supra note 184, at 5–6 & n.23. Congressional moratoria, renewed annually
for more than two decades, prevented offshore leasing in all OCS in the continental United States
areas outside the Gulf of Mexico and in Bristol Bay, Alaska. These moratoria were let to expire in
the lead up to the 2008 presidential election. See id. at 1.
268. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., BEAUFORT SEA PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES
186, 195, AND 202—FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOL. I, at I-2 (2003) [hereinafter
SALES 186, 195 AND 202 FEIS], available at http://www.boem.gov/About-BOEM/BOEMRegions/Alaska-Region/Environment/Environmental-Analysis/2003_001.aspx.
269.See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 266. With one exception, these sales
were area-wide. In 1998, as a result of controversy over leasing in the Arctic Ocean and out of a
desire to protect the Arctic Refuge from offshore oil spills, the Secretary of Interior offered a much
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These sales resulted in substantial corporate investment. Lease Sale
71, for example, was held in the Beaufort Sea in 1982 and resulted in
more than $2 billion dollars of high bids and 121 leases being issued.270
The 1984 and 1988 Beaufort Sea sales resulted in another 429 leases and
nearly $1 billion in high bids. The 1988 Chukchi Sea sale resulted in
350 leases being issued and nearly $500 million of high bids.271 In total,
the 1991, 1996, and 1998 Beaufort Sea sales resulted in 114 leases; the
1991 Chukchi Sea lease sale resulted in twenty-eight leases being sold.272
Several of these sales generated controversy and litigation. In Village of False Pass v. Watt, Alaskan native, commercial fishing, and conservation entities challenged a lease sale scheduled for the St. George
Basin in the Bering Sea.273 The plaintiffs asserted that the Secretary
failed to comply with various duties under OCSLA and NEPA and violated the ESA by failing to adequately protect endangered whales in the
lease area.274 The court found that the Secretary fully complied with
OCSLA but violated NEPA by failing to consider the impact of preliminary seismic testing on whales. It also found that the Secretary violated
more limited area for Lease Sale 170 in the Beaufort Sea. The available area covered only the federal
waters offshore of state lands, from the Colville River to Canning River. See MINERALS MGMT.
SERV., BEAUFORT SEA PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 170, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT II-5 fig.II.E.1 (1998) [hereinafter SALE 170 FEIS], available at
http://www.boem.gov/About-BOEM/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Environment/EnvironmentalAnalysis/Sale170_1.aspx. Of the 203 blocks offered, twenty-eight leases were issued. See Alaska
OCS Region, supra note 267. The next sale, Lease Sale 176, was cancelled. The Secretary found that
the eighteen months remaining in the five-year planning period was not a sufficient time period in
which to conduct an adequate environmental analysis. Press Release, Mineral Mgmt. Serv., Secretary Babbitt Defers Alaska’s Beaufort Sea Lease Sale 176 (Jan. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.boem.gov/boem-newsroom/press-releases/2001/beufort.aspx. In this same time frame
the state of Alaska held oil and gas lease sales in its Beaufort Sea waters (zero to three nautical miles
offshore). In challenges brought by environmental groups and a local government, the Alaska Supreme Court found that Alaska had not complied with its own laws in offering these lease sales. Trs.
for Alaska v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 795 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1990); Trs. for Alaska v. Dep’t of Natural
Res., 851 P.2d 1340 (Alaska 1993); Trs. for Alaska v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 865 P.2d 745 (Alaska
1993). Despite these challenges, the lease sales had gone forward with some leasing, although the
lessees later relinquished most of the leases. See DIV. OF OIL & GAS, ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES.,
BEAUFORT SEA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE AREA (1999), available at http://dog.dnr.alaska.gov/
Publications/BeaufortSea.htm.
270. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 266.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Vill. of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123, 1131 (D. Alaska 1983) [hereinafter Village
of False Pass I]. The plaintiffs were the villages of False Pass and Nelson Lagoon; the Bering Sea
Fishermen’s Association; the United Fishermen of Alaska; Jack U. Williams (a resident of
Mekoryuk, Nunivak Island); the Aleutians East Coastal Resource Service Area Board; Trustees for
Alaska, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Friends of the Earth, National Audubon Society,
and Alaska Center for the Environment. Id. at 1129.
274. Id. at 1131.
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the ESA by failing to take action to carry out the “reasonable and prudent
alternatives” identified in NFMS’s biological opinion to protect endangered whales.275 The court enjoined the execution of the leases pending
compliance.276
Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s partial denial of summary
judgment alleging that the Secretary violated the ESA by issuing a Final
Notice of Sale before receiving a final biological opinion from NMFS;
failed to protect endangered whales from oil spills as well as seismic testing; and violated NEPA by failing to provide a worst case analysis for a
100,000 gallon oil spill. Intervenors—oil companies and the Secretary—
cross-appealed the district court’s partial summary judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor and the injunction granted against them.277 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district’s court order in all respects.278
DOI also offered leases in the Bristol Bay region of the Bering Sea
in the 1980s (formally known as the North Aleutian Basin planning area).279 Before industry could explore those leases, however, the Exxon
Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound, vividly illustrating the risk
of spilled oil to the offshore environment. In response, Congress placed a
moratorium on leasing in Bristol Bay, and in 1995 the United States
bought back and retired the leases.280
3. Exploration
The leases that were sold during this first period led to limited exploration drilling in the U.S. Arctic Ocean. By 1997, thirty exploratory
wells had been drilled in the Beaufort Sea. Five additional wells were
drilled in the Chukchi Sea between 1989 and 1991.281 The exploration

275. Id. at 1165.
276. Id. at 1166.
277. Vill. of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 1984).
278. Id. at 616–17 (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., NORTH ALEUTIAN BASIN OCS PLANNING AREA: ASSESSMENT
OF UNDISCOVERED TECHNICALLY-RECOVERABLE OIL AND GAS 7 (2006), available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Resour
ce_Evaluation/North-Aleutian-Basin-Assessment-Report.pdf.
280. Id. These proposals did create controversy. Three tribal villages and several environmental organizations challenged the decision to hold a lease sale in Bristol Bay. In Tribal Village of
Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the Secretary failed to comply with the ESA by rejecting some “reasonable and prudent
alternatives” to protect endangered whales; that the Secretary’s EIS was flawed; and the Secretary
violated the consultation and notice requirements under OCSLA by failing to adopt Governor of
Alaska’s recommendations to delay and limit the sale area. Id.
281. Alaska Historical Data, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., http://www.boem.gov/
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activities caused a significant amount of controversy among Alaska Native and conservation groups, but there were no court challenges to these
exploration drilling proposals.282 The exploration wells in this period included Mukluk, which at the time was recognized as “the most expensive
dry hole in history.”283 Oil prices, which had been rising consistently,
peaked in 1980,284 and companies let almost all of their leases in the Arctic Ocean expire. As of 2000, companies owned no leases in the Chukchi
Sea and only five leases remained, encompassing less than 10,000 acres
in the Beaufort Sea.285
Only one development project—BP’s Northstar—resulted from that
exploration. After an unsuccessful legal challenge regarding the adequacy of the government’s approval of BP’s development and oil spill response plans,286 BP began producing oil at Northstar in 2001. Northstar
is located on a bottom-founded earthen structure created by raising the
level of what was a tidally exposed island three miles off of the Alaskan
coast. Through directional drilling Northstar accesses both federal and
state leases.287 Because it is on a man-made island, Northstar does not
share all of the characteristics of typical offshore development, which is
more directly susceptible to ocean conditions. Nonetheless, these manmade islands have had challenges dealing with Arctic conditions.288

About-BOEM/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Historical-Data/Index.aspx (last visited June 4,
2014); BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., BEAUFORT SEA EXPLORATION WELLS (2006), available
at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/
Historical_Data/Exploration%20Wells%20Beaufort%20Sea.pdf.
282. David Whitney, Petition Seeks Halt to Oil Well, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 3, 1997.
283. See YERGIN, supra note 239, at 715.
284. James L. Williams, Oil Price History and Analysis, WTRG ECON., http://www.wtrg.com/
prices.htm (last visited June 4, 2014).
285. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 266.
286. See Edwardson v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 268 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2001).
287. See AOGCC Pool Statistics, ALASKA OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N,
http://doa.alaska.gov/ogc/annual/current/18_Oil_Pools/Northstar-%20Oil/1_Oil_1.htm (last visited
June 4, 2014); see also SALE 170 FEIS, supra note 269, at I-1; SALES 186, 195 AND 202 FEIS, supra
note 268, at I-2.
288. See Pushing Sea Ice 2009, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ume7Cj8bRM (showing ice pushing up the small drilling island Oooguruk on June 23, 2009). Further, BP initially found another of its prospects, Liberty, to be an economically viable discovery and
proposed to develop it from an onshore location six miles from the reservoir using directional drilling. BP shelved this prospect after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill resulted in increased regulatory
and industry scrutiny of such extended-reach drilling. See U.S.: BP to Delay Development Drilling
at the Liberty Field in the Beaufort Sea, ENERGY-PEDIA NEWS (July 8, 2010), http://www.energypedia.com/news/usa/bp-to-delay-development-drilling-at-the-liberty-field-in-the-beaufort-sea; Wesley Loy, BP Announces It’s Backing off Liberty Development Plans, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS
(June
29,
2012),
http://www.adn.com/2012/06/29/2526216/bp-announces-its-backing-offliberty.html.
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B. 2001–2011
The second big push to develop Arctic Ocean oil and gas resources
began when George W. Bush took office in 2001. As explained above,
almost no leases were owned at the time, and the new administration
moved aggressively to change that. These efforts resulted in more than
three million acres of leases being sold between 2003 and 2008 and an
outburst of controversy and litigation. The following section describes
the expansion of activities and related controversy.
1. Five-Year Leasing Programs
a. 2002–2007
Soon after taking office, the Bush administration began preparing
the 2002–2007 Five-Year Leasing Program. The Program scheduled
three lease sales in the Beaufort Sea and two in the Chukchi.289 As explained below, the three Beaufort Sea lease sales held pursuant to this
plan—Lease Sales 186, 195, and 202—are responsible for almost all of
the leases owned in the Beaufort Sea and, therefore, underlie the ongoing
controversy surrounding Shell’s proposals to drill there. In the end, sales
were not held in the Chukchi Sea or Bristol Bay under this Program.
b. 2007–2012
The Bush administration continued its aggressive push to sell leases
in the Arctic with the 2007–2012 Five-Year Leasing Program, which
scheduled two sales in the Beaufort Sea and expanded leasing there from
roughly 9.4 million acres that were offered in the 2002–2007 Leasing
Program to nearly thirty million acres.290 The Leasing Program included
three lease sales in the Chukchi Sea, which had no current oil development or industry infrastructure and had not been the site of a lease sale
since 1991.291 Each Chukchi sale would have offered roughly thirty mil289. MINERAL MGMT. SERV., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM
2002–2007: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOL. I, at i (2002), available at
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/FEISVol1pdf.aspx.
290. MINERAL MGMT. SERV., PROPOSED FINAL PROGRAM: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL &
GAS LEASING PROGRAM 2007–2012 (2007), available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-GasEnergy-Program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/MMSProposedFinalProgram2007-2012-pdf.aspx; see
also MINERAL MGMT. SERV., FINAL NOTICE OF SALE PACKAGE CHUKCHI SEA OIL AND GAS LEASE
SALE 193, at 2 (2008), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/
BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Leasing/Lease_Sales/Sale_193/Info.pdf.
291. MINERAL MGMT. SERV., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM
2007–2012:
FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
STATEMENT
(2007),
available
at

2014]

Oil and Gas in America’s Arctic Ocean

1323

lion acres, including the rescheduled Lease Sale 193, which had been
included in the 2002-07 Leasing Program but not held.292 The new program also included a 5.6 million acre lease sale in Bristol Bay.293
President Bush justified this expansion by saying that offshore drilling bans were “outdated and counterproductive,”294 and therefore he
would open up more areas where no such ban was in place.295 President
Bush also asserted that new technology allowed offshore oil exploration
to be executed so that it “is out of sight, protects coral reefs and habitats,
and protects against oil spills.”296
Conservation groups and an Alaska Native village challenged the
decision to approve the 2007–2012 Leasing Program and the underlying
environmental analysis in court.297 One petitioner, Center for Biological
Diversity, argued among other things that DOI violated NEPA by failing
to consider the climate change impacts of developing these offshore petroleum resources and violated the ESA by failing to consult with expert
agencies on the potential impact of the Program on listed species.298 In a
separate petition, the Native Village of Point Hope, Alaska Wilderness
League, and Pacific Environment claimed that the agency had violated
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/Intro.aspx [hereinafter OCS 2007–2012 FEIS]; BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., ALASKA OCS REGION, LEASE
SALES (2014), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/
BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Leasing/Historical_Alaska_Region_Lease_Sal
es.pdf (showing all leasing activity offshore Alaska).
292. See OCS 2007–2012 FEIS, supra note 291, at II-2, available at
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Five-YearProgram/Chapter2Alternatives.aspx; id. at fig.II-1, available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-GasEnergy-Program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/Figures2-1thru2-6.aspx.
293. Id. at II-2, fig.II-4; see also Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), Alaska OCS Region, North
Aleutian Basin, Proposed Oil and Gas Lease Sale 214, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,095 (Apr. 8, 2008), available
at http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/notice/73fr19095.pdf.
294. H. Josef Hebert, Bush Urges Congress to Lift Offshore Drilling Ban, SEATTLE TIMES
(June 19, 2008), http://seattletimes.com/html/politics/2008002744_apoffshoreoil.html.
295. See Bush Calls on Congress to Lift Oil Drilling Ban, NBC NEWS (July 14, 2008),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25674571/#.UWRrg6KKJdc (noting that increasing supply would “ease
market tensions and boost supply”). See supra notes 184 and 280 for a discussion of the relevant
“bans.”
296. Hebert, supra note 294.
297. Two challenges were filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for District of Columbia regarding the approval of the plan and its underlying EIS. The Center for Biological Diversity filed a petition on the first day after approval, and several weeks later a coalition comprised of the Native Village of Point Hope, Alaska Wilderness League, and Pacific Environment filed a second petition. Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 07-1247 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 2008); Native
Vill. of Point Hope v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 07-1344 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 2008). These two
petitions were consolidated in Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
298. Opening Brief for Petitioners, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563
F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1247).
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NEPA by failing to account appropriately for the vast amount of missing
baseline scientific information about America’s Arctic waters and violated OCSLA by irrationally equating the environmental sensitivity of the
offshore environment to the environmental sensitivity of the Alaska
coastline.299
In 2009, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioners that DOI inappropriately equated the environmental sensitivity of the
offshore environment with the sensitivity of the Alaska coastal environment and that this irrational approach skewed the balancing that OCSLA
requires DOI to undertake when deciding what areas to include in the
Leasing Program.300 The court found against the petitioners on their other
claims, including finding that their NEPA claim related to missing baseline science was not ripe for judicial review.301 In making this latter ruling, however, the court emphasized the importance of DOI having this
information before the lease sale stage.302
By the time the court issued its decision, President Obama had taken office. Thus, new Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar revisited the
2007–2012 Leasing Program on remand.303 In March 2010, Secretary
Salazar announced that DOI would cancel the future Arctic leases scheduled in that Program—two each in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas and

299. Opening Brief for Petitioners at 28–32, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1344); Opening Brief for Petitioners, Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (No. 07-1247). Amicus briefs were submitted in the
consolidated case by a coalition of conservation organizations, which supported the petitioners’
argument that there was insufficient scientific information to justify decisions about Arctic resources. An amicus brief was also submitted by two Stanford economists supporting the argument
that climate change impacts should be quantified and considered. Briefs of Amici Curaie, Native
Vill. of Point Hope v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1344).
300. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 487–89. The government’s analysis of the relative environmental sensitivity had been based on a single study evaluating coastal areas.
301. Id. at 480.
302. Id. at 486–87 (“These gaps in information, however, must be considered in conjunction
with the ‘pyramidic structure’ of a five-year leasing program. At this early stage of the Leasing
Program, the existence of some gaps in the baseline data for these three seas is not fatal to the Leasing Program.” (internal citations omitted)). As described below, DOI did not have this information
before it held Lease Sale 193, and, thus, while this D.C. Circuit ruling came too late to directly influence that sale, the decision was relevant to the legal challenge that was brought against it. See infra
Part V.C.2.
303. The new administration consolidated the remand with its review of the late term 2010–
2015 draft leasing program proposal. See supra note 185. As one of his first acts after being confirmed as Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar announced that the comment deadline on the draft
2010–2015 Five-Year Leasing Program would be extended and that a series of public meetings
would be held. These meetings were held, and before the agency reached a decision, the court invalidated the current 2007–2012 Leasing Program and remanded it to DOI.
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one in Bristol Bay.304 Concurrently, President Obama issued an executive
order withdrawing Bristol Bay from oil and gas leasing through at least
2017.305 Consequently, only one Arctic lease sale from this Program was
held—the aforementioned Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193. Notably, Secretary Salazar did recommit to that sale in his March 2010 decision.
In announcing its revision to the 2007–2012 Leasing Program, Secretary Salazar publicly recognized that better science was needed to
guide decisions about the Arctic Ocean and directed USGS to prepare a
report laying out the state of science in U.S. Arctic waters.306 Thus, the
government appeared to be taking concrete steps to respond to the lack of
baseline information about the Arctic Ocean.307
2. Leasing
Other than a few thousand acres, lease sales held between 2003 and
2008 are responsible for all of the leases owned by companies in the U.S.
Arctic Ocean. Three lease sales were held in the Beaufort Sea pursuant to
the 2002–2007 Five-Year Leasing Program, and one was held in the
Chukchi Sea pursuant to the 2007–2012 Five-Year Leasing Program. In
total, these sales resulted in more than three million acres of leases being
sold largely to multinational oil companies for roughly $3 billion. Netherlands-based Royal Dutch Shell was the dominant bidder.308

304. Elizabeth Bluemink, Obama Drilling Policy Excludes Bristol Bay, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.adn.com/2010/03/31/1206793/bristol-bay-off-limits-arctic.html.
305. Id.
306. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Secretary Salazar Unveils Arctic Studies Initiative
That Will Inform Oil and Gas Decisions for Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (Apr. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2010_04_13_releaseA.cfm.
307. Id.
308. Graphic prepared by Oceana from data included in JOHN TALBERTH & EVAN BRANOSKY,
CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY, NET PUBLIC BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM (2012).
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a. Beaufort Sea
In a deviation from DOI’s historical practice of preparing a new
EIS for each sale, BOEM’s predecessor, the Minerals Management Service, prepared one EIS to cover all three scheduled sales in the Beaufort
Sea.309 It used this document to support the first lease sale and then prepared less-detailed Environmental Assessments for the two subsequent
sales, thus “tiering” the NEPA-required analyses of the latter lease sales
to the first one.310 Substantial public opposition existed to all of the lease
sales.311 The agency held Lease Sale 186 in 2003, and it resulted in the
sale of thirty-four leases encompassing 181,810 acres.312 Lease Sale 195
was held in 2005, and it resulted in the sale of 117 leases, encompassing

309. SALES 186, 195, AND 202 FEIS, supra note 268, at I-21.
310. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: PROPOSED OIL AND GAS
LEASE
SALE
195
BEAUFORT
SEA
PLANNING
AREA
(2004),
available
at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/BOEM_Newsroom/Library/Publications/2004/EA195w
ithout%20linkver4.pdf; MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: PROPOSED OCS
LEASE
SALE
202
BEAUFORT
SEA
PLANNING
AREA
(2006),
available
at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/BOEM_Newsroom/Library/Publications/2006/2006_E
A_202.pdf.
311. SALES 186, 195, AND 202 FEIS, supra note 268, AT VII-1 (noting that most of the 4,911
comments supported the no action alternative).
312. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., TABLE 6: ALASKA OIL AND GAS LEASE OFFERINGS
(2011), available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Regional-Leasing/
Table_6.aspx.
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more than 600,000 acres.313 Lease Sale 202 in 2007 resulted in the sale of
90 leases encompassing more than 490,000 acres.314
Among other things, these three sales are notable for the distinct
lack of competitive bidding. Of the 247 tracts sold, DOI received only
one bid on 241 of them—multiple bids were submitted on only six.315 In
fact, in Lease Sale 195, there were no instances of competitive bidding—
each tract sold received only one bid.316 Shell was by far the dominant
bidder in Lease Sales 195 and 202.317 The company purchased no leases
during Lease Sale 186, but it since purchased leases that EnCana bought
in that sale.318
By the time DOI made its decisions regarding Lease Sale 202, the
controversy over the leasing of U.S. Arctic waters had reached a boiling
point. The North Slope Borough and Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission filed a lawsuit challenging the agency’s assessment of the environmental impacts of the sale.319 The plaintiffs claimed that during review of
the lease sale, BOEM managers and decision makers changed the conclusions of the agency’s scientists about the significance of impacts in
order to speed up the lease sale process and avoid having to do a new
EIS.320 The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska ruled against
the plaintiffs.321 An appeal to the Ninth Circuit also was unsuccessful.322

313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See id. (compare data in table under columns “No. of Tracts Bid On” and “No. of Bids
Rec’d”).
316. See id.
317. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., SALE DAY STATISTICS: BEAUFORT SEA LEASE SALE 195
(2005), http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/
Regional_Leasing/Alaska_Region/Alaska_Lease_Sales/Sale_195/Analysis%20of%20Bids%20by
%20Company2.pdf; MINERALS MGMT. SERV., SALE DAY STATISTICS: BEAUFORT SEA LEASE SALE
202, at 2–3 (2007), http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/
Leasing/Regional_Leasing/Alaska_Region/Alaska_Lease_Sales/Sale_202/SALEDAYSTATS.PDF.
318. Kay Cashman, Shell, ConocoPhillips Buy EnCana’s Alaska Beaufort Sea OCS Leases,
PETROLEUM NEWS (Oct. 23, 2005), http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/14850948.shtml.
319. See N. Slope Borough v. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., No. 3:07-cv-0045-RRB, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1502, at *1 (D. Alaska, Jan. 8, 2008).
320. Plaintiffs Opening Brief at *24–26, *29–31, N. Slope Borough v. Minerals Mgmt. Serv.,
No. 3:07-cv-0045-RRB, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 64990 (D. Alaska, July 20, 2007); Press
Release, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, Invasive Species Threat from Arctic Offshore Drilling Ignored (Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://www.peer.org/news/news-releases/2008/01/24/
invasive-species-threat-from-arctic-offshore-drilling-ignored/.
321. See N. Slope Borough, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1502, at *1 (order denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the action).
322. See N. Slope Borough v. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., 343 F. App’x 272 (9th Cir. 2009).
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b. Chukchi Sea
As explained above, Lease Sale 193, held February 8, 2008, was
the first sale held in the Chukchi Sea in nearly two decades. High energy
prices and the coming change in presidential administration created
strong incentives for DOI to offer, and industry to purchase, leases. Public attention was likewise acute given the importance of the Chukchi Sea
to wildlife and communities, the national political attention focused on
offshore drilling, and DOI’s delay in deciding to list the polar bear under
the ESA, which eliminated a potential complication from the lease sale in
the Chukchi Sea.323
Lease Sale 193 resulted in approximately 2.1 million acres being
leased at a total price of more than $2.6 billion.324 Again Shell was the
dominant bidder, purchasing more than half of the acreage and spending
more than $2 billion.325 Unlike in the Beaufort Sea, however, other large
companies—notably ConocoPhillips and Statoil Hydro—made substantial investments.326 The sale was one of the largest in terms of acreage
and money ever held in the U.S.327
A coalition of Alaska native and local and national conservation organizations challenged the sale.328 Among other claims, the plaintiffs
asserted that DOI illegally failed to address missing scientific information about baseline conditions in the Chukchi Sea, failed to account
for the likely production of natural gas as well as oil, and failed to appropriately predict or evaluate the potential impacts of oil and gas activities

323. By court order, DOI was supposed to make its polar bear listing decision in early January
2008. Secretary Kempthorne acted contrary to this court order by delaying the listing of the polar
bear until after Lease Sale 193 was held the next month. See Bryan Walsh, Polar Bears Wait-Listed
As Endangered, TIME (Jan. 17, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,
1704808,00.html.
324. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., FINAL BID RECAP: LEASE SALE 193, at 9–24 (2008),
http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-Newsroom/Offshore-Stats-and-Facts/Alaska-Region/RecapSale_193.
aspx.
325. Though other companies invested, Shell’s spending dwarfed theirs. Shell bid more than
$10 million on several leases that did not receive bids from any other companies. Also, in several
instances, Shell vastly outspent the competition, when it existed. Shell bid more than $6,000 per
acre, for a total of more than $34,000,000 for lease block 6913. ConocoPhillips bid just more than
$10 per acre, for a total bid of just more than $60,000. Id. at 15.
326. See generally id. (detailing all of the bids received on tracts offered in Lease Sale 193).
327. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 291. The second largest sale in the Arctic
was in 1982 in the Beaufort Sea, resulting in more than $2 billion in high bids. Id. Only two sales in
history—both in the Central Gulf of Mexico—have generated higher total bid amounts. Gulf of
Mexico OCS Region, supra note 188 (showing total high bids, including sales in 2007 and 2008 in
the Central Gulf of Mexico that exceeded Lease Sale 193).
328. Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D. Alaska 2010).
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on the Chukchi environment, including on the local people.329 The agency’s EIS concluded that “[b]ased on the paucity of information available
on marine mammal ecology in the Chukchi Sea and on specific locations
of future developments, we are unable to determine at this time if significant impacts will or will not occur.”330
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska ruled for
the plaintiffs, finding that DOI had violated 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22, which
guides an agency’s NEPA review when there is incomplete or unavailable information.331 Specifically, the court found that the agency had identified substantial missing scientific information but had not complied
with the obligation to determine whether that information was essential
to the decision at issue and whether it could be obtained.332 The court
329. Id. at 1012–13. During the administrative process leading up to that lease sale, NMFS had
expressed concern about the absence of adequate data to assess the individual and cumulative effects
of the proposed oil and gas activities on marine resources, and the agency cautioned that the data did
not support the impact assessments in the draft EIS. See Letter from Robert D. Mecum, Acting
Adm’r, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., to John Goll, Reg’l Dir., Minerals Mgmt. Serv., MMS Draft
EIS for Chukchi Planning Area (Jan. 30, 2007) (on file with author).
330. CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193 FINAL SEIS, supra note 29, at app. A, A7.
331. See Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D. Alaska 2010). 40
C.F.R. § 1502.22 reads as follows:
When an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the
human environment in an environmental impact statement and there is incomplete or unavailable information, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking.
(a) If the incomplete information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and
the overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant, the agency shall include the
information in the environmental impact statement.
(b) If the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse
impacts cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the means to obtain it are not known, the agency shall include within
the environmental impact statement:
(1) A statement that such information is incomplete or unavailable; (2) a
statement of the relevance of the incomplete or unavailable information to
evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human environment; (3) a summary of existing credible scientific evidence
which is relevant to evaluating the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human environment, and (4) the agency’s evaluation
of such impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research methods
generally accepted in the scientific community. . . .
Id.
332. See Native Vill. of Point Hope, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1018. Moreover, the agency had decided to proceed with Lease Sale 193 while determining that missing information prevented designation
of critical habitat for newly ESA listed polar bears. Five months after the polar bear decision was
due and just three months after the Chukchi Sea lease sale, DOI stated in the May 15, 2008 polar
bear ESA listing, “A careful assessment of the designation of marine areas as critical habitat will
require additional time to fully evaluate the physical and biological features essential to the conservation of the polar bear. . . . [and that] critical habitat is not determinable at this time.” Endangered
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also found that DOI had violated NEPA by failing to consider the possibility of natural gas development in the Chukchi Sea despite incentives
to pursue it.333 The court remanded the EIS to DOI.334
In response to the remand, DOI initially released a draft supplemental EIS that concluded that none of the missing information was essential to the decision to hold the sale.335 DOI retracted that draft and,
after the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, issued a
new supplemental EIS that also addressed the potential impacts of a very
large oil spill, again concluding that none of the missing information was
essential to its decision.336 Specifically, for each of the hundreds of acknowledgments made in the EIS regarding incomplete information, the
agency made one of five findings, none relying on new information: 1)
though incomplete, there was sufficient information on which to base a
sound judgment; 2) the analysis included the assumption that adverse
effects would occur (e.g., in event of oil spill); 3) the impacts would be
same under all alternatives; 4) the existence of other laws and regulations
would preclude significant effects; or 5) that more information would be
known at a later stage of development.337
The district court ultimately sanctioned this approach.338 In February 2013, plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the rationales on which BOEM based its conclusions that missing scientific information is not essential to its decisions at the lease sale
stage were arbitrary and that the agency based its analysis of impacts on
a development scenario that was arbitrarily small.339 As explained below,
the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of petitioners in January 2014.
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus
maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 28,298 (May 15, 2008). Thus, the government apparently determined that information was sufficient to sell leases but not to designate critical
habitat for endangered polar bears.
333. Native Vill. of Point Hope, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (“The Court agrees with Plaintiff that
the inclusion of incentives for natural gas production, without addressing the impact of natural gas
exploration, is arbitrary . . . .”).
334. Initially, the court enjoined all activity under Lease Sale 193 pending the remand. Id. at
1019. There were subsequent proceedings on relief, and eventually, the court allowed certain activities—including large-scale seismic surveying, pre-drilling studies, and administrative transactions—
to proceed during the pendency of the remand. It would not, however, allow exploration drilling. Id.
at 1018; see also Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, No. 1:08-cv-0004-RRB, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78306 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 2010).
335. CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193 FINAL SEIS, supra note 29, at 2.
336. See id.
337. Id. app. A at 10–11.
338. See Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar,
No. 1:08-CV-0004-RRB (D. Alaska Feb. 13, 2013) (No. 269).
339. Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, No. 12-35287 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2012).
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3. Exploration
Having purchased leases in the Beaufort Sea in 2005, Shell began
the process of seeking approvals to drill exploration wells. The company’s push to drill these wells touched off a lengthy public controversy
about the company and the manner in which the government makes decisions to authorize activities like those proposed by Shell. This ongoing
controversy can be divided into three temporal categories based on the
company’s efforts: 2007–2009; 2010–2011; and 2012–present. The first
two are discussed here, and the last is addressed in the succeeding section. Each section is organized around the approvals that spurred litigation—approvals of exploration plans, the granting of permits under the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, and approval of oil spill response
plans, etc.
There are some commonalities among Shell’s successive efforts to
drill exploration wells. First, Shell repeatedly sought to use the Kulluk
drill rig and the Noble Discoverer (the Discoverer) drilling vessel.340 The
Kulluk was a conical drill barge built in 1983 for use in the Arctic.341 It
was dormant from 1993 to 2005 when Shell bought it and began preparing it for the uses described below.342 The Discoverer was built in 1966
and was not specifically designed for the Arctic.343 It was owned by the
Noble Corporation and contracted to Shell.344 The vessel suffered significant damage while conducting exploration drilling off Australia.345 In
addition, Shell leased, constructed, or retrofitted a variety of other support and response vessels to complement the Kulluk and Discoverer.346
340. Kulluk, MARINE EXCH. OF ALASKA, http://www.mxak.org/community/kulluk/kulluk.html
(last visited June 5, 2014); see also Kulluk Conical Drilling Unit, MARINE EXCH. OF ALASKA,
http://www.mxak.org/community/kulluk/kullukmore.html (last visited June 5, 2014).
341. Kulluk, supra note 340 (“After that the rig was stacked for fourteen years in McKinley
Bay near Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories of Canada. The rig was purchased by Shell Offshore Incorporated of New Orleans, Louisiana, in 2005 and spent the next year being refurbished
where she had been stacked in Canada.”).
342. Noble Discoverer, MARINE TRAFFIC, http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/shipdetails.
aspx?MMSI=636014934 (last updated May 24, 2014).
343. Id.
344. Rich Miller, Shell, Conoco Postpone Plans for Offshore Drilling in Arctic Alaska,
PROFESSIONAL MARINER (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.professionalmariner.com/June-July-2013/ShellConoco-postpone-plans-for-offshore-drilling-in-Arctic-Alaska/.
345. Rob Maetzig, Twinkle, Twinkle, Damaged Drillship, TARANAKI DAILY NEWS ONLINE
(Nov. 5, 2011), http://www.stuff.co.nz/taranaki-daily-news/news/4987045/Twinkle-twinkledamaged-drillship.
346. SHELL GULF OF MEXICO, INC., EXPLORATION PLAN 2010: EXPLORATION DRILLING
PROGRAM POSEY BLOCKS 6713, 6714, 6763, 6764, AND 6912, KARO BLOCKS 6864 AND 7007
BURGER, CRACKERJACK, AND SW SHOEBILL PROSPECTS OCS LEASE SALE 193, at 2 (2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/eab_web_docket.nsf/Filings%20By%20Appeal%20Number/
555142AF66ACBEAC852577190066D55D/$File/Exhibit%206%20and%20Exhibit%207...3.06.pdf.
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Each iteration of Shell’s proposals plans for some combination of these
vessels.
a. 2007–2009 Beaufort Sea Exploration
For the 2007–2009 drilling seasons, Shell proposed to drill up to
twelve exploration wells in the Beaufort Sea over three years using the
Kulluk and Discoverer operating simultaneously, each accompanied by
icebreakers and numerous other support vessels.347 In February 2007,
BOEM approved Shell’s exploration plan, accompanied by an Environmental Assessment.348 There was no official opportunity for the public to
review or provide comment on the exploration plan or the Environmental
Assessment before the permit was issued.349
In its proposal, Shell identified the general location of the four
wells it planned to drill in 2007 but said that the location of the wells
drilled in subsequent years was unknown.350 The drilling in 2007 was to
take place in Camden Bay,351 which is roughly twelve miles offshore
from the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. At the time, the available information suggested that Camden Bay was a particularly important location for bowhead whales as they transited to and from the Canadian
Beaufort Sea.352 Several exploration wells had been drilled near Camden
Bay in the 1980s and one in the 1990s.353
In addition to the exploration plan, Shell submitted applications for
various other permits and approvals required to begin drilling operations,
including an oil spill response plan, Clean Air Act permits, letters of authorization and incidental harassments authorizations under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, and a consistency determination under the
Coastal Zone Management Act.354
347. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: SHELL OFFSHORE INC.
BEAUFORT SEA EXPLORATION PLAN 2 (2007) [hereinafter SHELL 2007 EA], available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Enviro
nment/Environmental_Analysis/2007-009.pdf.
348. Id. (Finding of No Significant Impact).
349. See Letter from McDonnell on Shell’s Proposed Drilling in the Beaufort Sea to Goll (Feb.
15, 2007).
350. SHELL 2007 EA, supra note 347, at 1–2. Shell did identify several lease blocks on which it
sought to drill. Id. These leases were purchased in Lease Sale 195 held in 2005.
351. Id.
352. Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815, 818–21 (9th Cir. 2008).
353. SHELL 2007 EA, supra note 347, at 1; see also Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n,
Conservation Order No. 407, ALASKA DEP’T OF ADMIN. (Oct. 23, 1997),
http://www.doa.alaska.gov/ogc/orders/co/co400_499/co407.htm (granting ARCO Alaska, Inc. an
exception to allow it to drill an oil pool in Camden Bay).
354. See infra Part V.C.3.
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As described here, conservation and Alaska native groups challenged a number of these government approvals once they were awarded.
i. Challenge to the DOI’s Approval of Shell’s Exploration Plan
The North Slope Borough, Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commision,
and a number of conservation and Alaska Native groups challenged
DOI’s approval of the exploration plan.355 Per OCSLA’s jurisdictional
requirements, these challenges proceeded directly in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.356
Petitioners immediately sought a stay of the government approval
of Shell’s exploration plan due to concerns about the effect that icebreakers traveling through the Chukchi Sea and in the Beaufort Sea
would have on bowhead and beluga whales and on subsistence hunting.357 Petitioners asserted that DOI’s approval of the exploration plan
violated both OCSLA and NEPA. They petitioners argued that the agency could not adequately evaluate Shell’s plan under these laws because
Shell had not identified the location of the wells it planned to drill in
2008 and 2009.358 Petitioners also argued that the Environmental Assessment prepared by MMS did not fully evaluate impacts to a number of
wildlife species, such as young bowhead whale calves susceptible to separation from their mothers.359 Agency scientists predicted “the proposed
action has the potential to cause significant impacts to a variety of protected wildlife resources,”360 and were concerned about the consequences

355. See Alaska Wilderness League, 548 F.3d at 819.
356. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(2) (2012) (“Any action of the Secretary to approve, require modification of, or disapprove any exploration plan or any development and production plan under this subchapter shall be subject to judicial review only in a United States court of appeals for a circuit in
which an affected State is located.”). The law was not clear whether a challenge to the exploration
plan approval by environmental and Alaska Native groups should be filed directly in the Ninth Circuit, or whether they were required to first file an administrative appeal in the Interior Board of Land
Appeals (IBLA). Alaska Wilderness League, 548 F.3d at 819. Thus, some groups first filed appeals
in the IBLA, while others filed their challenge to the exploration plan approval in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Id. After the IBLA issued an order suspending any further proceedings pending
the outcome of the case filed in the Ninth Circuit, groups that were before the IBLA filed their petitions with the Ninth Circuit Court as well. Id. Eventually, the three cases before the Ninth Circuit
were consolidated and Shell intervened in the case. Id.
357. See Brief of Petitioners, Alaska Wilderness League, 548 F.3d 815, 2007 U.S. 9th Cir.
Briefs LEXIS 909, at *11–19.
358. See Petitioners’ Consolidated Brief, Alaska Wilderness League, 548 F.3d 815, 2007 U.S.
9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 908, at *23–32.
359. Alaska Wilderness League, 548 F.3d at 825–27.
360. MMS Analyst Review of EA for Exploration (on file with author); See also Juliet
Eilperin,
Warnings
Ignored
by
Agency,
HERALD-TRIBUNE
(May
25,
2010),
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20100525/ARTICLE/5251048?p=3&tc=pg.
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of a large oil spill, especially to subsistence users and polar bears.361 In
addition, the petitioners argued that the Environmental Assessment was
deficient because it avoided consideration of a large spill on the grounds
that such an impact, though large, was too unlikely to warrant consideration and that the DOI had violated NEPA by improperly “tiering” to earlier analyses.362
The court delayed making a decision on the motion for stay until
August 1 based on declarations filed by Shell that gave the court the
“understanding that there will be no icebreaking, drilling, or other vessels, or other drilling related activity, in either the Chukchi or Beaufort
Seas until after August 1, 2007.”363 However, in July the North Slope
Borough informed the court that Shell’s icebreakers had begun transiting
the Chukchi and Beaufort seas.364 The court then issued an order requiring Shell to “report to the court on the status of any of its icebreaking
vessels, supply ships or other water craft whose activities are potentially
related to drilling activities and are currently present in or headed toward
the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas . . . .”365 This order allowed the court to
monitor what was happening on the water as it considered the merits of
the lawsuit.
In August 2007, the court granted a stay, finding that the environmental and Alaska Native groups had shown there was a probability that
they would succeed on the merits of the case and that they faced the possibility of irreparable harm if the court did not grant the stay.366 The stay
remained in effect until the court ruled on the merits of the case in November 2008 and, therefore precluded Shell from drilling in both 2007
and in 2008.367
361. Alaska Wilderness League, 2007 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 908, at *19–21.
362. Id. at *39–40. The government’s own experts shared the concern about tiering. For example, in a review of Shell’s proposed 2007 drilling plans, a BOEM analyst noted that “[t]he tiered
concept assumes that subsequent environmental documents will be required to focus the analysis on
site-specific, project-level issues, impacts, and appropriate mitigation measures developed. In this
instance, I definitely do not feel that this has been the case.” Id. at *39. Another analyst commented,
“[W]e are always told not to worry about our lease sale analyses, because the specifics will be addressed later. Yet when specific projects do roll around, we are given neither the time nor the information necessary to adequately analyze and mitigate the proposed activity.” Id. at *40.
363. Petitioners’ Joint Response to Shell Offshore, Inc.’s Notice to the Court at 2, Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. July 18, 2007) (Nos. 07-71457, 07-71989,
07-72183).
364. Id.
365. Order at 1, Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. July 18,
2007) (Nos. 07-71457, 07-71989, 07-72183).
366. Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting a stay
of drilling pending adjudication of the case).
367. Id. at 820, 835.
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In its opinion on the merits of the case, the court noted that “a number of agency experts expressed concern about the potentially significant
impacts the drilling would have on bowhead whales, polar bears, and the
Inupiat subsistence harvest.”368 Due to the agency’s acknowledgement of
the gaps in data and the potential for serious consequences, followed by
its unsubstantiated conclusions that any impacts would be insignificant,
the court determined that the agency had not taken the requisite hard look
at Shell’s plans.369 The court found that there remained “substantial questions as to whether Shell’s plan may cause significant harm to the people
and wildlife of the Beaufort Sea region.”370 The court also found that the
agency’s approval of the project violated OCSLA, because the permit
application did not identify the location of each proposed well.371
In March of the following year, the court, without stating a reason,
vacated and withdrew its November opinion, noting that it would issue a
new opinion.372 Shortly after, Shell withdrew its exploration plan, the
agency rescinded its prior approval of that plan, and the court dismissed
the case as moot without issuing a new opinion.373
ii. Administrative Appeals of 2007 Clean Air Act Permits
In addition to the exploration plan approval, Shell also needed permits from EPA under the Clean Air Act for its proposed 2007–2009 activities. EPA issued two minor source permits—one for the Kulluk and
one for the Discoverer.374 The North Slope Borough, conservation
groups, and Alaska Native entities filed administrative appeals challenging both air permits at the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB), an administrative body within EPA set up to review the Agency’s decisions.375
Once such an appeal is filed, the permits at issue are not considered final
368. Id. at 819.
369. Id. at 831–32.
370. Id. at 825, 834–35.
371. Id.
372. Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 559 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacated and
withdrawn).
373. Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 559 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009), dismissed as
moot sub nom. Alaska Wilderness League v. Salazar, 571 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009).
374. In re Shell Offshore, Inc., 13 E.A.D. 357, 359–60 (EAB 2007), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/OCS%20Permit%20Appeals%20(CAA)/5E8F19
CE776970DE8525735600525853/$File/Shell%20Oil.pdf.
375. Id. at 357. The conservation petitioners included Resisting Environmental Destruction on
Indigenous Lands, a Project of the Indigenous Environmental Network; Northern Alaska Environmental Center; Alaska Wilderness League; Center for Biological Diversity; and Natural Resources
Defense Council. Air permits from EPA are subject to appeal to the EAB under 40 C.F.R. § 124.19
(2014).
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until the appeal is decided.376 Therefore, pending the EAB’s decision,
Shell did not have permits and could not proceed with exploration drilling.
Petitioners argued to the EAB that EPA erred in awarding minor
source permits for the two vessels rather than requiring regulation under
the strictures of the Clean Air Act “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD) program.377 Specifically, the petitioners argued that EPA
erred by: (1) concluding that the drilling vessels were technically only
“OCS sources” subject to regulation when they are attached to the ocean
floor and (2) treating each drill site as a separate minor source, rather
than aggregating the emissions from multiple wells over the entire season.378 The petitioners also challenged EPA’s conclusion that only wells
drilled within 500 meters of each other would be considered part of the
same source.379
In September 2007, one month after the Ninth Circuit issued its order staying Shell’s activities, the EAB affirmed EPA’s determination that
each well could be counted a separate source, but it found that EPA did
not provide adequate explanation to support its conclusion that sources
would be considered the same if wells were drilled within 500 meters of
each other.380 The EAB remanded the permits to EPA, thus continuing
the automatic stay.381 In addition to the stay from the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, these EAB orders provided a second reason for which Shell
was precluded from drilling in 2007, 2008, and 2009.
b. 2010 Beaufort and Chukchi Exploration Plans
Shortly after withdrawing its 2007–2009 exploration plan, Shell
submitted two new single-year exploration plans for the 2010 drilling
376. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(f)(1).
377. In re Shell Offshore, Inc., 13 E.A.D. at 359. The most substantial import of the decision to
grant minor source permits was that Shell was not required to apply “Best Available Control Technology” (BACT) to its vessels. Id. at 366. BACT is an emissions limitation, which is made on a
case-by-case basis based on energy, environmental, and economic impacts. Guide to Environmental
Issues: Glossary of Terms & Acronyms, EPA OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE, http://ofmpub.epa.gov/sor_internet/registry/termreg/searchandretrieve/glossariesand
keywordlists/search.do?details=&glossaryName=Environmental%20Issues%20Glossary (last visited
June 7, 2014). It can include additional control equipment or modification of the production processes or methods. Id.
378. In re Shell Offshore, Inc., 13 E.A.D. at 369–70.
379. Id. NSB also challenged EPA’s calculation of the drill ships’ potential to emit (PTE)
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and the enforceability of the permits’ NOx limitations, the validity of Shell
ambient air quality modeling, the adequacy of the opportunity for public participation, and the sufficiency of EPA’s environmental justice analysis. Id. at 357.
380. Id. at 358.
381. Id. at 406.
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season.382 Shell planned to use one drill ship (the Discoverer) to drill up
to five wells in both the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.383 In the Beaufort
Sea, Shell proposed to drill two exploratory wells near Camden Bay and
north of Point Thompson, about thirty miles off the coast.384 In the Chukchi Sea, Shell proposed to drill three wells on any of five potential sites
spanning ninety miles, approximately seventy to 135 miles offshore.385
Once again, federal agencies granted Shell most of the approvals
necessary for the company to proceed with drilling operations.386 These
approvals were granted despite the pending legal challenges to the 2007–
2012 Five-Year Leasing Program and Lease Sale 193. Again, local government, conservation, and Alaska Native groups filed various challenges to the federal government’s approvals of Shell’s exploration plan and
Clean Air Act permits.387

382. See Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 16–17, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 378 F.
App’x 747 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-73942).
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. Concurrent with these developments, and as explained above, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the 2007–2012 OCS Leasing program violated OCSLA. See supra notes 300–
02 and accompanying text. Shell’s Chukchi Sea leases were purchased in a lease sale held under that
program, and thus while DOI was re-evaluating that program in 2009 and 2010, Shell could not
conduct exploration activities on its leases. DOI, however, proceeded to evaluate Shell’s exploration
proposals. This uncertainty was cleared away when Secretary Salazar let stand the Chukchi Sea lease
sale in his final decision on remand, although as explained below by that time the Secretary had
suspended consideration of the final approvals for Shell’s 2010 exploration activities due to the
Deepwater Horizon disaster.
387. Discussed more in-depth infra Part V.C.3.a.
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i. Challenge to MMS’s Approval of Shell’s 2010 Exploration Plans
MMS approved Shell’s Beaufort Sea Exploration Plan in October
2009 and its Chukchi Sea Exploration Plan two months later.388 Alaska
Native entities and conservation groups challenged the exploration plans
in petitions for review filed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.389
388. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV. - ALASKA OCS REGION, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY
MGMT. FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (2009), available at http://www.boem.gov/
uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Environment/Environmental
_Analysis/2009-061-fonsi.pdf.
389. Petitioners AEWC and Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope filed the Petition for Review for of the Beaufort Sea approval, No. 09-73944, on December 15, 2009, and filed the Petition
for Review for the Chukchi Sea approval, No. 10-70368, on February 4, 2010. Petitioners Native
Village of Point Hope, Alaska Wilderness League, Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of
Wildlife, National Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Oceana, Ocean Conservancy, Pacific Environment, Resisting Environmental
Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL), Sierra Club, and The Wilderness Society filed their
Petition for Review of the Beaufort Sea approval on December 15, 2009. Those same groups, as well
as National Audubon Society, Ocean Conservancy, and The Wilderness Society filed their petition
for review of the Chukchi Sea approvals on January 19, 2010. The court consolidated all of the peti-
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Among other claims, the petitioners argued that a blowout was a reasonably foreseeable event and that, therefore, MMS must analyze the potential environmental effects of a large spill from exploration drilling.390
Petitioners also argued that, once again, MMS had failed to consider impacts to bowhead whales and that MMS improperly analyzed the impacts
of drilling in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas separately and dismissed any
potential for cumulative effects of drilling in both areas or in drilling
over multiple years.391 The Ninth Circuit summarily denied the petitions
in May 2010, stating without substantive explanation that MMS had met
its obligations under NEPA and that the agency did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously.392
A month before the opinion was issued, however, the Deepwater
Horizon exploded and sank in the Gulf of Mexico. As this disaster unfolded over many months, it raised immediate public concern about the
safety of offshore drilling and the ability to quickly and effectively respond to any and all problems.
The wholesale inability of industry and government to stop the
blowout quickly or clean up spilled oil in the relatively calm and infrastructure-rich waters of the Gulf of Mexico led the Obama Administration to suspend consideration of its final approvals for Shell’s planned
drilling in the U.S. Arctic Ocean in 2010.393

tions and allowed Shell to intervene on the side of the federal government. Order, Native Vill. of
Point Hope v. Salazar (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 2010) (No. 09-73942), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/eab_web_docket.nsf/Filings%20By%20Appeal%20Number/86A9966325
DA82A08525771B004FCCB3/$File/Exh.%20C...7.03.pdf.
390. Id.
391. See Consolidated Brief for Petitioners, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 378 F.
App’x 747 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2010) (Nos. 09-73942, 09-73944, 10-70166, 10-70368); Opening Brief
on the Merits for Petitioners Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission and Inupiat Community of the
Arctic Slope 41–47, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 378 F. App’x 747 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2010)
(Nos. 09-73942, 09-73944, 10-70166, 10-70368). In its 2008 Biological Opinion, NMFS concluded
that “[b]ecause [of] the potential for noise disturbance to displace whales from important feeding
areas, special scrutiny should be given to . . . drilling operations which may impact these areas.”
MINERALS MGMT. SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON OIL AND GAS LEASING AND EXPLORATION ACTIVITIES IN THE
U.S. BEAUFORT AND CHUKCHI SEAS, ALASKA 99 (2008), https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/
protectedresources/whales/bowhead/biop0708.pdf (emphasis added). NMFS had also warned that
significant impacts could occur, especially to mothers and calves if important feeding habitat was
disturbed. Id. at 87. A similar risk of disturbance existed for walrus because they feed at Hannah
Shoal, about twenty-five miles from one of the proposed Chukchi Sea drilling sites.
392. Native Vill. of Point Hope, 378 F. App’x 747.
393. Memorandum Ken Zalazar, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Michael R. Bromwich,
Dir., Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Decision Memorandum Regarding the Suspension of Certain
Offshore Permitting and Drilling Activities on the Outer Continental Shelf 1 (July 12, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/upload/Salazar-Bromwich-July-12-Final.pdf.
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ii. Administrative Appeals of 2010 Clean Air Act Permits
Before the Gulf of Mexico blowout, Shell had applied for two permits pursuant to the Clean Air Act Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program for its Discoverer drill ship, one for drilling in the
Beaufort and one for the Chukchi.394 EPA issued the permits in the
spring of 2010.395 Again Alaska Native and environmental groups appealed the permits to the EAB.396 Among other things, Petitioners argued
that Best Available Control Technology Standard (BACT) should be required on all vessels associated with Shell’s drilling operations, not just
the drill ship.397 In its decision, the EAB ruled against the petitioners on
this BACT claim.398 In addition, EPA had determined that a rig became
an “OCS source” when a Shell representative declared it secure, stable,
and ready to begin exploration. The EAB held that that the agency did
not provide a “cogent, reasoned explanation” of its adoption of Shell’s
approach to determining when the drill ship becomes a stationary source
subject to regulation and that this determination inappropriately delegated to Shell EPA’s authority to regulate.399 Finally, the EAB found that
EPA’s analysis of the potential for adverse health impacts to Inupiat
communities along the Arctic coast did not comport with the agency’s
own concurrent revision of standards for particular emissions.400
Ultimately, Shell was unable to drill in 2010 and 2011 because (1)
the analysis underlying Lease Sale 193 was illegal and on remand to the
agency; (2) EPA did not comply with the law in awarding Clean Air Act
permits; and (3) the government put its exploration decision-making on
hold in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

394. In re Shelf Gulf of Mexico, OCS Appeal Nos. 10-01 to 10-04, slip op. at 13, 15 (EAB
Dec. 30, 2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/OCS%20Permit
%20Appeals%20(CAA)/41B37138DABA5A54852578090072B80A/$File/Denying%20and%20Re
manding....pdf. Unlike in its 2007 applications, Shell acknowledged here that the Discoverer was a
major emitting facility subject to the Clean Air Act’s PSD program.
395. Id. at 15, 17.
396. Id. at 1. The groups were the Center for Biological Diversity, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Native Village of Point Hope, Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands
(REDOIL), Alaska Wilderness League, Audubon Alaska, Northern Alaska Environmental Center,
Ocean Conservancy, Oceana, Pacific Environment, Sierra Club, Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, and Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 2–3.
400. Id. at 3, 8.
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C. 2012–Present
Beginning with the revised 2007–2012 Five-Year Leasing Program,
decisions about offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic were squarely
under the control of the Obama Administration. As it moved forward, the
administration completed a new 2012–2017 Five-Year Leasing Program,
continued its commitment to Lease Sale 193, and once again granted approvals and permits for exploration drilling in the Chukchi and Beaufort
seas. These decisions, again, led to controversy.
1. 2012–2017 Five-Year Leasing Program
The 2012–2017 Five-Year Program and accompanying programmatic EIS were finalized in August 2012. The plan includes two lease
sales in the Arctic Ocean: Lease Sale 237 scheduled in the Chukchi Sea
in 2016 and Lease Sale 242 in the Beaufort Sea in 2017.401 The program
document explains that the sales are scheduled late in the five-year planning horizon to allow for additional scientific information to be gathered
and for improved “contingency planning and infrastructure development.”402 In addition, BOEM committed to moving toward a revised system of leasing for the Arctic Ocean that is “markedly different from the
traditional area-wide leasing model applied in the GOM, in which all unleased acreage in the area is typically offered for sale.”403 The agency
stated that it
[i]s developing a process in which it will continue to use incoming
scientific information and stakeholder feedback to proactively determine, in advance of any potential sale, which specific areas offer
the greatest resource potential while minimizing potential conflicts
with environmental and subsistence considerations . . . . To facilitate this approach, BOEM will carefully consider specific subsets of
the broader planning area that have the most promising oil and natural gas resource potential, based on analysis of geological and geophysical (G&G) data as well as information developed through any
exploration under existing leases from previous sales. BOEM will
401. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., PROPOSED FINAL OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM 2012–2017, at 4 (2012) [hereinafter PFP 2012–2017], available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/Five_Year_Pr
ogram/2012-2017_Five_Year_Program/PFP%2012-17.pdf. On August 27, 2012, Secretary Ken
Salazar gave final approval to the schedule of lease sales set out in the Proposed Final Program
(PFP). 2012–2017 OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
http://www.boem.gov/Five-Year-Program-2012-2017/ (last visited June 8, 2014); see also PFP
2012–2017, supra, at 4 tbl.B.
402. PFP 2012–2017, supra note 402, at 7–8.
403. Id. at 7.

1342

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:1271

further refine those areas in order to exclude or protect through mitigation environmentally sensitive habitats and subsistence uses
based on ongoing scientific study and the incorporation of traditional knowledge supplied by Alaskan Natives.404

It is not clear how these changes will be implemented. A challenge was
filed to the plan by Center for Sustainable Economy.405 Briefing in the
case is ongoing.406
2. Lease Sale 193
In February 2013, the plaintiffs in the challenge to Lease Sale 193
appealed the district court’s decision upholding the supplemental EIS as
compliant with NEPA. In their appeal, the petitioners argued that DOI
had violated NEPA in two regards. First, they argued that the supplemental EIS did not satisfy the agency’s obligations when acting in the
presence of significant scientific uncertainty.407 Specifically, they argued
that the reasons given by the DOI—that missing scientific information is
not essential to decisions at the lease sale stage—are arbitrary.408 Second,
the petitioners argued that the agency based its analysis of impacts on an
arbitrarily limited development scenario.409
On January 22, 2014, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the petitioners.410 The court found that DOI had violated NEPA by relying on an
arbitrarily small prediction of the amount of the development that might
result from selling leases in the Chukchi Sea. All of the analysis of potential impacts to the environment in the EIS supporting the decision to
hold Lease Sale 193 was premised on a scenario in which one billion
barrels of oil were developed from the leases sold. One billion barrels
reflected the “lowest possible amount of oil that was economical to produce,” and DOI chose to use it even though estimates of hydrocarbon
potential in the Chukchi Sea ranged up to twenty-nine billion barrels
with a mean estimate of twelve billion barrels.411 The court rejected the

404. Id.
405. Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, No. 12-1431 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2012).
406. Id.
407. Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell, 740 F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2014).
408. Id.
409. Id. at 499–502.
410. Id. at 502–05.
411. Id. at 501.
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government’s justification for using this low estimate and remanded the
case to the district court.412
Several days after the court decision, Shell announced that it would
not seek approval—as it had planned—to drill exploration wells in the
Chukchi Sea beginning in 2014.413
3. 2012–2013 Beaufort and Chukchi Sea Exploration
Looking again to drill exploration wells, Shell submitted revised
exploration plans in May and June 2011, respectively, seeking approval
for 2012 to drill up to four wells in the Beaufort Sea, two wells each at
its Sivulliq and Torpedo prospects, and six wells at its Burger prospect in
the Chukchi Sea.414 In August 2011, BOEM conditionally approved the
Beaufort Exploration Plan, and in December 2011 BOEM conditionally
approved the Chukchi Exploration Plan.415 The conditional approvals
allowed Shell to drill the wells proposed under its exploration plans as
long as the company received the permits required by other agencies and
met other particular conditions imposed by BOEM.
The use of such conditional approvals has prompted concern because it allows for continued environmental and economic uncertainty
beyond the exploration plan approval.416 Future agency decisions about
the conditions can be improperly influenced by the massive industry in-

412. Id. at 504–05. The court found that the supplemental analysis satisfied the DOI’s obligations to address missing information and rejected the petitioners’ argument to the contrary. See id. at
496.
413. See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Shell Says It Won’t Drill in Alaska in 2014, Cites Court Challenge, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/shell-saysit-wont-drill-in-alaska-in-2014-cites-court-challenge/2014/01/30/72dd06f8-89ab-11e3-916ee01534b1e132_story.html. In October 2013, Shell had announced plans to return to the Chukchi Sea
in 2014 and had been pursuing the necessary approvals.
414. SHELL OFFSHORE INC., REVISED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE EXPLORATION PLAN
CAMDEN
BAY,
BEAUFORT
SEA,
ALASKA
1–6
(2011),
available
at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Plans/Regional_Plans/
Alaska_Exploration_Plans/2012_Shell_Beaufort_EP/Shell%202012%20Camden%20Bay%
20Exploration%20Plan%20Public%20Copy.pdf; SHELL GULF OF MEXICO INC., REVISED OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE EXPLORATION PLAN CHUKCHI SEA, ALASKA 1–5 (2011), available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Plans/Regional_Plans/
Alaska_Exploration_Plans/2012_Shell_Chukchi_EP/CS-EP-Public.pdf.
415. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REVIEW OF SHELL’S 2012 ALASKA OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS
EXPLORATION PROGRAM 11–12 (2013) [hereinafter DOI 60-DAY REPORT], available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/Shell-report-3-8-13-Final.pdf.
416. See Letter from Cindy Shogan, Exec. Dir., Alaska Wilderness League et al., to Dr. James
Kendall, Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt. 39 (July 25, 2011), available at
https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90463/621169/737117/736922/A2F7W2__AWL_Comment_Letter_on_Shell_Beaufort_Sea_Spill_Plan_and_Exploration_Plan_7-25-11.pdf.
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vestment that follows conditional approvals, further tilting the decisionmaking field toward approving risky activities.
Shell also sought and received approvals for its oil spill prevention
and response plan and air and water pollution permits. As detailed below,
each of these authorizations spurred litigation. Despite this and other active litigation as described above, Shell mobilized its drilling rigs into
U.S. Arctic waters in the summer of 2012, though it did not manage to
complete any exploration wells.
a. Challenge to Exploration Plan Approvals
For the third time, Alaska Native and environmental groups challenged the approval of Shell’s exploration plans in the Ninth Circuit.417
As the first plans to be submitted in the Arctic since the Gulf of Mexico
blowout, Shell’s revised plans were required to respond to two Notices to
Lessees issued by the Secretary of the Interior as a result of the Gulf incident. The revisions related to the calculation of a worst-case discharge
and to Shell’s ability to deploy containment equipment in the event of a
blowout.418
In their challenge, the petitioners focused on BOEM’s compliance
with the OCSLA regulations governing spill response capabilities. Petitioners argued that the government had improperly approved Shell’s exploration plans before Shell had an approved oil spill response plan in
place, and had violated the law by relying on a cursory explanation of
Shell’s well capping and containment system, for which the design had
not even been completed, much less was it built or tested.419 Petitioners
also contended that Shell’s estimate of the time required to drill a relief
well was overly optimistic and that if a relief well could not be drilled in
417. Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2012). Native Village of
Point Hope, Alaska Wilderness League, Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife,
National Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Environmental
Center, Ocean Conservancy, Oceana, Resisting Environmental Destruction On Indigenous Lands
(REDOIL), Sierra Club, and The Wilderness Society filed their petition challenging the Beaufort
approval (No. 11-72891) on September 29, 2011, and ICAS filed its petition on October 3, 2011
(No. 11-72943). Id. The same groups filed petitions challenging the Chukchi Sea approval in February 2012. Again the cases were consolidated, and Shell and the state of Alaska joined as intervenors
in the case. See id.
418. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION, & ENFORCEMENT, NATIONAL NOTICE
TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
(OCS) (2010), http://www.boem.gov/Regulations/Notices-To-Lessees/2010/10-n06.aspx; BUREAU
OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION, & ENFORCEMENT, NATIONAL NOTICE TO LESSEES AND
OPERATORS (NTL) OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (2010),
available at http://www.ocsbbs.com/ntls/10-n10.pdf.
419. Native Vill. of Point Hope, 680 F.3d at 1129.
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such a short time, the total amount of oil needing to be recovered could
exceed the amount anticipated in Shell’s plans.420
The Ninth Circuit assigned the case to the same panel from previous year, and the court again rejected the challenges.421 The court sanctioned the agency’s reliance on the old spill response plans when it approved the drilling plans and determined that, because the agency had
eventually approved the new spill response plans, the issue was moot.422
The court also deferred to the agency’s own expertise in determining that
the cursory description of Shell’s spill containment plans was sufficient
and that the time estimate for drilling a relief well was realistic.423
b. Continuing Controversy over Air Emissions424
Shell again applied for Clean Air Act permits needed for its proposed drilling. EPA issued two PSD permits for the Discoverer—one for
the Chukchi Sea and the other for the Beaufort Sea.425 EPA issued a minor source permit for the Kulluk.426
Alaska Native and environmental groups again challenged the permits at the EAB. With respect to the Discoverer permits, the petitioners
again argued that EPA erred by determining that the vessels are OCS
sources subject to regulation only when attached to the seabed.427 In addition, the petitioners challenged EPA’s determinations in assessing
compliance with the Clean Air Act that ambient air would be measured
420. Id.
421. Id. at 1126.
422. Id. at 1131.
423. Id. at 1134.
424. In December 2012, Congress transferred the authority to regulate air emissions from OCS
sources from EPA to the DOI. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74,
§ 432, 125 Stat. 786, 797 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW112publ74/html/PLAW-112publ74.htm. These changes do not apply to permits already issued or
under consideration, like those at issue for Shell. See id. § 432(d). BOEM has committed to revising
its regulations to better enable the agency to address the new responsibilities.
425. In re Shell Gulf of Mexico, OCS Appeal Nos. 11-02, 11-03, 11–04, & 11–08, slip op. at 1
(EAB Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/
OCS%20Permit%20Appeals%20(CAA)/FFB31450EBD172148525798300737184/$File/Denying%
20Review...51.pdf.
426. See In re Shell Offshore Inc., OCS Appeal Nos. 11-05, 11-06, & 11-07 (EAB Mar. 30,
2012), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/Filings%20By%20Appeal
%20Number/148252B4723F0450852579D100714934/$File/Shell%20Kulluk.pdf.
427. The groups challenging the Discoverer permits were the Native Village of Point Hope,
Resisting Environmental Destruction of Indigenous Lands. Alaska Wilderness League, Center for
Biological Diversity, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Environmental Center,
Ocean Conservancy, Oceana, Pacific Environment, Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society and the
Iñupiat Community of the Arctic Slope. Id. at 1. In addition, the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission initially joined the challenge but later withdrew.
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500 meters from the ship and that the emissions would not violate new
increment standards for certain pollutants.428 Finally, the Alaska Native
groups argued that EPA’s environmental justice analysis regarding disproportionate impacts to the North Slope communities continued to be
arbitrary.429
The EAB dismissed the appeal, finding EPA’s determination that
the rig became an OCS source when attached to the bottom was adequately justified. The EAB affirmed EPA’s measurement of compliance
at 500 meters from the ship, found that Shell’s estimated emissions
would comply with the new standards, and concluded that the supplemental analysis adequately looked at the disproportionate health impacts
on the North Slope as compared to the rest of Alaska.430
With respect to the Kulluk permit, the petitioners argued that EPA
erred in establishing limitations on the Kulluk’s potential to emit various
pollutants and in declining to require a pre-construction increment analysis.431 The groups also challenged the 500-meter exemption for measuring ambient air quality and raised environmental justice concerns. On
March 30, 2012, the EAB rejected those arguments and upheld the Shell
Kulluk air permit.432
Once the EAB appeals were complete, Alaska Native and environmental groups filed two cases in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals challenging EPA’s approval of the permits.433 The court rejected the petitioners’ arguments and upheld the permit approvals. With respect to the Discoverer, the Ninth Circuit held that the Clean Air Act was ambiguous as
to whether best available control technology was required for vessels not
attached to an Outer Continental Shelf source, and therefore, deferred to
EPA’s determination that such technology was not required. 434 The court

428. In re Shell Gulf of Mexico, supra note 426, at 2–3. Shell had explained to EPA that this
distance was necessary for the ship to comply with the NAAQS.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. See In re Shell Offshore Inc., supra note 427, at 46. The groups challenging the Kulluk
permit include: Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands, Alaska Wilderness
League, Center for Biological Diversity, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Oceana, Pacific Environment, Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and Inupiat
Community of the Arctic Slope. Id. at 1. “[I]ncrements are maximum allowable increases in pollution concentrations that may occur in particular areas.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
432. Id. at 100.
433. Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands v. EPA, 716 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir.
2012) (amended Apr. 23, 2013).
434. Id. at 1165.
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also upheld EPA’s decision to allow measurement of ambient air to
begin 500 meters from the ship.435
In August 2013, the Ninth Circuit rejected the challenges to the
Kulluk permit, thereby affirming EPA’s decision not to require a preconstruction increment analysis for the Kulluk.436
c. Spill Plan Approvals and Challenge
As explained above, companies seeking to drill exploration wells
must have approved oil spill response plans.437 Shell first had a Beaufort
Sea response plan approved in 2006 to accompany its proposed 2007–
2009 drilling program. Renewed approvals were granted in 2010 for both
the Chukchi and Beaufort Sea response plans. Drilling never occurred in
those years, however, and DOI required Shell to resubmit plans for its
proposed 2012 activities.
In the new submissions, Shell’s emergency response plan is based
on the assumption that “10 percent of the 25,000 [barrels of oil per day
(bopd)] discharge escapes the primary offshore recovery efforts at the
blowout.”438 Shell’s planning assumption means that Shell expects to
contain, recover, and remove approximately 95% of any oil spill in the
water and that only 5% would remain unrecovered and capable of affecting shorelines.
This response assumption is made despite the fact that, as explained
above, less than 10% of the spilled oil that resulted from the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon accidents was recovered using mechanical
means and that none of the equipment Shell proposed for use had been
tested in Arctic conditions. As explained below, some of that equipment
had not even been built.
BSEE approved Shell’s oil spill response plans in February 2012.439
In July 2012, a coalition of Alaska Native and conservation organizations
filed a lawsuit in federal district court in Alaska challenging those ap-

435. Id.
436. See Alaska Wilderness League v. EPA, 727 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2013).
437. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
438. SHELL, supra note 135, app. C at C-11. According to Shell, “the unrecovered 2,500 bopd
is assumed to drift toward the mainland, driven by winds out of the [west-northwest].” Id. Shell
assumed that “half of the oil reaching the near-shore environment would be recovered by the skimming systems dispatched from the [Shell’s nearshore recovery task force].” Id. Shell further stated
that “[t]he remaining 1,250 bopd are assumed to migrate toward the shoreline where [Shell’s spill
response contractor] would mobilize personnel and equipment to intercept the oil and deploy boom
for shoreline protection.” Id.
439. Dan Joling, Shell Spill Response Plan Wins Federal OK, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Feb.
17, 2012), http://www.adn.com/2012/02/17/2322791/shell-wins-ok-for-arctic-spill.html.
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provals.440 The plaintiffs argued that BSEE violated the law by approving
a plan based on Shell’s assertion that it can remove 95% of a worst-case
discharge and that the trajectory analyses on which the response plan is
premised are faulty because they fail to encompass oil remaining under
ice through the winter.441 The plaintiffs also argued that insufficient information was provided to BSEE for the agency to determine whether
and how the worst-case discharge was modeled and that the spill response plan did not contain information about Shell’s Arctic containment
system, which BOEM and BSEE stated was an important component of
response. In addition, several of the plaintiffs argued that BSEE violated
NEPA by failing to prepare either an Environmental Assessment or EIS
to evaluate the spill plan—or alternatives—and violated the ESA by failing to consult with expert agencies about potential impacts to endangered
species.442
This is case of first impression, and there is little case law interpreting the statutory provisions at issue. It proceeded in district court in conjunction with an action filed by Shell seeking declaratory judgment that
the spill plans comply with the law.443
In August 2013, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments
wholesale,444 and they are pursuing an appeal.445
d. Clean Water Act Permits
To drill exploration wells, Shell must apply for and receive permits
from EPA pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) under the Clean Water Act. In lieu of individual permits
for each activity, EPA can issue a “general permit” covering categories
of similar activities. In May 2009, Shell asked EPA to provide coverage
under its existing general permit for discharges from drilling activities in
the Arctic Ocean.446 Shell’s proposed discharges dramatically exceeded

440. Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment, Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Nos. 3:12-cv-00048-RRB,
1:12-cv-00010-RRB (D. Alaska Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/
files/159Order-denying-MSJ.pdf.
441. Id. at 13.
442. Id. at 24–36.
443. Id. at 1–2.
444. See generally id.
445. Shell Gulf of Mexico v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 13-35835 (9th Cir. argued Aug.
13, 2014).
446. See Letter from David Dickson, Alaska Wilderness League et al., to Lisa P. Jackson,
Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency et al. (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/
permits/ocs/shell/alaska_wilderness_league_petition_shell_chukchi_noi_1-20-2010.pdf.
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the amounts anticipated by the general permit.447 Concerned that approval under a general permit would make it difficult to monitor impacts, environmental and Alaska Native organizations requested that EPA require
individual permits for the proposed drilling.448
Before EPA ruled on Shell’s request, the company repeated and
broadened its application, seeking to operate under the general permit for
the proposed 2012 activities and beyond.449 This time Shell was joined
by ConocoPhillips and Statoil, who also sought coverage under the general permit for drilling planned in 2012 and 2013.450 ConocoPhillips and
Statoil also proposed to discharge volumes of pollutants including muds,
cooling water, and sanitary and domestic waste that exceeded the
amounts analyzed by EPA.451 Concerned again about the general permit
approach, environmental groups requested that EPA permit the activities
only under individual permits.452
In summer 2011, EPA granted coverage to the three operators under the expiring general permit.453 Subsequently, the Alaska Eskimo
447. Id. at 3. For example, Shell proposed to emit nine times the amount of cooling water
compared to the amount that was analyzed in the ocean discharge criteria evaluation (ODCE). Shell
also proposed to discharge in the Chukchi Sea almost twice as much drilling mud in a single year of
drilling as EPA estimated would be discharged over the five-year general permit period. Id. at 3–4.
448. Id.
449. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NOTICE OF INTENT INFORMATION SHEETS, SHELL CHUKCHI
SEA LEASE BLOCKS (2010), available at ftp://ftp.epa.gov/reg10ftp/alaska/ocs/chukchi/water/noi/
2010-NOIs/; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NOTICE OF INTENT INFORMATION SHEETS, SHELL BEAUFORT
SEA LEASE BLOCKS (2010), available at ftp://ftp.epa.gov/reg10ftp/alaska/ocs/beaufort/water/noi/
2010-NOIs/.
450. See Letter of Notice of Intent from Bruce St. Pierre, Jr., Senior Envtl. Coordinator, ConocoPhillips, to Hanh Shaw, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Apr. 14, 2011), available at
ftp://ftp.epa.gov/reg10ftp/alaska/ocs/chukchi/water/noi/2011-NOIs/Conoco_Chukchi_cover_
letter_Apr_2011.pdf; Letter of Notice of Intent from Bill Schoellhorn, Exploration Dir. Alaska,
Statoil, to Hanh Shaw, Envtl. Prot. Agency (April 13, 2011), available at ftp://ftp.epa.gov/reg10ftp/
alaska/ocs/chukchi/water/noi/2011-NOIs/Statoil_Arctic_npdes_Notice_of_Intent_Chukchi_lease_
6206_6211_6260_6306_6310_Apr_2011.pdf.
451. Id.
452. Letter from Cindy Shogan, Exec. Dir., Alaska Wilderness League et al., to Hanh Shaw,
Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 24, 2011), available at ftp://ftp.epa.gov/reg10ftp/alaska/ocs/beaufort/
water/noi/2010-NOIs/public_comments_Alaska_Wilderness_League_Shell_Sivulliq_Revised_
NOI_CORRECTED_comments_1-28-2011.pdf.
453. Letter from Dennis J. McLerran, Reg’l Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Susan Childs,
Alaska Venture Support Integrator Manager, Shell Exploration & Prod. Co. (June 23, 2011), available at ftp://ftp.epa.gov/reg10ftp/alaska/ocs/chukchi/water/noi/2011-NOIs/Arctic_GP_EPA_
Coverage_Letter_Shell_Exploration_Co_June_23_2011.pdf; Letter from Dennis J. McLerran, Reg’l
Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Bruce St. Pierre, Jr., Senior Envtl. Coordinator, ConocoPhillips (June
23, 2011), available at ftp://ftp.epa.gov/reg10ftp/alaska/ocs/chukchi/water/noi/2011-NOIs/Arctic_
GP_EPA_Coverage_Letter_ConocoPhillips_June_23_2011.pdf; Letter from Dennis J. McLerran,
Reg’l Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Bill Schoellhorn, Exploration Dir. Alaska, Statoil (June 23,
2011), available at ftp://ftp.epa.gov/reg10ftp/alaska/ocs/chukchi/water/noi/2011-NOIs/Arctic_GP_
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Whaling Commission (AEWC) and Inupiat Communities of the Arctic
Slope (ICAS) filed a lawsuit that resulted in a settlement whereby EPA
agreed to issue a new general permit by a certain date.454
EPA ultimately issued new separate general permits for the Beaufort and Chukchi seas in October 2012.455 Although the new general
permits included an analysis of volumes of discharges that were more
closely aligned with the proposals by Shell, ConocoPhillips, and Statoil,
the permit itself placed no limits on the total volume of any discharge.
Thus, even though EPA’s underlying analysis of impacts relied on an
assumption that discharges would be limited to certain quantities over the
five-year period, nothing in the permit actually limited the total amount
of discharges permissible. The permit, therefore, left the door open for
companies to continue discharges exceeding those analyzed by EPA.456
Two lawsuits were filed—one by AEWC and the other by a coalition of conservation organizations. The suits allege that EPA violated the
Clean Water Act in setting the terms of the general permits and allowing
for coverage of the proposed activities.457 The cases are currently proceeding in the Ninth Circuit.
e. Shell Lawsuits Against Conservation Groups
Between February and June 2012, Shell filed three lawsuits in federal district court in Alaska related to its proposed exploration drilling.458
The suits named an Alaska Native and thirteen conservation organizations as defendants and sought declaratory judgments that approvals or
EPA_Coverage_Letter_Statoil_USA_Inc_June_23_2011.pdf.
454. Motion for Voluntary Dismissal, Inupiat Cmty. of the Arctic Slope v. EPA, No. 11-73182
(9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012).
455. Arctic Oil and Gas Exploration General Permits, supra note 231.
456. EPA determined that “it is neither reasonable nor necessary to establish a cap or threshold
on the volumes for each discharge.” ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESPONSE TO COMMENTS 86 (2012),
http://www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/permits/npdes/ak/arcticgp/Response_To_Comments_
Beaufort_Chukchi_General_Permits.pdf.
457. Alaska Wilderness League v. EPA, No. 13-60633 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2013); Alaska Eskimo
Whaling Comm’n v. EPA, No. 13-70697 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2013).
458.The first lawsuit sought a declaratory judgment that Shell’s oil spill response plans complied with applicable statutes. See Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. and Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Ctr. for
Biological Diversity, No. 3:12 cv-0048-RRB (D. Alaska Aug. 5, 2013), available at
http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/159Order-denying-MSJ.pdf. The second sought a declaratory judgment that the Incidental Harassment Authorizations issued by the National Marine
Fisheries Service complied with the law. See Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. and Shell Offshore, Inc. v.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 3:12 CV-0096-RRB (D. Alaska). The third sought a declaratory
judgment that the Letters of Authorization issued by the US Fish & Wildlife Service were legal. See
Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. and Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 3:12 CV0110-RRB (D. Alaska).
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permits obtained by Shell complied with the law.459 None of these suits
named the federal agency that issued the permits as a party, and the defendants moved to dismiss two of them for lack of jurisdiction and a
cognizable controversy.460 The district court denied those motions.461
Ultimately, the district court dismissed two of the suits as moot, and the
third was consolidated with the affirmative challenge to BSEE’s approval of Shell’s spill plans.462
Eventually, as part of its ruling rejecting the conservation groups’
challenge to BSEE’s approval of Shell’s oil spill response plans, the district court granted Shell summary judgment and awarded declaratory relief establishing its response plans as valid. Both of those rulings—the
decision in the affirmative challenge to the spill response plans and the
grant of declaratory judgment—are now on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.463
f. Shell’s Operations in 2012
Though litigation did not stop Shell from completing exploration
wells in 2012, substantial problems and near-disaster did. These problems reflect the difficult conditions in Alaskan waters and the risks inherent in operating there.
As an initial matter, Shell made public statements that were inconsistent with the commitments made in its Oil Spill Response Plans. As
explained above, Shell’s spill response plans were premised at least in
part on an assumption that the company could recover approximately
95% of a major spill before spilled oil could contact the shoreline.464 In
June 2012, however, a Shell spokesperson contradicted these clear
statements in the plan by saying that “we expect to ‘encounter’ 90 percent of any discharge on site—very close to the drilling rig . . . [and] to
encounter 5 percent near-shore between the drilling rig and the coast.
459. See generally Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. and Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity, No. 3:12 cv-0048-RRB (D. Alaska Aug. 5, 2013); Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. and Shell
Offshore, Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 3:12 CV-0096-RRB (D. Alaska); Shell Gulf of
Mexico, Inc. and Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 3:12 CV-0110-RRB (D.
Alaska).
460. See, e.g., Memo of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. and Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 3:12 CV0048-RRB (D. Alaska Apr. 17, 2012).
461. Order, Shell v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 12-80176 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2012) (denying petition for writ of mandamus).
462. Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Nos. 3:12-cv-00048-RRB,
1:12-cv-00010-RRB (D. Alaska Aug. 5, 2013).
463. See supra note 446 and accompanying text.
464. See supra note 439 and accompanying text.
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And we expect to encounter another 5 percent on shore. We never make
claims about the percent we could actually recover, because conditions
vary, of course.”465 These statements directly contradict the clear language of the plan.466
Shortly before drilling was to start in 2012, Shell notified EPA that
it would not be able to meet the emissions standards set in January for its
Arctic fleet, asking EPA to modify its permit.467 EPA granted Shell’s
request and issued a compliance order that allowed Shell to emit higher
levels of pollutants than originally allowed.468 Notwithstanding EPA’s
allowance of higher emissions levels, Shell’s operations in 2012 repeatedly violated the terms of its air permits. EPA cited both the Discoverer
and Kulluk for violating “numerous” conditions of the air permits. The
violations included failure to install required air pollution control equipment, failure to properly calibrate air pollution monitoring equipment,
operation of unpermitted propulsion engines, numerous violations of
emission limits, and the failure to timely report such violations.469 Eventually, Shell was fined $1.1 million for these violations.470
Shell also sought to lower the standards that would be required for
its oil spill response barge. After the barge failed to receive U.S. Coast
Guard certification, engineers from the company argued that it was no
longer appropriate to require them to meet the rigorous weather standards
originally proposed.471 Although Secretary Salazar initially characterized
a trial deployment of Shell’s oil spill containment dome in the waters of
Washington State as successful,472 DOI documents later revealed that the
465. See Richard Harris, Ahead of Alaska Drilling, Shell Practices Cleaning Up, NPR (July 1,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/01/155129571/ahead-of-alaska-drilling-shell-practices-cleaningup.
466. See supra note 439 and accompanying text (quoting section of Shell’s spill response
plan).
467. Kim Murphy, Arctic Oil: Shell Seeks Last-Minute Break on Air Pollution Permit, L.A.
TIMES (July 13, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/13/nation/la-na-nn-shell-air-pollution20120713.
468. Neela Banerjee, EPA Oks Air Pollution Permits for Shell’s Arctic Ocean Drilling, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/31/nation/la-na-nn-epa-shell-arctic20120831.
469. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NOTICE OF VIOLATION ISSUED TO SHELL GULF OF MEXICO INC.
(2013) [hereinafter NOTICE OF VIOLATION ISSUED TO SHELL GULF OF MEXICO INC.], available at
http://www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/permits/ocs/shell/notice_of_violation_discoverer_1-10-2013.pdf.
470. Lisa Demer, EPA Fines Shell More Than $1 Million for Pollution Violations in Alaska
Arctic, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.adn.com/2013/09/05/3060253/epafines-shell-more-than-1-million.html.
471. Kim Murphy, Shell May Be Ready for the Arctic, But Its Oil Spill Barge Isn’t, L.A. TIMES
(July 5, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/05/nation/la-na-nn-arctic-drilling-shell-barge20120705.
472. Broder, supra note 2.
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dome had “breached like a whale” and was “crushed like a beer can”
during the test.473 This failure led Secretary Salazar to prohibit Shell from
drilling into hydrocarbon zones at any of its planned wells.474
The company also had a series of significant problems moving vessels and other equipment. Most famously, at the end of December, the
icebreaker Aiviq—a brand-new, highly-touted purpose-built Arctic-class
support vessel–was towing the Kulluk from Dutch Harbor for a 2,000
mile trip to Seattle. The towrope disconnected, setting the Kulluk adrift
in rough, but not unusual, seas.475 The Aiviq re-established the towline
but then lost engine power, leaving both the Aiviq and Kulluk adrift.476 It
has since come to light that Shell’s contractors made the decision to depart Dutch Harbor to avoid an estimated $6 million in state taxes that
would have come due if it had remained in Dutch Harbor on January 1,
2013.477
A Coast Guard cutter joined the effort and established a tow with
the Kulluk, but its towline soon parted and became entangled in the
ship’s port propeller.478 Shell’s response vessel, the Nanuq, then arrived
on scene and, along with the Aiviq, established towlines again, but again
both lines separated from the Kulluk.479 The tug Alert then arrived from
Prince William Sound to help, but it was forced to release its towline to
the Kulluk after engine problems made towing too dangerous.480 The rig
grounded shortly thereafter, losing among other things its small support
boats, which spilled their fuel and washed further ashore.481 Despite millions of dollars of upgrades to prepare the Kulluk for drilling, its circular
design had apparently made it an “ungainly structure” that was particu-

473. Ryan, supra note 136 (quoting internal BSEE emails).
474. See John M. Broder, U.S. Approves an Initial Step in Oil Drilling near Alaska, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/business/energy-environment/usapproves-trial-drilling-for-shell-near-alaska-with-conditions.html?_r=0. Shell decided to continue
with its drilling program anyway. See id.
475. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Coast Guard Assisting Drilling Rig Stranded near Alaska, FUEL FIX
(Dec. 28, 2012), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/12/28/coast-guard-assisting-drilling-rig-stranded-nearalaska/.
476. Id.
477. Jim Paulin & Carey Restino, Shell Hoped to Save Millions in Taxes by Moving NowGrounded Drill Rig out of Alaska, ALASKA DISPATCH (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.alaskadispatch
.com/article/was-grounding-shell-drill-rig-kulluk-due-rush-save-alaska-taxes.
478. Dlouhy, supra note 476.
479. Paulin & Restino, supra note 478.
480. Id.
481. Id.
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larly challenging to tow in bad weather, spinning in circles and acting as
“a sail” that hindered rescue efforts.482
Shell lost control of its other drillship, the Discoverer, during the
2012 open water season as well. On its way to the drill site, the ship was
anchored in Dutch Harbor. The anchors were unable to hold the ship in
place, and it drifted toward the coast.483 Tugs were called in to assist the
rig, which was very close to shore.484 During the drilling operations,
Shell was unexpectedly forced to use the Discoverer’s propulsion engines to stay on site, as the anchor-handling icebreaker was not able to
keep the vessel in position during unmooring due to rough weather.485
This resulted in a violation of Shell’s air permit, which forbid the use of
propulsion during the operational phase covered by the permits.486 After
the drilling season, the Discoverer experienced propulsion problems and
was not able to return to Seattle under its own power.487
Ice in the Chukchi Sea delayed Shell’s plans to drill there by more
than one month.488 Additionally, twenty-four hours after the company
finally secured the Discoverer over its planned drill site, Shell had to
weigh anchor and move because a massive ice floe covering approximately 360 square miles was drifting dangerously close to the site.489
Throughout the 2012 drilling season, Shell also faced difficulties
transporting people to the drill site because it did not have an easily accessible port on the U.S. Arctic coast from which to make personnel
482. Lisa Demer, Was One Ship Enough to Tow Shell Oil Drilling Rig in Gulf of Alaska?,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.adn.com/2013/01/14/2751969/was-one-shipenough-to-tow-shell.html (quoting Charlie Nalen, Crowley Marine Services Vice President of Operations, and Lt. Dave Gilbert, U.S. Coast Guard).
483. Kim Murphy, Shell’s Arctic Drilling Rig Runs Adrift in Alaskan Harbor, L.A. TIMES (July
15, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/15/nation/la-na-nn-shell-discoverer-drifts-20120715.
This was not the first time the Discoverer unexpectedly weighed anchor. Maetzig, supra note 345. In
a late spring storm off the New Zealand coast in November 2010, the Discoverer’s mooring system
and drilling equipment were damaged when anchor lines snapped, and the ship was forced to drop its
riser—the pipe that connects the rig to the undersea well. Id.
484. Murphy, supra note 484.
485. NOTICE OF VIOLATION ISSUED TO SHELL GULF OF MEXICO INC., supra note 470, at 10.
486. Id.
487. Tim Bradner, Shell Rigs in Kodiak, Seward; Endeavor Work Continues, ALASKA J.
COMMERCE (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/JanuaryIssue-3-2013/Shell-rigs-in-Kodiak-Seward-Endeavor-work-continues/.
488. Yereth Rosen, Ice, Logistics Delay Shell Alaska Drilling Plans, REUTERS (July 6, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/07/us-shell-alaska-idUSBRE86601P20120707. In the beginning of July, Shell expected the delay to last until the beginning of August. However, Shell did not
actually begin drilling until September 8, 2012. Shell Starts Preparatory Drilling for Offshore Oil
Well off Alaska, CNN (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/09/us/arctic-oil/index.html.
489. Dan Joling, Drifting Sea Ice Halts Shell’s Arctic Drilling, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS
(Sept. 10, 2012) http://www.adn.com/2012/09/10/2619205/shell-halts-chukchi-sea-drilling.html.
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transfers. “All too often, fog socked in the helicopters Shell used to rotate
workers on and off its vessels,” and as a result, flights between the rig
and land-based facilities were delayed for days at a time.490 In addition,
the pilots operating Shell’s helicopters did not have Arctic experience,491
and the lack of de-icing capability on the helicopters continued to challenge operations after drilling was complete because the crew could not
be transported off the Kulluk rig.492
In addition, the cold weather caused problems with desalination and
treatment of water for use on the ship.493 Shell’s cranes froze in the cold
conditions and could not be used to move heavy equipment aboard its
ships.494 After the drilling season was over, weather also prevented Shell
from conducting required maintenance on the Kulluk drill ship.495 As
Deputy Interior Secretary David Hayes stated, “We’re no longer talking
about these things in the abstract, where . . . the issues seem very manageable. When they actually affect operations, it’s a reminder that this
is . . . a particularly challenging environment.”496
Many of Shell’s problems appeared to stem from the company’s
lack of appreciation for the difficulty of operating in Arctic and northern
water conditions as well as its high risk-tolerance.497 Shell’s problems led
to a series of government investigations. The Department of the Interior
undertook a sixty-day review of the drilling season that resulted in recommendations for improved regulations applicable to drilling in the Arctic and additional requirements for Shell.498 Secretary of the Interior Salazar concluded at the end of this review period that “Shell screwed

490. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Shell Navigates Obstacles in Arctic Drilling, FUEL FIX (Nov. 4,
2012),
http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/11/04/shell-navigates-obstacles-in-arctic-drilling/;
Jerry
Beilinson, Shell Oil Delayed in Arctic Departure, POPULAR MECHANICS (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/shell-oil-delayed-in-arctic-departure14544688#ixzz2BaFn6z5f.
491. Beilinson, supra note 491.
492. Editorial, The Perils of Arctic Drilling, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/03/opinion/la-ed-kulluk-beaufort-royal-dutch-shell-20130103.
493. Dlouhy, supra note 491.
494. Id.
495. Suzanna Caldwell, Why Did Kulluk Leave Dutch Harbor? Essential Repairs to Be Made
in Seattle, ALASKA DISPATCH (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/why-didkulluk-leave-dutch-harbor-essential-repairs-be-made-seattle (noting that the Kulluk was not able to
overwinter in Dutch Harbor because weather would delay the maintenance schedule).
496. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Shell Learning About the Arctic the Hard Way, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.adn.com/2012/11/11/2681986/shell-learning-about-thearctic.html.
497. See, e.g., Demer, supra at 483 (discussing the company’s failure to account appropriately
for normal but difficult weather conditions).
498. See generally DOI 60-DAY REPORT, supra note 416.
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up.”499 As noted above, EPA’s investigation into Shell’s violations of its
Clean Air Act permits resulted in a $1.1 million fine for the company.500
In addition, the Coast Guard opened a marine casualty investigation related to the Kulluk grounding and asked the Department of Justice to
open a criminal investigation of Shell’s drilling activities.501 The Coast
Guard reportedly found sixteen safety and environmental violations by
the Discoverer and almost as many by the Kulluk.502
On April 3, 2014, the Coast Guard released the final results of its
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the grounding of the
Kulluk. The report details mismanagement and poor risk assessment on
the part of Shell and its contractors.503 It also describes violations of the
law and regulations and recommended changes to improve safety and
planning. On the very first page of the report, Assistant Commandant for
the Coast Guard states that “the inadequate assessment and management
of risks by the parties involved was the most significant causal factor in
the mishap” and expresses trouble with the “significant number and nature of the potential violations of law and regulations.”504
Ultimately, Shell’s problem-plagued 2012 season is the in-thewater result of the process, controversy, and management difficulties
outlined above.
4. Proposal for 2014 Chukchi Sea Exploration
On October 31, 2013, Shell announced that, despite its continuing
problems, the company was considering seeking approval to return to the
Chukchi Sea in 2014.505 The announcement included a statement that
exploration in the Beaufort was on hold for the immediate future and that
the Kulluk drill rig might have been damaged beyond repair.506 Roughly
499. Kim Murphy, Salazar on Arctic Drilling: “Shell Screwed up in 2012”, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
14, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/14/nation/la-na-shell-arctic-interior-report20130314.
500. Demer, supra note 471.
501. See Sean Cockerham, Coast Guard Wants Shell Drill Rigs to Get Pollution Investigation,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.adn.com/2013/03/27/2842580/coast-guardasking-justice-dept.html.
502. Id.
503. U.S. COAST GUARD, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE MULTIPLE RELATED MARINE CASUALTIES AND GROUNDING OF THE MODU
KULLUK (2014), available at http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/KULLUK_COMPLETE_
REDACTED_2.pdf.
504. Id.
505. See Yereth Rosen, Shell Mulls Chukchi-Only Drilling for 2014, Minus Troubled Kulluk
Rig, ALASKA DISPATCH (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20131031/shellmulls-chukchi-only-drilling-2014-minus-troubled-kulluk-rig.
506. Id.
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a week later, the company did indeed submit a “scaled down” exploration plan.507 In that plan Shell sought approval to drill up to six wells in
the Chukchi Sea, beginning with the one it started in 2012.508 Shell
planned to use the Discoverer once again in the Chukchi Sea and to contract with another vessel, the Polar Pioneer as a backup.509 The revisions
also include reductions or relocations of spill response capacity and increased noise estimates.510
On November 29, 2013, BOEM sent Shell a letter requesting additional information needed to evaluate the plan.511 The review process
resulted in correspondence back and forth between the agency and company. Also, in response to a requirement from the review of Shell’s 2012
season, the company has submitted an Integrated Operations Procedure.512 In the wake of the Ninth Circuit decision invalidating the Lease
Sale 193 EIS, Shell announced that it would forego exploration in
2014.513 The company has since announced that it will pursue an expanded exploration program using the Discoverer and Polar Pioneer to drill
up to six wells over several years in the Chukchi Sea.514 The company
hopes to begin operations in 2015, but the approval process is subject to

507. See generally SHELL GULF OF MEXICO, INC., REVISED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
LEASE EXPLORATION PLAN CHUKCHI SEA, ALASKA—REVISION 2 (2013), available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasin
g_and_Plans/Plans/2013-11-06%20Shell%20Chukchi%20Sea%20EP%20Revision%202.pdf.
508. Id. at 1-2.
509. Id. at 2-2.
510. See id.
511. Letter from David Johnston, Reg’l Supervisor, Office of Leasing & Plans, Bureau of
Ocean Energy Mgmt., to Susan Childs, Alaska Venture Support Manager, Shell (Nov. 29, 2013),
available
at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/
Leasing_and_Plans/Plans/Shell%20Chukchi%20Sea%20EP%20Rev%202%20Review%20Letter
.pdf.
512. See Letter from Susan Childs, Alaska Venture Support Manager, Shell, to Bureau of
Ocean Energy Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Nov. 26, 2013), available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasin
g_and_Plans/Plans/2013-11-26_Shell_IOP.pdf. In addition, Shell has submitted a 2014 Integrated
Operations Plan. Id. The plan responds to one of the recommendations in the report that resulted
from DOI’s review of Shell’s 2012 problems. See DOI 60-DAY REPORT, supra note 416, at 2. Shell
has not responded to other recommendations, and the Department of the Interior has not completed
the Arctic safety standards called for in the report. See id. at 6–7.
513. Stanley Reed, After Weak Earnings, Shell Halts Plan to Drill in Alaska, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
30,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/business/international/shell-to-step-up-assetsales.html?_r=0.
514. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REVISED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE
EXPLORATION PLAN, CHUKCHI SEA, ALASKA (2014), available at http://www.boem.gov/EPPUBLIC-VERSION/.

1358

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:1271

ongoing remand resulting from the invalidation of the Lease Sale 193
EIS.
VI. WHAT’S NEXT
With that history as background, we look next to the future. Rather
than prognosticating, however, the Article offers steps that can and
should be taken to help avoid mistakes like those that have plagued Shell
and to provide protection for the health and resiliency of the U.S. Arctic
Ocean.
The United States is at a crossroads with regard to energy, the environment, and human activities in the Arctic Ocean. Government approvals have led to millions of acres of leases controlled by oil companies,
and those companies are seeking approvals to drill exploration wells.515
As explained above, these decisions have led to controversy, litigation,
and substantial risk to the marine environment. Despite consistent efforts
over nearly ten years, companies have not been able to complete any exploration drilling, and newly available sources of unconventional fuels
coupled with increasingly likely regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
create significant uncertainty as to the market need and price to support
industry investments in the U.S. Arctic Ocean.516
The United States has been down this road before; approvals in the
1980s led to some exploratory drilling but no development, and a decline
in oil prices led companies to forego the leases they had purchased.517 In
this section, we distill some of the reasons for this apparent boom-andbust cycle and the controversy it has generated. We then provide some
steps that could be taken to improve the decision-making process and,
hopefully, lead to a durable solution that maintains a healthy and diverse
Arctic marine environment.
A. Lessons Learned
As the preceding sections demonstrate, the United States has had a
troubling history in its efforts to balance the exploitation of Arctic resources while trying to respect and protect wildlife and local communities. Controversy and litigation have met almost every single government
decision related to offshore activities, and there is the appearance that
political considerations factor into decisions about public resources.
515. See, e.g., supra Part V.B.1.
516. See, e.g., OCEANA ET AL., FROZEN FUTURE: SHELL’S ONGOING GAMBLE IN THE U.S.
ARCTIC (2014), available at http://oceana.org/en/news-media/publications/reports/frozen-futureshell-s-ongoing-gamble-in-the-us-arctic.
517. See supra text accompanying notes 179–80.
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Fundamentally, these problems can be attributed to (1) the failure to ensure necessary preparedness to operate in a difficult and remote places;
(2) the lack of community involvement; and (3) the need for more specific policy direction for making decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
First, of course, it is clear that the Arctic is a challenging place in
which to conduct industrial activities. As Shell’s experiences in 2012
demonstrate, even one of the world’s largest companies did not appropriately appreciate or manage these risks. Importantly, however, the problems are not solely attributable to Shell. The government granted the approvals that allowed an unprepared company to operate in the Arctic
Ocean. Moreover, the government took ill-advised planning steps—in
the Five-Year Leasing Program, at the lease sale stage, and during courtordered remands of those decisions—that provided the leases and momentum for the company to seek those approvals. It is not clear that the
government balanced risks and benefits appropriately or that sufficient
forethought was given to the ramifications of decisions at the planning
and lease sale stages. Allowing companies to purchase leases they are not
prepared to explore safely creates a situation in which Shell’s poorly
planned and executed 2012 efforts can occur. Once companies have invested in leases and equipment, there is an overriding need to demonstrate to shareholders a return on that investment. Proving the reserves by
drilling successful exploration wells is one important way companies can
achieve this goal. Thus, allowing companies to purchase leases creates a
powerful incentive for those companies to explore, which in turn can
create pressure on the government to approve those plans.
Second, fundamental decisions about the expansion of oil and gas
activities in Arctic waters have been made behind closed doors without
meaningful opportunity for the public—and especially local community
members—to participate. Regulations do not require public review of
exploration plans, Environmental Assessments, or oil spill response
plans. Even some of the public hearings that have been held were inefficient and problematic.518 Though improvements have been made, more
remains to be done to fully incorporate the public and communities in the
decision-making process.
Third, it seems clear that the relevant government agencies do not
have adequate, specific direction to address subsistence and environmental issues when conditions are uncertain. Decisions were made to allow
oil and gas leasing and exploration despite widely recognized gaps in the
518. Dan Joling, Drilling Advocates Dominate Federal Offshore Hearing, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.adn.com/2011/02/26/1723933/drilling-advocates-dominateoffshore.html.
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scientific understanding of the functioning of the marine environment
and ways in which it might respond to disturbance.519 Similarly, oil spill
response plans were approved even though the technology being used
had never been tested in Arctic conditions, and the assumptions underlying the plans were at odds with all of the historical evidence.520 Some of
these decisions led to clear violations of the law.521 Others were based on
new interpretations of the law that are still being challenged in court or
on legal interpretations from other venues applied to the Arctic.522 There
was no clear direction for precaution in the face of scientific or other uncertainty.
Together, these failures have had three overlapping effects that
have led to the current state of controversy and failed operations in the
Arctic. First, they have contributed to a substantial distrust of government decision makers. DOI, in particular, has appeared to make decisions that favor development rather than focus on science, holistic planning, or precaution.523 Second, these agency decisions have put marine
resources at substantial risk. The grounding of the Kulluk with 150,000
gallons of fuel on board is the most dramatic recent example. In addition,
Shell exceeded its permitted air emissions and water pollution discharge
requirements, putting workers at risk due to apparent safety violations.
Finally, poor decisions have led to significant uncertainty and inefficiency. By making the region available for leasing without proper evaluation of the potential impacts, the government has created a situation in
which companies take financial risks and then advocate to government
regulators to allow activities that could validate those risks. Analyses
have shown that these risks to companies and the ocean are difficult to
quantify and manage.524 Differing views about the appropriate way to
balance risks to the environment against the purported benefits of allowing companies to explore and develop has resulted in controversy. This
519. See supra Part II.B.
520. See supra Part III.D.1.
521. See supra Parts V.B.1.b and V.B.3 (discussing 2007–12 Five-Year Leasing Program,
Lease Sale 193, and 2007 Exploration Plan litigation).
522. See supra Parts V.C.3.a–b (discussing challenges to spill response plan approvals, the
500-meter exclusion zone, and low-probability/high impact analysis for a major spill).
523. See DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 77–79 (detailing “[a]gency integrity
and pockets of corruption” and “[m]ismanagement and [m]isdirection”); see also supra notes 360–
62 and accompanying text (discussing failure to consider appropriately agency scientists’ concerns
about the potential for significant effects from Shell’s proposed 2007–2009 exploration plan); see
also note 331 and accompanying text (discussing the agency’s failure to fully address missing scientific information in compliance with 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 in deciding to offer nearly thirty million
acres of the Chukchi Sea in Lease Sale 193).
524. See LLOYD’S REPORT, supra note 131.
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controversy has contributed to expense, inefficiency, and distrust. A
more careful approach might have prevented it.
B. Moving Forward
Having identified several causes of the controversy and inefficiency
related to decisions about offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic
Ocean, we now turn to steps that can be taken to address these problems.
Government officials—in congress and in the Executive Branch—can
take
steps
to
effect
meaningful
change.
1. Congressional Action
Though it appears to be unlikely in the short-term, congressional
action would be the most comprehensive and effective way to address
the problems identified above. Congress should act to reform the process
by which decisions about Arctic oil and gas leasing, exploration, and development are made. Many proposals of this nature were made in the
wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill.525 Indeed, a series of deficiencies
in OCSLA have been identified, and changes have been suggested to
address them.526 Congress could take action that would ensure more effective compliance with NEPA, ensure that maintaining ocean health is
given the highest priority, require more effective public involvement and
interagency coordination, and improve spill response standards.527
More generally, there is no statute that provides general guidance
and philosophy for stewardship decisions about ocean resources in the
Arctic or elsewhere. Nor is there a broader statute providing a specific
mission for BOEM, BSEE, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue
(ONRR). Rather, those three agencies are left to implement OCSLA
without additional direction for ocean management. By contrast, for our
terrestrial territory, the Bureau of Land Management (a sub-agency within DOI), which oversees 245 million acres of federal land, is guided by
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act multiple use and sustained
yield objective.528 The U.S. Forest Service (within the Department of
Agriculture) manages roughly 190 million acres of land within the forest
system pursuant to a similar standard in the National Forest Management

525. See, e.g., Hartsig, supra note 202.
526. See generally id.; Michael LeVine & Andrew Hartsig, Management and Oversight of
Offshore Oil and Gas—The Need for Change, 42 TRENDS 1 (2010).
527. See, e.g., Hartsig, supra note 202, at 306–15.
528. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (2012)
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Act.529 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s manages over 150 million
acres in the National Wildlife Refuge System and is guided by the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act, which requires the
conservation, management, and restoration of refuge lands for the benefit
of present and future generations of Americans.530 Finally, the National
Park Service management of eighty-four million acres of National Parks
land is guided by the National Park Service Organic Act, which requires
conservation-oriented management of our parks with a focus on providing for the enjoyment by current and future generations.531
These statutes provide a basic structure within which the agencies
make public land decisions, and BOEM and BSEE’s piecemeal approach
to decisions reflects the absence of such guidance. OCSLA addresses
only choices about offshore oil and gas activities, and it is not designed
to provide stewardship for ocean ecosystems. The ideal federal law
would recognize, as we generally do for our terrestrial territory, that the
United States has an obligation to manage ocean resources not only for
the current generation of Americans but also for future generations. It
would ensure that the health and diversity of our marine waters is maintained and that development takes place only in a way that does not risk
ecosystem health or other human uses of the ocean. Such a statute would
complement OCSLA and provide broader direction to BOEM, BSEE,
and other agencies that make decisions about Arctic Ocean resources.
In the absence of such direction—and as explained above—the various federal agencies are left to implement different and often competing
mandates related to Arctic Ocean resources in a piecemeal fashion.
OCSLA addresses oil, gas, and mineral entry.532 The Magnuson–Stevens
Fishery Management and Conservation Act addresses fisheries.533 The
Marine Mammals Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act address sensitive and at-risk fish and wildlife species.534 The disparate
treatment of the Arctic under some of these laws highlights the need for
such legislation. Out of concern for the continued health and diversity of
fish and wildlife in Arctic waters, one agency—the National Marine
Fisheries Service—looked at the state of the science in the Arctic and
decided to close the federal waters to commercial fishing. Another agency—the Department of the Interior—looked at the same science and de529. 16 U.S.C. § 1600(3) (2012).
530. Id. § 668dd(a)(2).
531. Id. § 1.
532. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2014).
533. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1884 (2007).
534. Id.; Endangered Species Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1996), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2014).
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cided to offer wide swaths of the ocean for lease to the oil and gas industry and approves risky exploration proposals. Overarching legislation
might provide a vehicle through which to harmonize the various needs
related to the Arctic Ocean and help foster a productive future direction.
Unfortunately, congressional action to provide additional direction
that would alleviate the problem of piecemeal decision making does not
appear likely. Despite continued warning signs, including a natural gas
blowout and rig explosion at a shallow well in the Gulf of Mexico,535 the
legislation introduced in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill has
faded away. In its place, bills that would expand offshore leasing, remove important environmental safeguards, and prioritize oil and gas activities above all other uses of ocean resources have moved through the
House of Representatives.536
2. Executive Action
Within its existing statutory authority, the Executive Branch can
take steps that would (1) ensure that decisions are based on good scientific information and long-term planning; (2) improve transparency and
opportunities for public engagement; and (3) ensure demonstrated spill
response technologies. DOI has taken some steps to move in this direction, but more can and should be done.
a. Steps to Improve Planning, Public Engagement, and Response
The controversy and uncertainty outlined in this Article makes clear
that decisions have been made in a piecemeal fashion and without a clear
plan for the future of the Arctic region. Careful decisions require
thoughtful planning, and the government should think holistically about
how best to balance competing needs— including healthy oceans, affordable energy, national security, and financial benefits to corporations
and the American people—to create a vision for what it wants the Arctic
region to look like in fifty or 100 years into the future. Concrete guidelines could be created to help ensure that today’s decisions about industrial activities move us toward that vision.
An understanding of the marine ecosystem sufficient to predict and
mitigate potential impacts from industrial activities is integral to such a
535. See Hays, supra note 78.
536. See Offshore Energy and Jobs Act, H.R. 2231, 113th Cong. (2013). On a related note, the
mechanics of the federal budget process also inhibit informed agency decision making. The congressional system of appropriations makes it difficult for agencies to coordinate their science effort because, for example, ocean-related budget discussions and priority setting are spread throughout
multiple uncoordinated congressional committees.
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planning effort. That understanding can best be achieved through longterm baseline research and monitoring. Since the 1980s, studies in the
Arctic Ocean have not been guided by an overarching monitoring and
research plan. Instead, research priorities over the past several decades
have been guided by an assumption that enough was known about the
basics. DOI, therefore, focused “on more topical studies in smaller areas
to answer specific questions and fill identified information needs.”537
These applied research questions are important and have led to a better
understanding of specific issues, such as the bowhead whale migration
route in the fall through the Chukchi Sea. However continued monitoring
of key parameters is needed to understand whether the base of information gathered remains valid. Climate change has altered the region
dramatically over the last thirty years, and ecosystems have significant
variability on yearly to decadal spans.
The most efficient way to obtain the needed information is through
a comprehensive research and monitoring program that would do the
following:
1. Integrate existing information to give a more holistic picture of
what is known and conduct an analysis of the gaps in information to determine the most pressing research and monitoring
needs;
2. Gain a more comprehensive catalogue of identified species,
populations, and habitats, including seasonal migrations;
3. Track the physical forcing factors that modulate biological
productivity, habitat occupancy, and migration pathways;
4. Secure a better understanding of trophic linkages, physical and
biological processes affecting productivity and other facets of
ecosystem structure and functioning, and effects of anthropogenic perturbations;
5. Study potential ecological and sociological impacts; and
6. Integrate these scientific data to identify Important Ecological
Areas, as well as processes and habitats that are sensitive and
vulnerable to perturbation, and furnish a basis for marine spatial
planning.

537. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION, & ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, ALASKA OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF REGION, ALASKA ANNUAL STUDIES PLAN FINAL
FY 2011 3 (2010), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Environmental
_Stewardship/Environmental_Studies/Alaska_Region/Alaska_Studies_Plan/2011AlaskaStudiesPlan.
pdf.
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Such a plan must also account for the climate change consequences of
decisions to explore. Atmospheric levels of CO2 recently exceeded
400ppm,538 and the disproportionate effects of the changes caused by
those increases must be taken into account.
As explained below, the government has started to take some of
these steps to consider integrated Arctic management, and more can be
done.539
The planning proposed here can be undertaken without congressional action. Moreover, in this planning process—and in other decisions—it is vitally important to provide ample opportunity for public
engagement and to make public the information needed to participate
meaningfully. DOI could address these problems by allowing for public
input in a timely manner on environmental assessments, spill plans, and
other approvals. Moreover, government agencies can and should do more
to engage those most affected by decisions. For example, several Alaska
Native tribes in the U.S. Arctic are urging the federal government to take
the following actions:
1. Develop a “comprehensive and scientifically proven mitigation
and monitoring plan . . . to provide oversight to Arctic industrial activities that could impact our food security, way of life, and
the health of our peoples. . . .”540
2. Commit to formal consultation with tribes in determining the
deferral areas and other measures to protect “important cultural,
biological, and subsistence use areas of the Arctic Ocean ecosystem to ensure . . .food security, cultural identity, and protect
our way of life.”541
3. Place on hold any new leasing in the U.S. Arctic until the comprehensive plan is created and implemented, deferral areas are
imposed, and, importantly, when it is determined that “development can be done without jeopardizing the safety of nearby
villages, food security, and the migratory animals that [t]ribes
depend upon.”542

538. Geoffrey Mohan, Carbon Dioxide Levels in Atmosphere Pass 400 Milestone, Again, L.A.
TIMES (May 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/20/science/la-sci-sn-carbon-dioxide400-20130520.
539. See infra VI.B.2.b.
540. 160 CONG. REC. E556 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2014).
541. Id.
542. Id.
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Providing meaningful opportunity for local people to influence decisions
about the Arctic before they are made is critical to ensuring that the human rights of people in the Arctic are respected and honored by the United States.
Moreover, participating effectively in the decision-making process
requires access to information. President Obama has committed to create
“an unprecedented level of openness in Government” and “a system of
transparency, public participation, and collaboration.”543 Consistent with
this directive, DOI can and should make available to the public data,
studies, and other information relevant to decisions about oil and gas
leasing and exploration in the Arctic Ocean. Relatively simple steps—
like publishing letters, approvals, and data on agency websites and committing to accepting public comments on exploration and spill response
plans (as was the case for Shell’s Chukchi and Beaufort Sea plans)—are
not routine and would go a long way toward building trust, improving
public participation in the decision-making process, and fulfilling President Obama’s pledge to ensure openness in government. Similarly,
BSEE should post its enforcement activities544 and make data from incidents and near-misses, including causal information, available to the
public. Last, any information BSEE has or learns about significant international offshore incidents—particularly those regarding operators in the
United States like Shell—should be posted on its website.
Oil spill prevention and response technology should also be developed and proven in Arctic conditions, and the necessary infrastructure
should be put in place before more leasing or exploration occurs in U.S.
Arctic waters. As explained above, there has been extensive and ongoing
controversy surrounding the available response technologies, the lack of
infrastructure, and the fact that none of the response equipment has been
tested successfully in Arctic conditions. It is well within the administration’s authority to require such testing prior to approval of response plans
or exploration plans. As explained above, the administration has relied
on an overly restrictive interpretation of Clean Water Act regulations.545

543. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec. Dept’s & Agencies,
Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-12.pdf.
544. For a good example of posting enforcement activities, see Recent Enforcement Actions,
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN.,
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/public/enforcement (last updated Mar. 21, 2014) (the posting of pipeline
safety enforcement orders).
545. See supra notes 438–46 and accompanying text (discussing challenge to Shell’s oil spill
response plans).
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b. Mechanisms and Opportunities
The changes outlined above would go a long way to ensuring that
decisions affecting the Arctic Ocean are made in a holistic, inclusive
manner that, in turn, would bolster informed decision making and also
reduce controversy and risk. As explained below, the Obama administration, and DOI in particular, have taken some steps to move in this direction. Though there is more to be done, these changes evidence the administration’s authority to take meaningful action.
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon accident, DOI dissolved the
Minerals Management Service and replaced it with BOEM, BSEE, and
ONRR. These agencies then implemented some safety and oversight
changes.546 None of these changes, however, went as far as the National
Commission on the Deepwater Horizon and Offshore Drilling recommended.547 Nor were they sufficient to prevent the accidents and neardisaster caused by Shell in 2012.
Recently, DOI committed to implementing Arctic-specific stand548
ards. This commitment came in part as a result of Shell’s 2012 drilling
season,549 and it reflects the clear necessity to account for the unique difficulties of operating in the Arctic Ocean. While a step in the right direction, the new rules do not address planning or leasing. DOI can and
should think more broadly about reforming its regulations to address
shortcomings in the existing regulatory regime that generate ambiguity,
uncertainty, and controversy. In addition to developing regulations concerning containment systems, relief well capability, mutual assistance
and resource sharing, and technical drilling issues, BOEM and BSEE
should develop regulations to achieve the following:
1. Implement additional Arctic-specific spill prevention and response regulations, such as those detailed in the comments
submitted on June 21, 2013, by the Pew Charitable Trusts;
2. Provide specific direction for satisfying the agency’s balancing
obligations under section 18 of OCSLA and codify the “target-

546. See supra Part III.F.2.
547. See The Offshore Energy and Jobs Act: Hearing on H.R. 2231 Before the H. Comm. on
Natural Res., 113th Cong. 4–6 (2013) (written testimony of Donald F. Boesch, President of the
Univ. of Maryland Ctr. for Envtl. Sci. to the Comm. on Energy and Natural Res.), available at
http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/boeschtestimony06-10-13.pdf.
548. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Department of the Interior Releases Assessment
of Shell’s 2012 Arctic Operation (Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/
pressreleases/department-of-the-interior-releases-assessment-of-shells-2012-arctic-operations.cfm.
549. See DOI 60-DAY REPORT, supra note 416, at 6–7.
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ed leasing” approach to Arctic leasing described in the 2012–
2017 OCS leasing program;
Clarify the roles and responsibilities of BOEM and BSEE and
formalize the process and timing of various permit approvals
(e.g., formalize mandatory public comment periods for oil spill
response plans, environmental assessments, and associated
analyses; clarify that BOEM will not approve a proposed exploration plan until there is an accompanying approved oil spill response plan, etc.);
Explain how the agencies will comply with NEPA requirements at each stage of the OCS process in the Arctic (e.g., at
the exploration plan stage, require completion of a full NEPA
process before BOEM may deem an exploration plan complete);
Develop public disclosure requirements for information concerning seismic exploration, drilling operations, inspections and
compliance, and other activities;
Ensure that BOEM properly accounts for externalities, including climate change effects and other impacts associated with
activities approved on the OCS.550

More broadly, the Obama Administration has implemented changes
that provide the opportunity for meaningful planning. President Obama
created the National Ocean Council and implemented a National Ocean
Policy.551 The Arctic is singled out as a priority area in this planning process, and the National Ocean Council created an Arctic Strategic Plan
and intends to implement it.552 These documents outline steps that can be
taken to improve planning, decision making, and science for the Arctic
Ocean.
Similarly, President Obama created the Interagency Working Group
on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in
Alaska “[t]o formalize and promote ongoing interagency coordina550. See Letter from Ocean Conservancy, Oceana, & Audubon Alaska, to Tommy Beaudeau,
Acting Assistant Sec’y of the Interior (June 21, 2013) (on file with author).
551. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023 (July 19, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-stewardship-ocean-our-coasts-andgreat-lakes.
552. See generally NAT’L OCEAN COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CHANGING
CONDITIONS IN THE ARCTIC STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN FULL CONTENT OUTLINE (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/sap_8_arctic_full_content_outline_0602-11_clean.pdf.
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tion . . . [and] facilitate coordinated and efficient domestic energy development and permitting in Alaska while ensuring that all applicable
standards are fully met.”553 That entity has begun “charting an ecosystem-based management framework for the Alaska Arctic that would focus on particularly important ecological areas that support special wildlife, land or water resources, as well as areas important for the subsistence and culture of local communities.”554 As part of this effort, Interagency Working Group produced a report explaining steps that could be
taken to move toward integrated management for the Arctic.555
At the end of the day, however, these steps have not ensured the
forethought and planning needed to prevent controversy, litigation, and
risk. In part that failure may be attributed to the Obama Administration’s
repeated commitment to allowing exploration.556 Prior commitment to
certain risky activities is, of course, antithetical to a thoughtful planning
process.
More fundamentally, however, these efforts provide some cause for
optimism and underscore the Executive Branch’s authority to change the
manner in which decisions are made. None of the actions laid out in this
section require changes in existing laws or other congressional approvals—other than possible budget authorizations.557 A holistic look at these
steps and an effort to incorporate them into one vision for the region and
a set of principles to guide decisions into the future is well within the
Executive Branch’s authority.
Such an effort would improve certainty and clear and objective action standards, which would go a long way ensuring protection of the
marine environment, reducing risk and controversy, and improving decision making. At the end of the day, industry could benefit from that type
of certainty. In its decision not to pursue Arctic drilling in 2014, ConocoPhillips emphasized this exact point and was backed up by Jack
Gerard of the American Petroleum Institute who commented that the oil

553. Exec. Order No. 13,580, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,989, 41,989 (July 11, 2011).
554. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Senior Federal Officials Begin Charting an
Ecosystem-Based Management Framework for the Alaska Arctic (Mar. 6, 2012), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Senior-Federal-Officials-Begin-Charting-an-EcosystemBased-Management-Framework-for-the-Alaska-Arctic.cfm.
555. See INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. REPORT, supra note 43.
556. See Pfeiffer, supra note 189 (showing that high-level administration officials have stated
that the Obama Administration will allow exploration drilling in the Arctic as part of the “all-of-theabove” energy strategy).
557. See, e.g., Press Release, Comm. on Natural Res., House Votes to Halt Funding for Obama
Administration’s Mandatory Ocean Zoning (May 9, 2012), available at http://naturalresources.house
.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=294808.
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companies “have to look at political risk [which is] high when there is
regulatory uncertainty.”558
VII. CONCLUSION
As this history suggests, decisions about Arctic Ocean oil and gas
leasing and exploration have been made in a piecemeal fashion, without
the necessary scientific information, comprehensive planning, or appropriate guidance. These decisions appear to have been unduly influenced
by national and international politics, resulting in substantial controversy.
An examination of the historical context in which Arctic oil and gas activities have been advanced in the United States reveals that the United
States can find ways to make better, more informed, and more grounded
decisions about development in the Arctic. The first steps in that process
would be to improve planning, scientific understanding, preparedness,
and public involvement in order to create a lasting vision for the Arctic
Ocean. Implementing those changes is the best path toward management
of the U.S. Arctic Ocean that protects all of its tangible and intangible
values, ensures sustainability, and is respectful of local people, industry,
and concerned members of the more general public.

558. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, ConocoPhillips Puts Arctic Drilling Plans on Hold, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.adn.com/2013/04/10/2859931/conocophillips-puts-arcticdrilling.html (quoting Jack Gerard, head of the American Petroleum Institute).

